The Iran Threat

The threat in Iran is grave, even potentially cataclysmic. But that threat is only secondarily the danger to the 62, now 49, American embassy employees imprisoned in Teheran. The main danger is a disastrous war, to be launched by a furious and petulant United States against the people of Iran. For the really scaring thing about the still continuing Iranian crisis is not the Shiite zealots led by the venerable Ayatollah Khomeini; it is the barbarous emotions welling up in the breasts of the American people.

For it seems that civilization is only skin-deep, after all, in these United States: let the American eagle be tweaked a bit and savage bellows for war and destruction thunder across the land. If the Ayatollah and his colleagues are “fanatics” and “madmen,” what then are the countless American demonstrators who joyfully burn Iranian flags, chant “‘Nuke the Iranians” or “Came / O home” or, in the case of an anti-Iranian rally at Houston, burn an Iranian flag while grotesquely singing “America the Beautiful”? College campuses which once rocked with a fervent anti-war spirit are now calling for the expulsion and deportation of harmless Iranian students. A war fever is raging in the United States, and for once we cannot say that the Establishment is dragging a peaceful public into war; the war pressure is coming upward from the grass roots.

But neither can we say that the Carter Administration is blameless in instigating this affair. We already know that the Administration had been warned by its own experts that admitting the Shah into the U.S. would likely trigger Iranian reprisal against our embassy there; yet, not only did we admit the Shah but we did not even beef up security at the Teheran embassy. Bumbling, or a deliberate whipping up of crisis? Of course, with Carter’s record as stumblebum extraordinaire, even conspiracy-minded analysts will have to give considerable credence to the bumble hypothesis.

We do know, also, that the Administration was reluctant to admit the Shah, but that it was successfully pressured into this fateful step by none other than Henry Kissinger and his mentor David Rockefeller. Once again, Kissinger has worked his foreign policy evil; is there no way of getting rid of this man’s malign influence? What happened to the idea of the people choosing at the polls? Wasn’t Kissinger repudiated in 1976? And—conspiracy analysis again—we shouldn’t forget that we have a David Rockefeller-Triparte Commission-dominated foreign policy Administration, and also that the Shah is personally a multi-billion dollar client at Rockefeller’s Chase Manhattan Bank.

One libertarian of our acquaintances has a charming solution to the hostage crisis: send the Iranians Kissinger and Rockefeller in return for the hostages. There is in this solution a certain unique and piquant charm.

Is the Shah really dying, or is he really ill at all? Many physicians profess themselves puzzled at unusual features of the Shah’s therapy. One wonders, too, if he couldn’t have surgery or chemotherapy in Mexico; are there no medical facilities there? Certainly, with his $12 billion or so smashers, he has the wherewithal to fly down top specialists on his behalf. Surely, too, the Shah would solve a lot of world problems by coking off pronto from natural causes.

At any rate, whether or to what extent the Shah is ill, he is certainly at this writing very much alive, and kicking, and therefore must be treated as such. His case raises many fascinating and in advanced applied libertarian theory. Thus, forgetting about his alleged illness, what would we do, or more to the point, what should we do, if Hitler suddenly found himself alive and ill at New York Hospital? Should we defend his right to asylum, or send him back to Germany for trial?

Whatever we answer in the Hitler or Eichmann case, we must answer for the Shah also. The Shah, too, murdered 60,000 of his subjects, and tortured countless others at the hands of the dread SAVAK, the secret police, causing Amnesty International to call his bloody reign the worst torture regime in the world. And the Shah is a thief on a mammoth scale. The Shah’s plundering, by the way, is a paradigm example of land theft and of the proper libertarian analysis of this “feudal” act. For the Shah’s father, only fifty years ago, was a bandit who assumed the throne of Iran by conquest, and proceeded to literally steal half the land area of the country and place it into his “private” ownership, mulcting the peasant owners of “rents” to their new feudal overlords. The present Shah simply systematized and expanded his father’s speculations, and converted them from land to dollar wealth. When radical libertarians speak of justice and land reform, they are always confronted with the rebuttal that land thefts are lost in antiquity, and that titles are so fuzzy that no clear-cut justice can be done. But in the case of Iran none of that is true; the robberies were quite recent, in the memory of many now alive, and the record is all too clear.

Furthermore, the surging hatred of the United States in Iran is all too understandable. For a generation, it was the United States government that propped up the Shah on a massive scale, pouring literally billions in military and economic aid into his coffers. For years, the Shah was considered America’s geopolitical ally and satrap in the Middle East. And when, in the early 1950’s, the Iranians revolted and kicked out the hated Shah, the CIA rushed in to reinstall him in 1953—an action that Americans may have forgotten, but that Iranians have bitterly remembered. The Shah and the United States, the Shah, Kissinger and Rockefeller—all these have been closely linked, not only in the perception of Iranian “fanatics”, but also in reality.

Given all this—should we send the Shah back to Iran to be tried for his crimes? Should we have sent Hitler back? The answer in both cases must be no. For while a people may surely try their own rulers or ex-rulers for high crimes, governments should be bound by the concept of asylum. Governments should not be able to extradite political dissidents to the tender mercies of another regime. This is because governments, being governments, being coercive monopolies of force in a given territorial area, should be held to different standards than would free-market anarchist defense institutions. So long as these territorial monopolies of force exist, they should be held strictly to the boundaries of their own territorial areas. Once let them try to extend their jurisdiction to other areas, and only perpetual wars can ensue—wars such as anarchists are always bellyaching about when contemplating anarchism. For we live right now in an “international anarchy” in the worst sense; there are gangs of coercive states which

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Iran Threat —

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are not under any one world government (And why, by the way, don’t minarchists pursue the logic of their own beliefs and advocate world government?)? Whether we are anarchists or minarchists, we must try to limit these governments at least to their territorial area, to reduce government intervention to a minimum at home and abroad. Part of such a policy is for governments to take no sides in the internal quarrels of other nations, and to allow asylum once a foreign national and political dissident reaches its shores. So, despite their past crimes, the U.S. government should deport neither the Shah nor a hypothetical Hitler back to the land of their sins.

