Mr. Eric Scott Royce has gone to the trouble of compiling the voting records of every Senator and Congressman for 1973, listing their votes on 25 key measures in each House, and judging and rating them from a libertarian point of view. Every libertarian interested in politics will want a copy (available for $1.50 from Libertarian Information Service, Box 31638, Aurora, Colo. 80011.) My major quarrel with Mr. Royce is that in his rating system based on the data he treats an absent vote as equivalent to a wrong vote from the libertarian point of view. My own rating system simply ignores absences and lists the number of favorable votes. Mr. Royce’s methodology treats indifference or illness as equivalent to aggressive evil, which I can’t quite bring myself to do. (The only exception he makes is with poor old mugging victim Senator Stennis, who would otherwise have acquired a close zero libertarian rating for being on a sickbed. But if Stennis is exempt, why not others?)

In my own rating system for Senators (leaving the House members to Mr. Royce), I have taken Royce’s 25 votes, and added to them a listing and judgment on an additional 13 votes. Seven were omitted from Mr. Royce’s tabulation (continuing the Rural Electrification loan program and judgment on an additional 13 votes. Seven were omitted from Mr. Royce), I have taken Royce’s 25 votes, and added to them a listing exempt, why not others?)

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In my own rating system for Senators (leaving the House members to Mr. Royce), I have taken Royce’s 25 votes, and added to them a listing and judgment on an additional 13 votes. Seven were omitted from Mr. Royce’s tabulation (continuing the Rural Electrification loan program — libertarian vote is No; allowing the cities to use existing highway funds for mass transit — Yes; the rural environment assistance program — No; river and flood control program — No; airport development — No; allowing the Alaskan pipeline to be built — Yes; and lowering the minimum wage rate for teenagers — Yes); and five more came later than Mr. Royce’s July 31 cutoff date (the Trident program — No; overtax cuts — Yes; overriding Nixon’s veto of the war powers curtailment bill — Yes; the Emergency Energy Control Act — No; and government financing for Presidential campaigns — No). A special addition was a “negative vote” which I added for each of the ten bright and addle-pated Senators who went to the White House to bend the knee to their liege lord and to swear eternal fealty to Richard Nixon on Watergate (the Tomfool Ten: Curtis, Cotton, Fannin, Helms, Young, Bartlett, Thurmond, Tower, Bennett, and Hansen, all Republicans.) My own 13 votes added to Royce’s 25, make a total of 38 votes for the Senate. Instead of percentages, I have, in this Royce-Rothbard Report, grouped the Senators into categories, with their libertarian and anti-libertarian votes listed after each name. As compared to our ratings of the Senators in 1971-72 (Lib. Forum, Nov. 1972), we have, after poring over the voting charts, decided to add two categories to the list: “Fairly Good”, between “Good” and “Moderate”; and, for those whose evil is too great to be contained within the category “Excruciatingly Bad”, we have added the category “Super Bad.” Our list follows:

**Very Good:**
Scott (R., Va.) 24-10
Bartlett (R., Okla.) 26-12

**Good:**
Roth (R., Del.) 23-14
Byrd (D., Va.) 23-14
McClellan (D., Ark.) 21-13
Packwood (R., Ore.) 21-14
Hatfield (R., Ore.) 21-14

**Fairly Good:**
Fannin (R., Ariz.) 21-15
Bellmon (R., Okla.) 21-15
Buckley (R., N. Y.) 18-12
McClellan (R., Id.) 21-16
Helms (R., N. C.) 21-16
Brook (R., Tenn.) 20-16
Ervin (D., N. C.) 20-17

**Moderate:**
Hansen (R., Wyo.) 20-18
Bennett (R., Utah) 16-14
Nunn (D., Ga.) 19-17
Talmadge (D., Ga.) 19-18
Cranston (D., Calif.) 16-15
Goldwater (R., Ariz.) 11-11
Weicker (R., Conn.) 18-18
Curtis (R., Neb.) 19-19
Cotton (R., N. H.) 13-14
Hart (D., Mich.) 16-17
Hollings (D., S. C.) 18-19
Abourezk (D., S. D.) 16-17
Hruska (R., Neb.) 18-19
Bentsen (D., Tex.) 18-19
Hughes (D., Io.) 16-18
Proxmire (D., Wis.) 18-20
Church (D., Id.) 17-19
Johnston (D., La.) 16-18

**Bad:**
Dominick (R., Col.) 16-19
Stennis (D., Miss.) 3-6
Domenici (R., N. M.) 17-20
Eastland (D., Miss.) 14-18
Gurney (R., Fla.) 16-20
Thurmond (R., S. C.) 17-21
Clark (D., Io.) 16-21
Chiles (D., Fla.) 16-21
Nelson (D., Wis.) 16-21
Haskell (D., Colo.) 16-21
Taft (R., Oh.) 14-19
Griffin (R., Mich.) 16-20

**Very Bad:**
Mathias (R., Md.) 14-20
Saxbe (R., Oh.) 10-16
Mondale (D., Minn.) 13-20
Tunney (D., Calif.) 15-22
Case (R., N. J.) 15-22
Eagleton (D., Mo.) 13-20
Young (R., N. D.) 16-23
Bible (D., Nev.) 15-22
Beall (R., Md.) 15-22
Hathaway (D., Me.) 15-23
Stafford (R., Vt.) 17-21
Stevenson (D., Ill.) 15-23
Gravel (D., Alaska) 14-22
Bach (D., Ind.) 13-21
Schweicker (R., Pa.) 15-23
Tower (R., Tex.) 14-22
Metcalfe (D., Mont.) 13-24
Manสfield (D., Mont.) 13-22
Moss (D., Ut.) 13-24
Percy (R., Ill.) 14-23
Pell (D., R.I.) 15-24
Byrd (D., W. Va.) 15-24
Ribicoff (D., Conn.) 15-24
Kennedy (D., Mass.) 14-23
Aiken (R., Vt.) 14-23