But, of course, there is surely no positive injunction upon the U.S. government to devote a great deal of taxpayers’ resources to guarding the life of the Shah or any other imported monster. Did the U.S. taxpayer have to spend millions, and tie up virtually the entire police department of New York City, to guard the butcher Castro for nearly a week? Surely not. And neither does it have to knock itself out defending the Shah; surely, it is bizarre to think that the Shah, Castro, or our putative Hitler should have vastly more tax-resourcesspring to his defense, than for the defense of any one peaceful and put-upon citizen on the streets of New York. So let the U.S. government take all the guards away from New York Hospital. It is true that the Shah has his private guards at the hospital; but perhaps some of the revolutionary Iranian people could work their just will despite that hazard. Let the Shah take his chances, like everyone else, in the Big Apple. So the Shah is a criminal and the United States, as usual, is hip deep in blame, though we can’t countenance outright betrayal of the right of asylum. What then should the United States do in this predicament? Acknowledge its previous guilt, surely. Support the idea of an international tribunal to try the Shah—why not? Out of the hazards of the present situation best as we can respected private persons and groups, such as the constructive role already played by the Irishman Sean MacBride and conservative Congressman George Hansen (R.Idaho), who, in his private search for peaceful solutions with the Iranians, is a marvelously refreshing change from the usual bluster xenophobia, and war hysteria on the Right. And that is all; there must be no use of military force by the United States. Military measures would not only be costly and threaten a wider war, they would also injure innocent civilians in Iran as well as Americans. Already, the American freeze of Iranian bank deposits and cutoff of oil imports are petulant and coercive, and they accomplish nothing except financial disarray at home and abroad. They free no hostages and are only expensive and aggressive ways for the U.S. government to save face—a concept we have attributed exclusively to inscrutable Orientals.

But what about force? Defense? Punishment? The right of every American citizen to be protected? And what of the inviolability of the “sovereignty” of the American embassy?

Once again, because we are living in a world of coercive nation-states, with each attaining a monopoly over its territorial area, and because in the modern world any war between states necessarily commits the civilians of each country to the war regardless of their wishes, it is vital for each state to confine its use of violence strictly to its own area. So, in such a world, it is the responsibility of the American government to protect the lives and properties of its subjects—but only those who inhabit the territorial area of the country. We must therefore conclude that American citizens abroad must take their chances—that it is not worth embroiling all other Americans in a war on their behalf should they stray beyond U.S. jurisdiction.

To put the plight of the unfortunate Americans in Teheran in perspective: No one forced these people to stray outside the borders of the U.S. Moreover, they knew darned well, as did the rest of us, that Iran was an explosive trouble spot, and that therefore they were taking a considerable risk in remaining there. The U.S. government was delinquent in not reminding them of this risk, and, in fact, for encouraging them. They took their chances. And, after all, they were, voluntarily, U.S. government and U.S. embassy employees, and therefore they voluntarily took on the coloration of U.S. imperialist policy in Iran. In a sense, then, they all shared in the guilt of U.S. foreign policy, and their seizure by the Iranian students, while unfortunate, does not seem quite so irrational.

There is another important point here. Illustrative of a double standard and a jingo blood thirst at work. Every year, indeed every day, many Americans lose their lives and property to domestic criminals within the United States. People are here shot, killed, and kidnapped all the time; no one applauds these deeds, but why are there no blood cries for all-out vengeance when the criminals are here at home? Is it only because the prestige of the U.S. government has been damaged long ago, by numerous actions of the U.S. government itself, but those actions never worried out superpatriots by one whit.

But isn’t the embassy sacred American soil, and therefore wasn’t the attack on our embassy an act of war? But surely the “sovereignty” of an enclave of one house and an acre or two is only a pleasant fiction, not a serious reality. Surely it is not a moral problem for Americans to fight, die, and kill over. The inviolability of a nation’s embassy is an important pragmatic principle of international relations, since if embassies and diplomats are habitually aggressed against, very little international dealings or peaceful negotiations would ever take place. But this principle is important to every nation-state, not just to the U.S., and they all realize this fact. Once again, this is a matter for quiet international diplomacy, and not for acts of moral outrage and coercive saber-rattling by the United States.

But shouldn’t the kidnappers be punished? Here the pro-war theorists liken such a military thrust as equivalent to a domestic “police action.” But there are vital differences. First, as we have reiterated, on foreign soil there is no American monopoly of force, and therefore “punishment” is no longer a police action, but an act of military intervention and war. Furthermore, punishing the guilty, important though it be, is far less important for a libertarian than another principle: protecting the innocent. The innocent may not be injured or murdered in order to apprehend and punish the guilty. Supposedly, if police are chasing a robber or even a murderer fleeing down a crowded street. May the police, in order to catch the fugitive, spray the street with machine-guns and mortars, killing many innocent people along with the criminal? Certainly not, and police never do such a thing. But, in the same way, it is morally impermissible for any government, including the American, to launch a military offensive to punish the students, the Ayatollah, or whatever. For countless innocent civilians would be injured or killed by such an action.

But isn’t it immoral to deal with kidnappers? WHY? Is it immoral for parents to pay ransom to kidnappers to buy back their children? What peculiar moral theory could possibly be at work here?

And what of the Iranian students in the U.S.? The cry for their incarceration and deportation, and the steps in that direction already taken, are a monstrous imposition of collective guilt, a concept which properly horrified Americans when the Nazis employed it against the Czech town of Lidice. Just because we don’t like what some Iranian students did at Teheran, gives us no warrant to proceed with a force against other Iranian students in this country.

To conclude: the U.S. should pursue the delicate and threatening Iranian crisis with quiet diplomacy, and eschew all acts of force or saber-rattling threats of force. Another war threatens all of us in the Iranian crisis, and it behooved libertarians to be in the forefront of today’s and tomorrow’s anti-war movement. So far, the first libertarian organ to leap into the fray is Sam Konkin’s New Libertarian Strategy, whose “Stop the Presses” December issue has an excellent revisionist analysis of the Iranian crisis. We have had many differences with Konkin’s anti-L.P. “Movement of the Libertarian Left” tendency, but Konkin deserves great credit because he is the first libertarian periodical or institution to take a strong stand on the Iranian crisis. (Available at $10.00 a year from New Libertarian Enterprises, Box 1748, Long Beach CA 90801). Libertarians must put as much pressure as we can upon the Administration to stop the war, pressure that is desperately needed to offset the war fever, and, if necessary, to build a longer-range anti-war movement. If we needed any further reminders, the Iranian crisis shows us and everyone else, once again, that libertarians are NOT “conservatives” — we are for nonintervention and antiwar.
Zionism As It Sees Itself
by Elmer Berger

Review of Melvin I. Urofsky, We Are One, Anchor/Doubleday, $10.95, 536 pp.
by Elmer Berger
(Rabbi Berger is a veteran critic of Zionist tribalism, is the author of many books, and is the head of American Jewish Alternatives to Zionism.)

Abandon hope of understanding either the Palestine problem or the so-called "Jewish problem", all ye who enter here! The author, of course, may protest he did not aspire to contribute understanding to the central, political controversy in the Middle East. Indeed, Urofsky cannily states his parameters. In his Introduction he says he attempted "To tell...the relations of American Jewry to Israel...from the vantage point of American Jewry--its attitudes, its achievements, its problems, and its changing conditions". With some justification he asserts that From 1942 to 1948, American Zionism and its leaders did occupy the center stage in the fight to create an autonomous Jewish homeland in Palestine, to establish a refuge for that pitifully small number who escaped the destruction of the Holocaust.

So be it! But if this historian set out to record on the film of American Jewry every internal Zionist intrigue, every political battle of the Zionists with Washington and the United Nations, the reaction of the Arabs, the military achievements and economic tribulations of the "doughty little Middle East Davistate" it is legitimate to ask why the "vantage point of American Jewry" is so cluttered with--to be charitable--so many half truths.

There are, for example, sixteen references to the Balfour Declaration in the Index. But nowhere does Urofsky state the full text--or any accurate paraphrase--of the celebrated document. He repetitiously upbraids the British for "retreat from the Balfour pledge" (p. 7). But nowhere does he state or refer to two conditions which the British attached to their promise to use their "best endeavors" to "facilitate...the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people". More explicit and precise language than that used in the "best endeavors" promise was employed to guarantee it was

Clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country. (Emphasis supplied)

The difference in language emphasized the fact that the rights of the Palestinian Arabs and of Jews in countries other than Palestine who rejected Zionism's functional national rights for "the Jewish people" to build a national home were existing rights. They were not to be impaired--or even prejudiced--by any "best endeavors" on the part of Britain or by Zionism's arrogation of the role of spokesman for something called "the Jewish people".

Urofsky's omission of these fundamental legal/political facts from all of his sixteen references to the Declaration might be forgiven as an oversight if consistent omission of these identical facts were not the hallmark of Zionist propaganda. There is no law against writing still another Zionist propaganda tome. Fortunately, there is also no law compelling equating Zionist propaganda with either accurate reporting or serious, insightful scholarship.

Ignoring the guarantees of the rights of the two other parties inscribed on the face of the Balfour Declaration has contributed to the cosmetic image of Zionism and its Middle East state as crowd-pleasers and facilitated the Carter/Begin/Sadat try at substituting obfuscation of these rights for merely ignoring them. It also simplifies Rafshooning Begin into a philanthropic statesman for conceding territories and rights which were not his to concede except as "acquired by war". The resultant "pragmatic" solutions, of which Camp David is not the first and will not be the last--not surprisingly outraged the still deprived Palestinians and leaving without proper legal challenge Israel's Zionist claim to be "the sovereign state of the Jewish people" rather than of its own Jewish and Muslim/Christian Arab citizens--continue to add uniformed credence to such punditry as Urofsky's claim the Zionists were victimized by Traditional Muslim teachings, based upon the Koran, which have always held Jews to be an inferior people, whose downfall is inevitable "because they misbelieve the revelation of Allah and slew the prophets wrongly" (p. 204).

It is obvious that like Scripture, the devil can quote the Koran.

Urofsky makes it easy on himself to denigrate both Jewish and Arab anti-Zionists by avoiding, in fact, with the book, any definition of Zionism--or at least the Zionism institutionalized by law and practice in the State of Israel. Nowhere does he inform American Jews--or suggest they already know--the infra-structure they support in Israel is juridically linked to the conventionally recognized Israeli government by a Knesset enactment of 1952, commonly known as the "Status Law". Nowhere does he disclose that this Zionist infra-structure subsidizes "Jewish" housing, "Jewish" agriculture, "Jewish" education, "Jewish" labor and, of course, "Jewish" immigration. In no way does he help American Jews to any rational comprehension of the resentment of the Arab minority in Israel--and of Arabs generally--because

In the "sovereign state of the Jewish people" there is little hope that Arabs will gain equal rights...Arabs have no place in the Jewish state, except as a tolerated but essentially foreign element...In part, the discriminatory structure of the state of Israel is embedded in law and institutions. In part, it is based upon administrative practice. There is no substantial segment of Israeli society that opposes or seriously questions the fundamental principle of discrimination, nor is it an issue within World Zionism. As for American "supporters of Israel", they resort to the simplest and most familiar of all techniques--to deny the facts.**

That is the judgement of Noam Chomsky who, not so by-the-way, Urofsky attempts to deprecate to his uninformed American Jewry with the label, "one of the intellectual gurus of the New Left." (p. 372). To use some of Urofsky's Yiddishkeit seasoning, "What's a chutzpah!"