**Excruciatingly Bad:**
Fulbright (D., Ark.) 9-19
Cannon (D., Nev.) 13-23
Dole (R., Kan.) 14-24
Symington (D., Mo.) 13-23
Huddleston (D., Ky.) 13-23
Burdick (D., N. D.) 13-24
Stevens (R., Alaska) 11-22
Randolph (D., W. Va.) 13-24
Fong (R., Haw.) 13-24
Inouye (D., Haw.) 13-24
Mastie (D., Me.) 11-22
Brooke (R., Mass.) 13-24
McGovern (D., S. D.) 13-24
Baker (R., Tenn.) 11-22
Biden (D., Del.) 10-22
Montoya (D., N. M.) 13-25
Williams (D., N. J.) 11-23
Javits (R., N. Y.) 12-24
Scott (R., Pa.) 13-24
Allen (D., Ala.) 12-25
Hartke (D., Ind.) 11-24
Magnuson (D., Wash.) 11-24
Sparkman (D., Ala.) 9-23

(Continued On Page 2)
Congress '73 —
(Continued From Page 1)

PEARSON (R., Kan.) 10-24
COOK (R., Ky.) 9-26

SUPER BAD:
McGEE (D., Wyo.) 4-25

Grouping the parties and categories together, we have, for the Republicans: Very Good — 2; Good — 3; Fairly Good — 6; Moderate — 7; Bad — 6; Very Bad — 10; Excruciatingly Bad — 9; Super Bad — 0. Travelling from the Good to the Bad end of the spectrum, the Republicans start low and gradually increase to reach a peak of 10 Senators at Very Bad, and 9 at Excruciatingly Bad. This record is bad enough, but is topped a long way by the Democrats, whose score is as follows: Very Good — 0; Good — 2; Fairly Good — 1; Moderate — 11; Bad — 6; Very Bad — 15; Excruciatingly Bad — 20; Super Bad — 2. The Democrats begin very low at the Good end of the spectrum, reach a minor peak at Moderate, and then soar up to 20 at Excruciatingly Bad. We can get a further idea by lumping the Goods and the Bads together, which gives us: Republicans: 11 Goodish, 7 Moderate, 25 Baddish; while the Democrats weigh in at: 3 Goodish, 11 Moderate, and no less than 68 Bad. spots changed hands, as our former heroes

How did the Senators fare as compared to the 1971-72 record? As a group, the Democrats scored about the same, and the Republicans did a bit better, raising their Goodish ranks from 8 to 11. Individually, the top spots changed hands, as our former heroes (?) Roth and Byrd (Va.) fell from the Very Good to the Good category, to be replaced by two freshmen: Bartlett and Scott (Va.) Of our current Goods, Hatfield raised himself from Moderate, while the two others in the Good ranks (Packwood and McClellan) managed to vault spectacularly up from the Very Bad. None of our former Goods fell that far, all dropping a bit into the ranks of the Fairly Good and the Moderate.

A particularly chilling note is the huge expansion of the very bottom end of the spectrum. In the last Congress, there were only 6 Excruciatingly Bad Senators; now there are 29 Excruciatingly Bad and 2 Super Bad, a truly appalling increase in the ranks of evil. Once again, of course, as last time, the absolutely worst Senator of all is Mr. Slate, Scoop Jackson.

Mr. Royce's report is particularly useful in giving us the tools to analyze the voting record of our avowedly libertarian freshman Congressman. Steve Symms (R., Idaho.) Symms did not run on the Libertarian Party line, but he was endorsed by the Libertarian Party of Idaho, is perhaps himself a party member, and at the very least is anxious to be considered as a libertarian purist. We owe it, both to the cause and to the individual himself, to scrutinize the record of any libertarian who achieves public office with the utmost vigilance. If we are to remain enthusiastic about Libertarian Party activity, we must meet the challenge of the LePervians and the other critics of political party efforts by treating our successful candidates with a microscopic scrutiny to see to it that they indeed remain pure. Any deviations from purity must be denounced with the utmost vigor. If we do not think of a Libertarian who wins a seat, better be very careful about voting for him.

Let us then examine Steve Symms' voting record on the Royce Report's 25 votes. We find, to our stunned horror, that Steve voted libertarian on only 18 measures, and voted anti-libertarian on no less than 7! What gives here? If we analyze the Seven Sins, we find that many of them fall into the broad category of the military-foreign policy-patriotic. The military-foreign-patriotic sphere is of course a grave and vital issue, here revealing that on the most important issue-area of our time, Steve is not a libertarian at all but an anti-libertarian Conservative. Let us list his deviant votes point by point:

1) Vote for a federal research subsidy to the National Science Foundation. Steve didn't Baily Harper send you literature against government subsidized and controlled science? What mighty science complex in Idaho requires bender principle here?

2) Vote for a bill to prohibit any further federal expenditure of funds for U. S. combat operations in Laos or Cambodia. What gives here? What big cities are there in Idaho that require federal aid to mass transit? What would Symphony have lost to oppose this piece of statism?

3) Vote for a federal housing subsidy to the National Science Foundation. Steve, didn't Baily Harper send you literature against government subsidized and controlled science? What mighty science complex in Idaho requires bender principle here?

4) Vote for a bill to prohibit any further federal expenditure of funds for U. S. combat operations in Laos or Cambodia. What gives here? What big cities are there in Idaho that require federal aid to mass transit? What would Symphony have lost to oppose this piece of statism?

5) Vote for a bill to prohibit any further federal expenditure of funds for U. S. combat operations in Laos or Cambodia. What gives here? What big cities are there in Idaho that require federal aid to mass transit? What would Symphony have lost to oppose this piece of statism?

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Are We Another Rome? — (Continued From Page 2)

analysis really useful or even justifiable?

The "grandeur that was Rome" has captivated the imagination of thoughtful men from the very days of the collapse of the Roman empire in the West during the fifth century. The very men who conquered Rome, the Germanic kings of the Franks and Ostrogoths and Vandals, etc., eagerly sought Roman titles and symbols of imperial dignity from the Roman emperors in Constantinople. Countless German kings, following the example of Charlemagne, sought the title of Emperor of the Romans, and wasted their lives and treasure, and those of their subjects, trying to give reality to the revered but illusory Roman empire of the middle ages. With the revival of the study of Roman law in the medieval universities in the 12th century, the kings and princes of Europe dreamt of the absolute power of Roman emperors, and insinuated whenever they could the principles and practices of Roman despotism into the laws and constitutions of their own feudalistic states.

But absolute monarchy in medieval times met three sources of vigorous resistance: first, from the Christian Church, especially under the vigorous leadership of such popes as Gregory VII, Innocent III and Boniface VIII. Ironically, it was the Papacy which resurrected the Roman imperial tradition when Pope Leo III crowned Charlemagne emperor in A. D. 800. But subsequent experience caused the Papacy to it was the Papacy which resurrected the Roman imperial tradition when Pope Leo III crowned Charlemagne emperor in A. D. 800. But subsequent experience caused the Papacy to reject the concept of an emperor in the West and to fight for the privileges of the pope in France. From Boniface VIII, the Papacy began to claim the title of 'pontifex maximus,' and to strive, with the aid of kings and barons, to establish the supremacy of the pope over all other earthly authorities. But the Papacy was not the only source of resistance to absolute monarchy. Secondly, the cumulative resistance of the forces of feudal society, based on a contractual and customary notion of rights and liberty, rather than rule by the arbitrary will of the prince, successfully prevented the development of absolute monarchy. The familiar story of the struggle between the evil king John and the barons and bishops of England climaxing with the publication of the Magna Carta has parallels throughout medieval Europe, and the later absolute monarchies which we associate with Louis XIV of France were possible only after the Christian Church had been rent asunder by the Protestant Reform, and kings were no longer dependent upon the feudal nobles for income and military services.

Thirdly, absolute monarchy and the Roman imperial tradition faced opposition from the newly emerging urban commercial class who established in Italy and elsewhere communal republics as an alternative to imperial and kingly domination. These bourgeoisie looked to the traditions of Republican Rome, rather than to the Rome of the Caesars. This viewpoint began among the Florentines of the fifteenth century, quickly found a welcome response from the Venetians and other Italians living in communal republics, and spread throughout Europe wherever similar political institutions were developing. Tentative criticisms of the Roman Caesarian tradition had first come from Petrarch. His Africa extolled the Carthaginians, and in a dream sequence, he mourned that Caesar had turned his "ever victorious hands against the flesh and blood of his own commonwealth, and stained his triumph over foreign enemies with the blood of citizens". Yet in a biography of Caesar, Petrarch is openly in awe of 'the bloody dictator.' But by 1440 a more common opinion among the Italian humanists is that of the Venetian Pietro da Monte who expressed his "frank detestation of Caesar, the infamous parricide," Hans Baron has brilliantly demonstrated the great significance of this Roman republican tradition in his masterpiece, The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance (Princeton, 1968). But by the year 1590, a humanist attached to the court of the Grand Duke of Tuscany would argue that "Rome was never as free as at the time when she lost her liberty" by which he sought to soothe the feelings of the liberty-loving Florentines now subjects of Medici princes.

It is especially important for us to note that there is not just one Roman tradition to which one can appeal for a usable past. In fact there are at least three Roman themes which have attracted the attention of orators and political pundits: first, the grandeur and achievement of the Roman empire — a multi-national political entity stretching at its zenith from the Irish Sea to the Tigris and Euphrates; from the Rhine and Danube to the Sahara and Sudan. This empire is traditionally justified as an agency for civilizing barbaric and unruly peoples, imposing upon them order and law — of world wide scope — the famous Pax Romana.

This tradition plays a continuing role in the consciousness of American leaders. In August 1965 the editors of Fortune — the house journal of America's ruling elite — openly acknowledged that, while no one had planned it that way, America had indeed acquired a world empire. And that our characteristic idealism made us willing to bear the great sacrifices which our world mission would entail. Among these sacrifices was the need to bear any burden to ensure peace and order in Asia, and Europe and everywhere else one assumes. With the ruling elites thus fortified for the great mission of empire, Fortune's fellow editors at Life soon created a multi-issue illustrated history of the greatness of Imperial Rome — civilatrix of the ungrateful barbarian nations. The clear message of this popularly directed propaganda was that the American people were privileged to take up the burden of perpetual war for perpetual peace, as had the ancient Romans.

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As historians become more familiar through archaeological research with the remains of Roman ruins in the provinces, the sterility and sameness of Roman material culture stands out in marked contrast to the abortive but vigorous remains of pre-conquest local cultures. What is seldom considered is the tremendous loss that may have occurred through the cultural genocide perpetrated by Roman imperial conquests. Only an occasional voice has filtered through to speak of the feelings of the conquered races.Tacitus records one such voice, that of a Briton whose people are about to be vanquished by Roman arms:

"Brigands of the world, they (the Romans) have exhausted the land by their indiscriminate plunder, and now theyransack the sea. The wealth of an enemy excites their cupidity; his poverty their lust of power. East and West have failed to glut their maw. They are unique in being as violently tempted to attack the poor as the wealthy. Robbery, butchery, rape, the liars call Empire; they create a desert and call it peace."