Urofsky's nonfeasance as a historian in matters pertaining to the diplomacy, law, Zionist racism, and military campaigns which are at the heart of the conflict between Zionism and Palestinian/Arab nationalism may, perhaps, be forgiven because he admits that American Jewry--his acknowledged "vantage point"--"remained oblivious to this dilemma", (p. 207). It is more difficult to find excuses for some of his pronouncements about this American Jewry itself. Where, for example, did he find any appreciable number of these Americans who would subscribe to his assertion (p. 490) that

Undoubtedly the greatest problem facing American Jewry results from its successful acceptance into American society.

If ever an ex cathedra pronouncement stood logic and the laws of nature on their heads this one does it. There are certainly Jews who believe their "successful acceptance" has proceeded too slowly. And there are those who, ignoring all history, fear that Judaism in the freedom of America, cannot accommodate itself to this civilization's charging patterns as Judaism has done to so many civilizations of the past. To accommodate to these individual predilections, Judaism has developed denominations in the United States. The diversity is officially suppressed in Israel--to the considerable embarrassment of American Reform and Conservative rabbis who beat the drums for Zionism but are prohibited from performing a number of clerical services by their politically ensconced colleagues of Orthodox persuasion in the Zionist state. But in the United States, to assert most American Jews--from Senators to Governors, to business tycoons, to doctors, lawyers, beggars, men and thieves--fear "successful acceptance" rather than aspiring to it is surely a laboratory specimen of hallucination.

Urofsky and many of his Zionist peers fear that "a separation" may develop "between ethnicity and religion". Zionism's puritanical antedote to this perceived threat has been aliyah, immigration to Israel, "the ingathering of the exiles", the "central task of the state". But in the United States the recruitment of immigrants has been a frost. American

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The common view on dueling is that it is a relic of a bygone era: an uncivilized, primitive, savage bygone era. All modern, progressive, forward-looking societies now prohibit dueling. And for good reason, it is alleged. For with dueling, the strong would kill off the weak, big bully types would run over everyone else, the meek would never live long enough to inherit the earth.

We shall prove, however, that this widely accepted view is nothing but a tissue of fallacies. We shall show that the critiques of dueling are without substance, and that there are great benefits of dueling which have been ignored.

The first thing to be made clear about dueling, though, is that it is an offer, not a threat. It is a request (do you want to duel with me?): it is not a demand (I insist that you duel with me). For a duel to take place, both parties must agree. In other words, a duel can only take place between consenting adults, and, as such, should command the tolerance that most of good will give to all actions solely concerning consenting adults.

In order to prove this, let us consider the case where A says to B: "If you don't voluntarily duel with me, I'm going to kick your ass anyway." Now this statement is clearly a threat. As such, it would be prohibited by the libertarian legal code. There is no real difference, in effect, between this supposed "offer" of a duel, and an out-and-out threat. The first part of the threat, "If you don't voluntarily duel with me", actually adds nothing to the sentence. The actual import is "I'm going to kick your ass" whether or not the first part of the sentence is kept in, i.e., whether or not you "agree" to the procedure.

An offer is something you are just as free to accept as to reject: no force or threat of force will be applied to you if you reject the offer. Thus, in the case of an offer of a duel, if the invited person refuses to participate, that is the end of the matter. The offerer of the duel cannot persist. If the offerer of the duel does persist, this only shows that the original "offer" of the duel was no such thing. This shows that the "offer" was really a threat; that the "request" was really a demand. As long as the offer was a bona fide offer, a mere refusal is an end to the matter.

If Mr. B. refuses an "offered" duel, and then Mr. A. starts using or threatening violence against him, thus showing up the original "offer" for the threat that it was, Mr. A. is just as guilty of aggressive behavior in the present system which outlaws voluntary dueling as he would be in a system which allowed voluntary dueling. We must therefore reject one of the claims against legalizing voluntary dueling. We must reject the claim that anyone would be forced into doing something against his will.

Of course, if you refuse a duel, you may be subjected to all sorts of non-aggressive, non-violent sanctions. You may be called a coward. Strictly speaking, however, this can in no way violate anyone's rights. Sticks and stones can surely break your bones, and violate your rights, but mere name calling can do neither.

It is true of course that being called a coward can cause psychological harm, but whether it does or not is to a very great degree under the control of each individual person. This is the kind of control that is given to a greater degree than ever before. And thanks to the pioneering work of Dr. Albert Ellis, the possibility of the individual averting harm from himself in situations such as these is becoming more and more widely known.

Dr. Albert Ellis is a twentieth century follower of Epictetus, a philosopher of the first century A.D. At the core of the philosophy of Epictetus is the view that "Men are disturbed not by things, but by the views which they take of them." Thus it is that Dr. Ellis holds that (Continued On Page 5)
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psychological harm would be caused not so much from being called a coward, but from the view you take about such name calling.

If you take an irrational view about being called a coward you will be harmed. (You will harm yourself.) The point that cannot be stressed too strongly is that the choice of which view to take is completely up to the individual! In other words, it is completely up to the individual to choose whether or not to be psychologically harmed by being called a coward.