Tacitus, Agricola

Prof. Oscar Halecki, in his The Millenium of Europe (Notre Dame, 1961) rightly points out that the "Roman Peace" was an illusion, a myth.

"In addition to the permanent hostility with Persia, a source of endless conflicts, there was an equally permanent tension along the whole long European border. Even the reign of Augustus, which started with the closing of the temple of Janus and the dedication of the ara pacis in 9 B. C., was troubled in 9 A. D. by the disastrous defeat in the German war. . . . As conditions of life in subsequent centuries became much worse, and almost all parts of the once powerful empire suffered from uninterrupted warfare and destruction as a consequence of invasions and penetrations — uprisings and civil conflicts between armies of the empire; the bygone age of the Pax Romana seemed almost an ideal situation to which men would look back in times of even more troubles."

Halecki goes on to point out that

"following Roman precedent, all conquerors of future ages who had established their dictatorial rule at home and tried to force it upon one foreign country after another, were to justify their imperialistic policies by pretending that they would create a new and better order, putting an end to the
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rivalries among the troublesome smaller states and 
unifying large areas to the economic advantage of the 
populations. That fallacy reached its climax in the days of 
Hitler, whose Third Reich wanted to continue for the next 
millennium the imperial tradition which the first German 
empire had inherited from Rome".

As Halecki concludes:

Rome’s “unequivocal greatness and her amazing 
achievements in the first one or two centuries of the 
Christian era must not make us overlook the fact that the 
 imperial tradition is the most questionable part of our 
Greeco-Roman heritage, different from its highest, truly 
humanistic ideals, and that it is at the same time the part 
which is most difficult to reconcile with our Christian 
history.”

Halecki’s warning was echoed by the late Frank Meyer, one of the most 
thoughtful conservatives of our time. Meyer wrote an article in National 
Review in 1967 (Sept. 9) commenting upon Amaury de Riencourt’s widely 
discussed analysis of postwar Europe and America entitled The Coming 
Caesars. De Riencourt, as a European, saw America as the New Rome 
whose Caesars with their atomic armed legions would create a new world 
order ushering in universal peace and progress but at the expense of 
liberty. Americans were, like the Romans, “iron, soulless 
administrators” who had arisen in the late summer of a culture to 
preserve order and the civilized forms when the creative heart has gone 
out of the society.

Significantly, Meyer rejected the analogy between Rome and America. 
First of all, he identified America’s true political ideals more closely 
with the individualism and love of personal freedom of the Greeks rather 
than the collectivist penchant for order of the Romans. And he found one 
overwhelming defect in the Roman analogy: Western civilization is 
unlike that of Rome; it is essentially different since “it is based on the 
Christian vision of the innate value of the human person and of his 
freedom under God”. As Meyer concluded, “If the Caesars come, borne 
on the wave of mediocrity, it will not be because America imposed them 
on Europe, but because in neither continent have there been enough men 
dedicated to truth and freedom to resist them”.

It is disturbing to note that two of the most notable liberal critics of 
American foreign policy, Senators Fulbright and McCarthy, have failed 
to base their critiques on the firm basis suggested by Halecki or Meyer — 
the moral defect in any imperialist tradition. McCarthy’s book, The 
Limits of Power, and Fulbright’s collection of essays entitled The 
Arrogance of Power, center their argument on the pragmatic questioning 
of whether we have tried to exercise an imperial sway beyond the 
capacity of our resources. This argument is essentially a reflection of the 
great 18th century historian of Rome’s decline and fall, Edward Gibbon, who 
 wrote:

“The decline of Rome was the natural and inevitable effect of 
immoderate greatness: the causes of destruction multiplied with the extent of conquest; Prosperity ripened 
the principle of decay and as soon as time or accident had 
removed the artificial supports, the stupendous fabric 
yielded to the pressure of its own weight.”

Rome then was at the end reduced to “a pitiful helpless giant” — to 
borrow a current phrase.

Clearly this liberal critique of empire is doomed to failure. Who can say 
with assurance what the “limits of American power” are? Or how much 
greatness is immoderate? Does anyone publicly suggest that America 
become anything less than the greatest power on earth? Not if he wants 
to get elected to political office. An appeal to the fate of the fall of the 
Roman empire must fail also on the most obvious pragmatic ground. The 
Roman empire lasted for five centuries or so. And there is not a 
political soldier, statesman, corporate executive or bankor in the 
mediat-industrial complex that rules this society who wouldn’t settle for 
a fraction of that timespan for America’s empire.

A second tradition frequently used by those who look to Rome for their 
rhetorical analogies is that Rome “fell” because of moral decay brought 
on by luxury and vice. Here again Gibbon may be consulted for his view that 
“prosperity hastened the principle of decay”. This was also a 
favorite ploy of classical historians. It can be used in a variety of 
interesting ways according to the occasion. Puritans use it to denote 
those who spend money in ways they disapprove: socialiasts denounce 
the mal-distribution of wealth; conservatives complain about the Roman 
policy of “bread and circuses” for the masses as the very thing that 
Rome’s destruction. All this is such nonsense that it was inevitable that it would 
capture the fervid imagination of Richard Nixon. Speaking to a group of 
130 newspapermen in Kansas City in July 1971, our beloved Leader said 
that when he looks at the pseudo-classical architecture of Washington, “I 
think of seeing them in Greece and Rome and I think of what happened to 
the great civilizations of the past. As they became wealthy, as they lost 
their will to live, to improve, they became subject to the decadence that 
destroys a civilization. The United States is reaching that period.” It 
makes you wonder if Nixon isn’t trying to destroy the prosperity of the 
economy deliberately in order to save us from ourselves!

The third theme derived from Roman experience is the tradition of the 
Roman republic. It has been seen as a self-governing and liberty loving 
society. The Florentine humanists of the 15th century were the first to 
exploit the astily republican aristocratic tradition of Rome exemplified in 
the works of Cicero, Livy and Tacitus, much of whose work was common 
to previous generations. This republican tradition thrived on libertarian 
assets of the Republican regime and compared its virtues and liberal 
values to the sterility and despotism of the later Roman imperial regime. 
To these Florentines, trying to preserve their communal republic from 
the tyranny of Renaissance despotism. Brutus was the great hero of the last 
age of the Republic, and the Caesars were the villains. It was this 
tradition that animated some of the American revolutionaries like 
Patrick Henry who reminded his audience in the House of Burgesses that 
Caeasar had his Brutus, and Charles I his Cromwell, and that George III 
might profit by their example.

The founding fathers of the American Republic were well educated 
mens, and in that age that meant well educated in classical literature. A 
reading of the Federalist papers reveals the ease with which Hamilton, 
Jay and Madison summoned the events and personalities of ancient 
Greece and Rome to argue their case for the new constitution.

Madison, for instance, found that “the liberties of Rome were the final 
victims of her military triumphs” and warned that a standing army was 
as dangerous as it was possibly necessary. “On the smallest scale it has 
its inconveniences, on an extensive scale, its consequences may be fatal” 
as in the case of Rome’s Republic.

At first sight, the Republican tradition of Rome might appear to be a 
useful device against the tyranny towards Caesarism — which is a fourth 
Roman tradition which has beguiled all men who lusted for power over 
their fellow humans. But the republican tradition has its own inherent 
limitations for us. Sir Ronald Syme points out that:

“... in all ages, whatever the form and name of government, 
be it monarchy, republic or democracy, an oligarchy lurks 
behind the facade; and Roman history, republican or 
 imperial, is the history of a governing class . . . . Liberty 
and the laws are high sounding words. They will often be 
rendered, on a cool estimate, as privilege and vested 
interests.” (Sir Ronald Syme in The Roman Revolution 
(Oxford 1938))

And it should be remembered that the civil wars which brought the 
downfall of the Roman Republic were a struggle for power and offices 
in the aristocracy. If the victors happened to be rhetorical 
champions of the “people”, they did not radically reorder the structure of 
Roman society. Human slavery remained a basic institution in society; 
the masses of citizens remained politically disenfranchised; the lower 
classes remained subject to the arbitrary will of the ruling aristocracy — 
occasionally renewed by fresh blood and hungry for the privileges that 
the rulers of Rome always enjoyed. After the fall of the Republic and a new 
senatorial aristocracy, lacking the pride and tradition of liberty of the 
old, kept their mouths shut and enjoyed the profits of their new-born 
power under the dictatorship of the Emperors.

I remain skeptical of the value of using any of the major themes of 
Roman history as political propaganda in our contemporary situation. 
First, there is little in the history of the Roman empire’s long rule to 
convince any one that we should abandon our own imperial destiny. 

(Continued On Page 5)
The Machinery Of Friedman
By Joseph Salerno

In The Machinery of Freedom, David Friedman bases his apology for anarcho-capitalism on solely "practical" considerations. In so doing, he eschews the bedrock foundation of the natural rights ethic and rests his theoretical structure on the dangerously shifting sands of utilitarianism. All this, we are told, to avert the popular disapproval that attends ethical vis a vis practical concerns. Consequently, we find Mr. Friedman in chapter 34 equitably discussing the production and utilization of retaliatory nuclear weapons in a free society, without recognition of the moral problem entailed in the very existence of weapons of indiscriminate mass annihilation. But this particular shortcoming bears an integral relation to an overriding general flaw in Friedman's exposition.

In essaying to banish ethics from the purview of his analysis, Friedman has effected a monstrous bifurcation between anarcho-capitalism and libertarianism. He posits an anarcho-capitalist society in a political and ethical vacuum, and then goes on to analyze law "production" in economic terms, blithely unaware of his transgression against the most elemental dictates of common sense. For it is absurd to assume the existence of the economic institutions of anarcho-capitalism outside the politico-ethical framework of libertarianism. An objective, libertarian exposition of a morally tenable ethical position by default, while libertarians myopically scurry about seeking evanescent victories in disjointed skirmishes. This strategy will doom libertarians to long run failure and transmogrifications, a doctrine with explicitly normative underpinnings. No doubt Friedman would even have us believe that the intense conflagration enveloping the abortion issue was ignited by arsonists bereft of moral convictions. So let us not decapitate the beauteous corpus of libertarian doctrine, but rather strengthen and purify the ethical underpinnings. No doubt Friedman would even have us believe that the intense conflagration enveloping the abortion issue was ignited by arsonists bereft of moral convictions. So let us not decapitate the beauteous corpus of libertarian doctrine, but rather strengthen and purify the ethical underpinnings.