An irrational view would be the following. "Oh horrors, it's awful to be called a coward. This shouldn't be. It's unfair. It's horrible. I'll never be able to face people. They'll hate me. They'll despise me. And that will even be more awful. I'll have to keep hidden. But how will I even be able to face myself. I'll have to commit suicide. Thinking thoughts such as these will lead straight to psychological harm.

On the other hand, one could choose to take a more sane approach. One could choose to say something like: "It is true that I will have to pay a penalty for refusing to duel. Or, for the duelist calls me a coward for refusing to duel with him, there will be several people who will refuse to have anything to do with me. This is unfortunate, regrettable and a pain in the ass. But life is full of just such occurrences. And even though I won't like it, I will be able to stand it. Actually, I could tolerate much worse. That is what it comes to that. Limiting those, these penalties may be, I have judged, in a calm rational mood, that it would be better to refuse to duel. I'd accept the penalties attached to refusing to duel. I won't like them, but I'll make the best of them."

It is, of course, true that it is no mean task to be able to really mean it, when one takes the rational approach. It is all too easy to merely mouth the rational words. And this is what Dr. Ellis' rational therapy is all about: through much practice, and a sort of Socratic dialogue with the therapist, really internalizing the rational view, and then learning how to apply it to all sorts of situations.

We have so far said that dueling is a legitimate activity that should be legalized; that the offer of a duel cannot hurt anyone (except in a psychological way); that the demand for a duel should be illegal, just as the psychological harm would be caused not so much from being called a coward, but from the view you take about such name calling. The criticism of our case concerns the claim that any such massochistic action necessarily concerns "only one person". Suppose, it is criticized, that the masochist who duels is a father and husband who has a wife and children dependent upon him. In this case, it would be illegitimate for the person to duel. And since almost everyone has someone dependent upon him for support, then it would be wrong for almost everyone to duel (or unnecessarily risk his life). Therefore the prohibition of dueling can be justified.

There are several things wrong with this criticism. First of all, it flies in the face of the doctrine of self-ownership. If a person cannot risk his life, duel, or whatever, because there are people dependent upon him, then to that extent he is not the owner of himself. But if he is not the owner of himself then those who are dependent upon him, or slave masters, since they control him. So this criticism of dueling involves the advocacy of slavery.

Moreover, if the family is dependent upon the breadwinner, he is also dependent upon them. (How else can we explain his willingness to abide by their decisions as to what vocations to enter, and what risks to take.) But if he is dependent upon them, then for the same reasons that he has to follow their orders about risky behavior, they have to follow his views on risky behavior. In other words, if he can be construed as a slave of theirs, then they can with equal legal (or lack of logic) be construed as slaves of his.

And if they are truly slaves of his, then he can order them to allow him to do the risky thing they feared. They must obey this order of his to allow him to duel, otherwise they would be disobedient slaves, and that would never do. But by the same token, they could order him not to give them the option to allow him to duel. And so on. The point here is that it is an entirely illogical situation for one person to be both a slave and an owner of another person. And that this illogic is logically derivable from the criticism of voluntary dueling on the ground that the potential dueler has "responsibilities".

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"successful acceptance" into American life, Urofsky offers a few, inexpensive highs. If it is your bag, on page 409 you can learn that in Israeli Hebrew, "Things taste better with Coke" is Yeter tov im Koka Koka. With a couple of floating Israeli pounds that may get you a "pause for reflection" in Begin's Zion. Or, for the duelist calls me a coward for refusing to duel with him, there will be several people who will refuse to have anything to do with me. This is unfortunate, regrettable and a pain in the ass. But life is full of just such occurrences. And even though I won't like it, I will be able to stand it. Actually, I could tolerate much worse. That is what it comes to that. Limiting those, these penalties may be, I have judged, in a calm rational mood, that it would be better to refuse to duel. I'd accept the penalties attached to refusing to duel. I won't like them, but I'll make the best of them."

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And if they are truly slaves of his, then he can order them to allow him to do the risky thing they feared. They must obey this order of his to allow him to duel, otherwise they would be disobedient slaves, and that would never do. But by the same token, they could order him not to give them the option to allow him to duel. And so on. The point here is that it is an entirely illogical situation for one person to be both a slave and an owner of another person. And that this illogic is logically derivable from the criticism of voluntary dueling on the ground that the potential dueler has "responsibilities".

Zionism — (Continued From Page 4)

"successful acceptance" into American life, Urofsky offers a few, inexpensive highs. If it is your bag, on page 409 you can learn that in Israeli Hebrew, "Things taste better with Coke" is Yeter tov im Koka Koka. With a couple of floating Israeli pounds that may get you a "pause for reflection" in Begin's Zion. Or, for the duelist calls me a coward for refusing to duel with him, there will be several people who will refuse to have anything to do with me. This is unfortunate, regrettable and a pain in the ass. But life is full of just such occurrences. And even though I won't like it, I will be able to stand it. Actually, I could tolerate much worse. That is what it comes to that. Limiting those, these penalties may be, I have judged, in a calm rational mood, that it would be better to refuse to duel. I'd accept the penalties attached to refusing to duel. I won't like them, but I'll make the best of them."

It is, of course, true that it is no mean task to be able to really mean it, when one takes the rational approach. It is all too easy to merely mouth the rational words. And this is what Dr. Ellis' rational therapy is all about: through much practice, and a sort of Socratic dialogue with the therapist, really internalizing the rational view, and then learning how to apply it to all sorts of situations.

We have so far said that dueling is a legitimate activity that should be legalized; that the offer of a duel cannot hurt anyone (except in a psychological way); that the demand for a duel should be illegal, just as the psychological harm would be caused not so much from being called a coward, but from the view you take about such name calling. The criticism of our case concerns the claim that any such massochistic action necessarily concerns "only one person". Suppose, it is criticized, that the masochist who duels is a father and husband who has a wife and children dependent upon him. In this case, it would be illegitimate for the person to duel. And since almost everyone has someone dependent upon him for support, then it would be wrong for almost everyone to duel (or unnecessarily risk his life). Therefore the prohibition of dueling can be justified.