Let us now proceed to an examination of the substance of Friedman's analysis. Here his errors are dishearteningly numerous and grievous. The first of three sections of the book is given over to a utilitarian defense of anarcho-capitalism on solely "practical" considerations. In so doing, he eschews the bedrock foundation of the natural rights ethic and rests his theoretical structure on the dangerously shifting sands of utilitarianism. All this, we are told, to avert the popular disapproval that attends ethical vis a vis practical concerns. Consequently, we find Mr. Friedman in chapter 34 equitably discussing the production and utilization of retaliatory nuclear weapons in a free society, without recognition of the moral problem entailed in the very existence of weapons of indiscriminate mass annihilation. But this particular shortcoming bears an integral relation to an overriding general flaw in Friedman's exposition.

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The Machinery Of Friedman —
(Continued From Page 5)

legitimate recipients of vouchers.

It is on this last point that Friedman overtly abandons libertarian doctrine. He contends that it is necessary for the state to obstruct into the educational system via the enforcement of standards of qualification, in order "to prevent parents from setting up fake schools in order to transfer the voucher money to their own pockets." But why David should parents set up fake schools and transfer money to their own pockets? Is it not simply reclaiming stolen money from a thief? Why should parents be compelled to send their offspring even to a gloriously competitive school system? Why not clamor for the state to cease forthwith and in toto its interventions in the educational process, surely a cause more worthy of libertarian time and effort than the implementation of the voucher plan? And why, David, is it necessary to confront you, a self-proclaimed libertarian, with such queries?

As for Friedman's contention that the voucher system is preferable to a system of tax rebates because it provides the poor with greater benefits, one can only point out that it is based on egalitarian, and not libertarian considerations. One might also refer Mr. Friedman to the question of the provision of goods and services to the poor in a competitive free economy. He has received in the works of various libertarian theorists e.g. Rothbard, Hospers, etc.

In chapter 12 and 13 Friedman argues that the present hierarchically-structured university will give way to radically decentralized, "free market" institutions and tutors in a free society. First of all, one must question whether it is proper to attempt to prognosticate the exact configuration of a given market i.e. the market for higher education. After all it depends on a great extent on the configuration of consumer demand, a scientifically unpredictable variable. If market participants desire a university where the board of trustees, alumni and faculty to varying degrees set policy and formulate the curriculum without student participation, institutions of this type will preponderate on the free market. The libertarian qua libertarian can say no more about it. This raises the question of the propriety of Friedman's designation of the particular type of institution he favors as "free market," This leaves us with the ridiculous inference that the presently constituted university, which we as saw above could exist on a purely free market, is somehow inferior to the market institutions.

Chapter 14 is a rather mawkish entreaty for the abolition of immigration laws. What is astounding is Friedman's solution to the potentially distorted influx of immigrants which could be caused by the relatively minuscule welfare benefits provided by the American State. Instead of rectifying the problem by calling for an end to the whole kit and kaboodle, he suggests incorporating a fifteen year national residency requirement into the present welfare system. He also succeeds in obscuring the distinction between the libertarian position regarding government interdiction of immigration, and immigration itself. Libertarianism makes no judgement as to whether immigration per se is a good thing. In a free society it is conceivable that immigration would be restricted by private property owners e.g. road owners, stockholders or residents of private communities, ship companies etc.

In chapter 17 Friedman again deviates from libertarian principles by formulating a plan to decentralize local government and thereby ameliorate the inefficiency that has been plaguing it. Understandably, libertarians are in sympathy with any reduction in the size of a governmental unit, provided it is attended by a reduction in government power and control over the individual. Needless to say this does not imply that libertarians should favor the streamlining of government as an end in itself, especially if it results in a greater efficiency in government coercion e.g. tax reforms that provide the state with greater revenues and b. decreasing popular discontent with government. Thus it is disconcerting to find a libertarian outlining a blueprint for the more efficient functioning of local government, complete with a proposal for the most efficient method of setting tax rates and collecting revenues.

This is repellent enough, but must be partake in the bureaucratic assault on linguistic integrity and the artificial creation of symbols and serve up us the likes of "subcities" and "mini-mayors"?

In chapter 23 we encounter a cavalier dismissal of the 1968 Paris revolt as socialistic and comparable in motivation to the occupation of Prague by Soviet armor. Friedman exhibits a total lack of cognition of the issues involved. He ignores the gruesomely meticulous regulation of all aspects of economic and social life by the fascistic French government, and the stratified caste structure of French society, as well as the incipient anarchism of many of the student rebels. Further on in the chapter, Friedman's egalitarian predilections again surface when he asserts that the greater the dispensation of wealth in a given society, the better would it's economy approximate a free enterprise economy. This is a fallacious proposition. Two societies, possessing widely differing distributions of wealth and income, could both theoretically qualify as purely free societies. The determining characteristic is the presence or absence of coercive relations among men. The fact that empirically societies with relatively free economies tend to possess a greater equality in the distribution of wealth and income does not ameliorate the inefficiency that has been plaguing it. Understandably, libertarians should favor the streamlining of government as an end in itself, especially if it results in a.

The third section of the book is for the most part an exposition of the nature, function and viability of anarcho-capitalist institutions. The general lines of the analysis, which views the existing anarcho-capitalist institutions outside a politico-ethical framework, have been criticized above. It remains for us to evaluate particular aspects of the positive analysis.

Friedman grounds his discussion of the problem of national defense on the spurious concept of a collective or public good. Here one can do no more than recommend Professor Rothbard's brilliant and definitive demolition of the collective good, and the closely related, external benefits fallacies in Man Economy and State. It is suffice it to say that crippled in its inception, Friedman's analysis cannot but lead to lame conclusions. Our expectations are borne out when we are apprised that: 1. Neither government nor market can provide us with a "perfect" solution to the national defense problem. 2. As a matter of fact, there is a good chance that the market may perform more imperfectly than government, and lo and behold "by a freak of fate" a vestigial state may be "temporarily useful." 3. Anyway he (David) would rather pay taxes to Washington than Moscow. And so the closetarchist emerges.