There are several things wrong with this criticism. First of all, it flies in the face of the doctrine of self-ownership. If a person cannot risk his life, duel, or whatever, because there are people dependent upon him, then to that extent he is not the owner of himself. But if he is not the owner of himself, then those who are dependent upon him are his owners, or slave masters, since they control him. So this criticism of dueling involves the advocacy of slavery.

Moreover, if the family is dependent upon the breadwinner, he is also dependent upon them. (How else can we explain his willingness to abide by their decisions as to what vocations to enter, and what risks to take.) But if he is dependent upon them, then for the same reasons that he has to follow their orders about risky behavior, they have to follow his views on risky behavior. In other words, if he can be construed as a slave of theirs, then they can with equal legal (or lack of logic) be construed as slaves of his.

And if they are truly slaves of his, then he can order them to allow him to do the risky thing they feared. They must obey this order of his to allow him to duel, otherwise they would be disobedient slaves, and that would never do. But by the same token, they could order him not to give them the option to allow him to duel. And so on. The point here is that it is an entirely illogical situation for one person to be both a slave and an owner of another person. And that this illogic is logically derivable from the criticism of voluntary dueling on the ground that the potential dueler has "responsibilities".

*This language is from the Judgment handed down by the Israeli Supreme Court in the case of Adolph Eichmann.

Prose in the Social Sciences: Problems and Remedies
by Justus D. Doenecke

(Mr. Doenecke is professor of history at New College of the University of South Florida. He is the author of Not to the Swift: The Old Isolationists in the Cold War Era and The Literature of Isolationism, and has written over twenty articles on various aspects of American diplomatic history. He also contributed to various political and theological journals)

Although we have more writing today in the social sciences than ever before, very little of it can be called good. That is, it is seldom that we read prose that—on its own merits—wants to keep us reading. Often we read to master specific material and argument, and if the writing is poor, the reading process is a painful one.

Yet scholarly writing need be neither dull nor pedantic. In history, one can readily look at the works of David Herbert Donald, Edmund Morgan, Carl Becker, and Robert R. Palmer. Similarly, in political thought, one can draw from Albert Jay Nock, Frank Chodorov, Milton Mayer, and Felix Morley.

The following suggestions are aimed at individuals who have mastered most basic skills but who see the need for genuine improvement. In other words, they know what a sentence is, can identify the parts of speech, and have learned how to form a paragraph. However, they still have trouble with focus, or find their prose too verbose, or cannot resist lapses into jargon. The following suggestions, then, are for individuals who know how to write but who want to write better. They should not be followed slavishly. However, they might well make the difference between good prose and mediocre writing.

1—Write frequently. One learns, as with any other skill, by doing. Ability can only come with practice, and even good writers can lose their skill through neglect. Many authors are at a blank page for hours hoping some inspiration will come. It seldom does. Better to get your material down on paper, even if you realize it is far from perfection, and then be able to work on your draft.

2—Begin writing before all your facts are in. Do not wait until all your information is collected before you start. The facts are never complete. Many books and thesis remain unread, and essays and term papers never finished, because the author insists upon waiting until all data is gathered. A good rule of thumb: write as soon as you find that your sources are beginning to repeat themselves, or in a sense when you cease being surprised. The sheer act of writing forces you to focus, to know better what to investigate (and what needs no more investigation), and to raise more intelligent questions of your material.

3—Keep going. Once you start writing, keep it up. Don’t verify every fact if such verification forces you to change pace. Just write “look up” in margin and continue writing.

4—Use pencil. It is far better to write in pencil than with a ballpoint pen. The reason: a pencil is erasable, and that eraser should be used often. Any sort of ink involves various crossouts, arrows, and awkward marginal annotations. Pretty soon the page becomes unworkable.

5—Note the three rule for sentences. If a sentence involves three typed lines without punctuation, there is an excellent chance that the sentence is carrying too much. In other words, more often than not, it means trouble for the reader as well as yourself. Very rarely do such sentences read smoothly. As Eric F. Goldman, a prominent historian and master of English prose, once said in seminar, “A sentence should be a beautiful thing.”

6—Avoid tired expressions. Metaphors can often sound tired, and the last thing you want is tired prose. Delete such phrases as “toss hat in the ring,” “hits the nail on the head,” “food for thought,” “sheds light on,” “last but not least,” and “gone but not forgotten.”

7—Avoid efforts to be either clever or “literary.” Style best comes when you try to write simple. Be yourself.

8—Be alert to jargon. In some of the social sciences, it is considered “in” to speak in the most convoluted way possible. Take, for example, a sentence that reads: “The process of representational guidance is essentially the same as response learning under conditions where a person behaviorally follows an externally depicted pattern or is directed through a series of instructions to enact novel response sequences.” It sounds horrible to you, but even some textbooks have sentences that read little better.

Some words are particularly susceptible to jargonlike prose. Take such words as basic, concept, context, parameter, and motivation. The same goes for such advertiser’s verbs as: accent, climax, contact, finalize, highlight, personalize, pinpoint, and slant. Then there are the journalese words, such as: approach (noun), crucial, drastic, bitter, exciting, factors, fascinating, key (adjective), meaningful, picture (situation), and stimulating.

9—Show restraint. Such words as marvelous, fantastic, fabulous, and terrific sound worn-out almost immediately.

10—Avoid vague intensifiers. Words like very, actually, really and awfully are not precise. Nor are such timid qualifiers as a bit, rather, and somewhat.

11—Know what words mean. There is a difference between disinterested and uninterested, imply and infer, affect and effect, fewer and less, and ambiguous and ambivalent. The same goes for like and as, media and medium, militate and mitigate, regardles and irrespective, between and among.

12—Avoid “Tom Swifties.” There are unnecessary adverbs that can clog up a sentence. “Yes,” he said, “hurriedly.” “Certainly,” she replied, “breathlessly.” “He knocked on the door, expectantly.” Leave such writing to the potboiler, be the author Horatio Alger or Mickey Spillane.

13—Avoid pretentious words. Some neo-conservatives attempt to show their erudition by using such terms “immanetization of the eschaton,” or “the advent of telological gnosticism.” They end up confusing us all. When a simple word will work, use it.

14—Vary your words as much as possible. Rather than use the noun “Carter” continually, try the president, the chief executive, the nation’s leader. The same holds true for verbs. So often in the social sciences, one finds “he said that” used repeatedly before a quotation.

15—Use as few words as possible. Don’t be afraid to cut, cut some more, and cut again. You might find the process painful, but it is usually necessary. There are few essays—indeed few sentences—that cannot stand some trimming. Make your motto: “simple and direct.” The amateur avoids cutting, thinking each word priceless. Professionals—in-the-making can’t afford such luxury.

16—Vary your sentence structure. Too often we have one simple sentence after another. It is the Dick-and-Jane readers write large: “Spot is a fine dog. He has not sired many pups. His owner is disappointed.” Make your paragraph readable by using different kinds of sentences with it. Hence, you need skilful use of such words as although, however, but, therefore, and nevertheless. Of course, don’t have every sentence beginning with a preposition and keep your “however” and “moreover” to a minimum. avoid beginning sentences with “however.” A short sentence sometimes can make a world of difference in attracting reader attention. Try it out.

17—Be alert to passive voice. Compare the two sentences: “Edinburgh was captured by Cromwell.” “Cromwell captured Edinburgh.” The first sentence is weak and roundabout, the second strong, straightforward, and clear. Make your motto here “concrete nouns and active verbs.” There is only one time when passive voice is justified. It is when we don’t know who performed an act. “The science lab was burned”; “A million dollars was donated.” (By the same token, avoid infinitives—e.g. to be, to show, to perform, as much as possible).

(Continued On Page 7)
One of the great myths of our time is that inflation is good for an economy and deflation is bad. The bias of Keynesian theories points to inflation as a cure for "stagnation" and "recession". Unemployment is allegedly alleviated through a continuing inflationary policy. Virtually all businessmen, bankers, economists and government officials are united in their fear of deflations. Deflation, as a consequence of depression, has been held to be a primary cause of downward turns in economic activity. People will not buy or sell, the argument goes, if next month prices will be lower. Interest rates will turn negative and social chaos will become the order of the day during deflationary periods.

All of this, of course, nonsense. Empirically, it can be shown that the American economy functioned quite well during long periods of gradual price deflation. Indeed, the free market tends to produce just such results as capital accumulates, production expands, and product quality improves over time. There is no justification for tampering with the money supply or tax rates in the vain hope of achieving some such shibboleth or "stability". Economic stability is everywhere the policy of those afraid of the results that occur on free markets. "Stability" is the rallying cry of people who wish to preserve the "status quo", and think they can somehow legislate certainty in an uncertain world. The past few decades are a monument to the irrationality of these arguments and policies. Ever increasing inflation rates, along with increasing unemployment and economic dislocation, have put an end to the alleged validity the arguments of the "stabilizers" once commanded.

It is due to the public awakening on this issue that a series of proposals are being considered to deal with the failures of American economic policy making. These proposals are ingenious, ranging from a new constitutional convention to assist the federal budgetary process, and calls for a "Balanced Budget Amendment", to clever statistical proposals that tie the federal budget to a constant percentage of the Gross National Product. All of these proposals will fail in their attempt to chain the growing omnivorous bureaucracy. Why? Because either they are open-ended in their plans, as the balanced budget idea is, in that it sees a tax increase to balance the budget as perfectly acceptable, or because they tie their goals to government-manipulated statistics and hope that the state will be honest in compiling them. None of these proposals attacks the root cause of inflation, namely, the vested interest of central governments to inflate.

There is no longer any debate concerning this point. Both theoretical and empirical results show unmistakably that governments always inflate the currency given the existing structure of taxation and central banking. In order to deal with the problem of inflation and unemployment, it is necessary to radically alter the incentives with which the government operates. Given that no simple solution can be imposed overnight, i.e., that the state is not going to be dismantled by congress or any president elected in the foreseeable future, what can be done to alter the present incentive system?

If tax revenues depend on the size of the GNP, then two things necessarily follow: first, the state will inflate the dollar amount of the GNP as much as possible to obtain more revenue; it already does this indirectly, as people are pushed into higher and higher tax brackets through inflation. Second, as mentioned earlier, statistics on GNP compiled by the state will be worth as much as their money. The incentive to lie is just too great. And who will argue with the data? Who else has the vast, compulsory data collection apparatus the government has?

A simple, and radical, solution to this problem is available: freeze the nominal dollar amount of expenditures by the government at the 1980 level! It now becomes the interest of the government to increase the value of its money, since in real terms that is the only way it can spend more. Under this deflationary system, as time goes on, the comparative size of government will decline, and eventually it will cease to be a drag on economic production and wealth creation. Even if the real value of the government's nominal income (taxes) increases, it cannot increase faster than the wealth in private hands.

Thus, the public interest is automatically served by the state's attempts to increase the real value of its tax resources. If the government, on the other hand, refuses to stop inflating, then its real share of national wealth will decrease, as it devalues its currency. How the state handles its now finite resources should be a matter of little concern to citizens, provided no new infringements on individual rights occur. If it freezes hiring, or lowers salaries, or cuts waste... all to the good. If it doesn't, then it will be in violation of the law, and those bureaucrats who spend more than is budgeted will be prosecuted. It is here that the will of the tax-payers must be irresolute. Once the law or amendment is passed, bureaucrats who break their budgets are thieves who should be tried and incarcerated and/or fined.