On the subject of revolution, Friedman demonstrates libertarians to abjure the tactic of civil disruption. This is a fine position for a libertarian to take, but one must remember that it is a function of strategic and not moral considerations. The absolute moral right to defend oneself against aggression, whoever the perpetrators, is freely ceded to the individual by libertarian ethics. The decision to exercise this right, however, depends on many considerations, such as the available weapons, the enormity of the aggression, the strength of the aggressor, the long run prospects of success etc. These considerations apply to state as well as private aggression. Thus it is today that any defensive violence breaks out, but we can oppose the American State with popular support, would surely be premeditated and result in a catastrophic setback to the movement and its goals. This is not to say that revolution may never be warranted on strategic grounds. Indeed the time may come when a great proportion of the populace has been imbued with libertarian ideas. Then it may be strategically and morally proper for libertarians to rise up and violently dislodge the proprietors of the state, for it is folly to assume that they can be induced to capitulate by nonviolent means. But to oppose revolution on moral grounds, as Friedman does, is to repudiate libertarian ethics. To counsel libertarians, again on moral grounds, to "(C)limb into a hole . . . and come out when people stop shooting each other," is to advocate moral idiocy. What if, David, the people shooting each other were the future heroes of a libertarian I

Royal power is by nature the mother of injustice.

— Dionysius (432-367 B. C.)

The virtuous need but few laws; for it is not the law which determines their actions, but their actions which determine the law.

— Theophrastus (370-286 B. C.)
Maddox Attacks Revisionism

By Bill Evers


Beginning earlier, but achieving increased recognition in the mid-1960's, new "revisionist" interpretations of the origins of the Cold War have upset what had been the accepted account.

The essence of historical revisionism, whether on the First World War or Vietnam, and the source of its political impact is to be found in its close and critical examination of official accounts and official propaganda. Because all history situates us at the end of a chain of events, it provides us with a concrete, empirical basis on which to act in accord with our values. Thus new historical evidence and explanations which are in important disagreement with the official statements of decision-makers have direct political consequences.

After the Second World War the Rockefeller Foundation and the Council on Foreign Relations instituted a program of subsidized scholarship in order to head off the development of revisionism in the writings of the war's history.

Knowing their record of interest in such matters, it is no surprise that similar influential groups are applauding and promoting this new anti-revisionist book by Robert James Maddox. In appraising Maddox's book as a piece of scholarship, two difficulties become immediately apparent. First, the book is not a full scale anti-revisionist book by Robert James Maddox. Instead, what Maddox provides is an examination of a few of the footnotes found on a few pages and covering the short time between the Yalta and Potsdam conferences in 1945 in seven books by revisionist historians (William Appleman Williams, D.F. Fleming, Gar Alperovitz, David Horowitz, Gabriel Kolko, Diane Shaver Clemens, and Lloyd C. Gardner).

The conclusion which Maddox draws after checking these footnotes is "that these books without exception are based upon pervasive misusages of the source material." To determine whether Maddox is right we can turn to published government documents and then compare Maddox's description of them with the revisionists'. We can also read Alperovitz's reply to Maddox in the March 1973 Journal of American History, the replies of the seven revisionists published in the June 17 New York Times Book Review, and the lengthy mimeographed replies obtainable on request from Kolko, Horowitz, and Gardner.

Not Pro-Moscow

The first type of error that Maddox makes is implying that Horowitz and Kolko are pro-Moscow. On the contrary, Horowitz has long been influenced by Issac Deutscher's Trotskyist views, and Kolko considers the Soviet Union like Britain and the U.S. to be an imperial power "less concerned with democratic politics than friendly nations."

In fact, the remarkable thing about Kolko's chapter on Yalta is not what Maddox thinks he finds in it. It is rather, as Robert D. Schulzinger has noted, that Kolko's description of the great powers' cynical disregard of Yalta for the rights of the peoples of small nations is similar to the contemporary complaints of Robert Taft, John Bricker, and Westbrook Pegler about Yalta's secret diplomacy.

A second sort of error that Maddox makes is in dropping the overall political context of American diplomacy. For example, in his treatment of Horowitz and Kolko on the Polish question, Maddox fails to weigh correctly the extent to which American decision-makers saw Poland in terms of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Finally, Maddox simply makes factual errors. He misconstrues the question of admitting Argentina to the United Nations in criticizing Horowitz. He distorts, in attacking Williams, Alperovitz, Kolko and Gardner, the attitude of American policy-makers toward the conditions for foreign aid to Russia after World War II. He misrepresents the de facto situation on Poland's western border in attacking Kolko.

But these are not new errors on Maddox's part. They can be found in an exchange of letters in the May 13, 1972 New York Review of Books, in which Ronald Steel corrected Maddox's mistakes.

Most important of all in assessing Maddox's work is the question of whether he zeroes in on footnotes that materially damage the thesis of any book he is criticizing.

The first problem is that Maddox often misunderstands or distorts the thesis of a book when he is attacking it. He certainly does not accurately convey the central contention of William Appleman Williams about the Open Door ideology.

Maddox describes Horowitz as finding a radical dichotomy between the foreign policies of Roosevelt and Truman, whereas Horowitz's considered such changes only stylistic. Horowitz's real point was that the postwar power distribution left most important decisions in U.S. hands.

Rand On The Middle East

The neo-Randian weekly newspaper Ergo has given us a detailed account of Rand's answers during a question period following her annual Ford Hall Forum speech in Boston (Ergo, Oct. 31) Rand's remarks on the Middle East are a chilling revelation of her lack of knowledge of the concrete facts of reality, as well as a grievous betrayal of her own oft-proclaimed libertarian moral principles.