The federal government, being the engine of inflation, is the prime target of this proposed policy, but the state and local governments can be held to their 1980 budgets as well. Such a policy would prevent "shifting" of expenditures and tax burdens. Yet another advantage of the proposal is that it can be implemented at any time in the future, regardless of economic conditions, since it will improve any economic situation we happen to be experiencing.

It is idle to argue that it will be unlikely for government to prosecute violators, for if that is the case, then why bother with such things as balanced budget amendments? We must assume that laws mean something, if they cease to mean anything, then all democratic attempts to control government are foredoomed, and armed rebellion is the only answer. That may come to pass, but until such a time arrives, a much simpler solution would be merely to implement this one modest reform. No bureaucrat need be fired immediately, nor any program cut off at once. The change will be gradual and beneficial to all. Deflation is not something that can be legislated away: it is coming, even as these words are written. We need to put deflation to work for us before inflation destroys our entire economy by means of a destructive hyper-inflation.
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(Continued From Page 7)

23—Read your work out loud to yourself, going quite slowly. This technique is one of the best possible for getting a good sense of pace and rhythm. It is also one good way of proofreading and few of us proofread sufficiently. Also be alert to good poetry, and to such prose as found in the King James Version of the Bible, Chaucer’s preface to the Canterbury Tales, or Lord Jim.

24—Have friends read your work. This is the greatest favor one can do for another. Others can catch redundancies you miss. They can tell you when something is unclear. And, by the way, if anyone is forced to reread a sentence more than once to follow your meaning, there is often something wrong with your writing. Painstaking writing for you often means painless reading for your audience.

25—Set plenty of time aside. You write best when you are neither worried nor interrupted. For some, the morning is the best time. Others work best late at night. Be able to work alone and aim for the same hours each day. Try to get a routine established. Have a pocket dictionary and thesaurus next to you at all times.

26—“What is it about?”. This is the question you’ve got to keep asking. Be it a book or thesis, an article or term paper, a chapter or a paragraph; keep asking yourself about the point of it all. If material does not focus on your point, save it for elsewhere in your project or keep it for another project.

27—Tips for organizing a book or thesis. When a young student was working on a major manuscript, he was aided by a prominent historian of American business, Forrest McDonald. McDonald’s advice can be used for all students working on a book or thesis:

- Begin by numberling, in the margin, each paragraph. Then make a topic sentence for each paragraph, numbering each sentence to correspond to the paragraph number. The topic sentence should summarize in one brief sentence the essence of that paragraph. The topic sentence should be inferred from the paragraph, and should indicate what the paragraph actually says, not what you intended for it to say.

- The topic sentence outline tells you just what you have said in the chapter. You have a small outline of the chapter in two or three pages.

- The next phase of the operation is to determine whether you have said what you intended to say, whether you have done so in a logical, coherent fashion, and so on. The analysis begins with a question: What is this chapter about? Answering it is not always easy; you should wrestle with it until you can state the meaning of the chapter in one sentence.

- Then ask yourself, well, what about it? What do I have to say about it? Try to expand on this, but in no more than two or three sentences. When you have completed the task, you are ready to proceed with the next step, which is gathering the paragraphs into groups. You will find that a few deal with this aspect of the subject, a few with another, and so on.

- You will also find that some don’t have anything to do with the subject as you have defined it. Take those out; they may belong in footnotes, they may belong in another chapter, they may belong in another book or article; they don’t belong in the chapter you are working on.

- Now, of those that do belong, you have grouped them in bunches; these bunches form the sections (sorts of super paragraphs) that constitute the chapter. What remains is to make sure that they are internally in order, inside sections, and that the sections follow properly from one another.

- In determining the proper arrangement of paragraphs and sections, several principles will guide you. The first is to bear in mind at all times your formulation of what the chapter is about, and the points you want to make about the subject. Otherwise, at least in writing history, the rule of thumb is a combination of the logical with the chronological. In general, the chronological is preferable except when that approach violates logic; when you resort to logical sequence rather than chronological, tip the reader off that it was necessary at that point to jump ahead or move back in time. Then resume chronology as soon as it is convenient to do so.

- Next, once you have worked out the proper order (still working with topic sentences), you note the sequence by renumbering paragraphs to correspond to your new, more logical outline. Now you employ scissors and Scotch tape to rearrange the actual copy to accord with the revised outline.

- Finally, you edit the scissors-and paste job. This entails (1) writing all necessary introductions to chapters and sections (2) writing or rewriting openers of paragraphs and sections, to make the transitions work; and (3) carefully checking the interior of each paragraph to make sure it develops the single point of the paragraph and nothing else. (If you have any questions, see the material on paragraphs in William Strunk and E. B. White, Jr., The Element of Style). When that is done, you have a chapter. Each succeeding chapter of course, must pick up where the last one left off, providing appropriate bridges between them; each should also open with a set of general observations that set the scene to each paragraph normally states the general proposition developed in the paragraphs as a whole). Each chapter should end with some similar kind of general conclusions—not woodenly stated as conclusions, as in a doctoral dissertation, but as general propositions.

- The conclusions too should set the reader up for the next chapter.

- The adoption of any single rule, or any combination, does not guarantee good writing. Following certain priorities, however, can help you considerably. Remember that few writers are born gifted. For most, the process of writing involves hard work. Often what appears effortless to read is the product of seven, eight—perhaps ten drafts. The main thing now is to be alert to obvious errors, and to be able to correct them yourself. If you can do this, you have taken the first step towards literacy.