Asked what the American people and the government should do about the Middle East war, Rand answered unhesitatingly: "Give every help possible to Israel." Not American soldiers, she conceded; but military weapons. We need not stress here the assault on liberty involved when the U.S. government taxes Americans in order to send arms abroad; surely, this is as statist and immoral, though not to the same degree, as sending American soldiers to the Middle East. As for the American people, Miss Rand sounds for all the world like the United Jewish Appeal: "Give everything you can" (Give till it hurts?). Reaffirming her supposed and longtime opposition to altruism, Rand added that "this is the first time I have contributed" to public causes, but now apparently we have a vital exception.

Why? What is the overriding cause for which we must set aside libertarian principle, isolationist principle, and opposition to altruism? why is Israel's "emergency" to be a claim on our hearts and pockets? Given Miss Rand's militant atheism, it surely could not be the necessity for the reestablishment of the Temple, or the fulfillment of the old prayer "next year in Jerusalem"; given her professed individualism, it surely could not be (one hopes) the Zionist call to blood, race, and soil. So what is it? Russia is of course dragged in, but even Miss Rand concedes that the Russian Threat is not the real issue here.

The real issue? Because "civilized men" have to be "fighting against savages", and when that happens, says Rand, "then you have to be on the side of that civilized man no matter what he is." The fact that Israel is (Continued On Page 8)

Key Point Not Faced

The second problem is that Maddox does not confront the revisionists by picking footnotes essential to their thesis. In the case of Alperovitz, for example, Maddox does not face Alperovitz's key argument that the possession of the atomic bomb by the U.S. was the major reason for a policy shift toward Russia in the middle months of 1945.

Useful critiques of Alperovitz's view can really only be found in the work of other revisionists like Kolko and Athan Theoharis.

Despite the obvious weakness of Maddox's work, it has been promoted by historians like the late Herbert Feis (one-time State Department economic policy-maker), George Kennan (another State Department official and original formulator of the containment doctrine), Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. (adviser to President Kennedy), and Eugene V. Rostow (Under Secretary of State under Kennedy).

I think, however, that the only objective evaluation that one can make of Maddox's book is that it is a poor job. Under close scrutiny, the book falls apart. Reconsidering the origins of the Cold War after having had the dubious benefit of Maddox's contribution, one can only conclude that the revisionists have made an important and probably lasting contribution to our understanding of what really happened.

Reprinted from the Stanford Daily.
Rand On The Middle East —
(Continued From Page 7)

socialistic, she adds, pales into insignificance before this great imperative.

There are two grave problems here: of the facts of reality, and of moral principle. Factually, what does Miss Rand mean by “savages”? Once work through the emotional connotations of the term, and the concept becomes a vague one. She explains that the Arabs are “primitive” and “nomads.” Here she betrays total ignorance of Palestine and its history. The only “nomads” in the region are not the Palestinian Arabs, who were driven out of their lands and homes by the Zionists, but the Jordanian Bedouins, who as hirelings of King Hussein are in effect anti-Palestinian and pro-Israel. Palestinian Arabs were not nomads but agriculturists; long before Israel, they “made the desert bloom.” The “nomad” theory was convenient Zionist propaganda, and nothing more. Perhaps the Palestinian Arabs are “savages” because they live miserable lives in hovels on the desert: but they do so because — a half a million of them — they were driven out of their homes and properties by the Zionists, and they remain in dire poverty as refugees. Miss Rand’s strictures are chillingly reminiscent of the English who drove the Irish out of their farms and lands by force, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and then looked down their noses at the “wild, savage” Irishmen who unaccountably spent their lives wandering around the forests.

Miss Rand asks herself the question: why are the Arabs against Israel? Unbelievably, she answers that they resent Israel because they are “savages” who “just do not want to use their minds”; deliberately choosing not to use their minds, they resent the superior technology and civilization of the Zionists. Surely this is the oddest explanation for Arab resentment ever penned. For what Miss Rand omits from the discussion is the one-and-half million Palestinian Arabs driven out of their homes and lands by force, to which were latter added another half-million ruled out of their farms and lands by force, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and then looked down their noses at the “wild, savage” Irishmen who unaccountably spent their lives wandering around the forests.

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This brings us to the even more important moral question: namely, assuming that one can really define “savagery”, what’s wrong with a “savage”? Isn’t a nomad or a savage, a person? Doesn’t he therefore possess inalienable rights? Isn’t he to be allowed to own his person and his property? What happened to the great libertarian principle, to which Miss Rand presumably adheres, of no initiation of force against another person? If savages are people, what is the justification for initiating force against them? Or are we to amend the great libertarian axiom to read: No one is allowed to initiate force against another, except if he be civilized and the other a savage? But then we are on murky and dangerous ground. What if Group A is a bit more “civilized”, and Group B a bit more “savage”? is it therefore legitimate and moral for A to attack and rob B? I am sorry to say that this is fascist ethical theory, and that therefore in this respect the many charges about Randianism being “fascist” seems to have a certain core of truth.

And yet Miss Rand says it: without going into the rights or wrongs of the case, of the aggression or the property rights or the liberty involved, she states flatly: “When you have civilized man fighting against savages, then you have to be on the side of that civilized man no matter what he is.” But surely, of any of her own apparent criteria, Soviet Russia, highly technically developed, is then far more “civilized” than, say, Mongolia. Does that mean that if Russia were to attack and sweep into Mongolia that we would all be honor bound to cheer for the Russians, and even to kick in our dollars for the great cause? And if not, why not?