The theme throughout Robert Ardrey's three books is the same. Man is by nature aggressive and territorial. He has instincts that drive him to war and destruction. He has, as part of his genetic endowment, a natural inclination for violence.

The origin of this aggressive instinct is described in African Genesis. The argument is based on the fossil remains of Australopithecus. Since tools have been found with the remains, these early men were hunters, that is, they were aggressive and were killers. Ardrey contends that early man's dependence on hunting as placed emphasis on aggressive drives. Over the time span of man's evolutionary history, those individuals that were more aggressive survived; those that lacked the proper level of aggression did not; and aggression slowly became part of man's nature—innate, unalterable, and unapproachable.

In The Territorial Imperative, Ardrey discusses the other of man's major instincts, territorially. For Ardrey, this is man's most fundamental instinct. Man's behavior with respect to this instinct is no different than the instinct-directed behavior of such animals as the lowly planarian worm, the digger wasp, the roe deer, and every primate but the gorilla. Ardrey concludes that "the territorial nature of man is genetic and ineradicable."

The theme in the last volume of the trilogy is the same. Man is aggressive and territorial because by no other means could he have survived. "For certainly two million years we were continually dependent on the weapon in the hand to make possible the survival of a territorial primate so ill-equipped by nature. Without the invention of the weapon, we could not exist."

Ardrey points out that our greatest and possibly fatal mistake was the recent development of farming and animal husbandry. This may be the reason men kill each other. "Until five thousand years ago there was no other way to survive. And if it was only then that organized warfare became a significant human entertainment, perhaps we may understand it as a substitute for the lost hunting way."

The "lost hunting way" is also the basis for all the other troubles that plague us. "Not only murder but riot, assault, vandalism, destruction of property may be seen as violent actions satisfying an appetite without which at one time we could not have survived, but for which little socially acceptable nourishment exists today."

This is the essence of Ardrey's writings. If Ardrey is correct, he provides no basis—in any manner—for libertarianism. If man's nature is as described, a libertarian society would be impossible. In fact, the only type of workable society may be a dictatorship where man's aggressive drives are regulated by strong external controls.

However, Ardrey is not correct:

1. Labeling any behavior as instinctive fails to explain its causes. Aggressive behavior exists in many diverse species, and is caused by many things. Insects, such behavior may be triggered by trace chemicals; in birds, by territorial defense, but only during the breeding season; in carnivores, by prey, but only if certain internal conditions are present; in apes, by a predator, but only if escape routes are not available and the troop is considered in danger; in man, by a mere verbal slur, but only if attack is an appropriate response in the individual's culture, and only if the individual's experience indicates that attack would be appropriate to the specific circumstances. If the murderous raids of the Brazilian Indians are explained in terms of instincts, how is the peacefulness of the Eskimos to be explained? True, man displays aggressive behavior. However, this does not imply an aggressive instinct. It implies the capacity for such behavior. Man also has the capacity for tenderness and love. Man's aggressive behavior is learned and is based on his beliefs and principles. Since

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man's ideology has largely been based on a disregard for human rights, is it any surprise that he acts aggressively?

(2) The development of a weapon two million years ago could not have played a major role in ensuring man's survival, since man's ancestral line goes back closer to thirty-five million years. Throughout most of this time, man had no tools and no weapons to help him.

(3) There is no evidence that early man's principle food was obtained by hunting. In fact, the majority of his diet was composed of fruits, nuts, tubers, grubs, and rodents.

(4) Of all the primates, only the gibbon can be considered territorial. Furthermore, most behavior for apes is learned, since different populations, living in different areas, display different behaviors. A possible display of territoriality in one habitat is not present in another.

(5) No evidence of territoriality exists today among hunting peoples still living, for example, the Bushman, the Pygmy, and the Eskimo.

(6) Why do governments find it necessary to pass laws against immigration and treason and for a draft? If aggression and territoriality are instinctive, we would lose our country and fight at the slightest provocation, real or imagined.

To accept Ardrey, is to blame biology for our destructive acts. Just as society is not responsible, neither are our genes. We must accept the responsibility for our actions. What do we choose to do?

Masters—(Continued from page 1)

have not put up much real argument at all. They indicate they consider the biological perspective misleading or useless but they do not seem to have much conviction about this. Often they flatly contradict their own premises by using Ardrey's methodology in trying to refute him, as when they attempt to show that man's ancestors were not in fact violently disposed and that therefore man is not. This tactic puts them in the position of saying, in effect, "Man has no instinct—and besides, all his instincts are peacable." To be consistent, culturalists would have to hold that it makes no difference at all whether we are descended from killer apes—that this has no relevance whatever to man as he is today. Understandably, few of them have been willing to commit themselves to that position.

Ardrey's writings are not without problems—such as his penchant for dramatic overstatement and sweeping but dubious analogies. But—as Nathaniel Branden recently observed in a different context—the first generation of any school of thought inevitably tends toward oversimplification. That the biological perspective is capable of balanced, rigorous, and fruitful development has been demonstrated by thinkers as varied as Steven Goldberg, Lionel Tiger, Robin Fox and John E. Pfeiffer.

Ardrey's three books are stylistically brilliant, filled with information, and downright fun to read. In my opinion, they remain the best introduction to the New Darwinian Revolution.

HERBERT SPENCER
STRUCTURE, FUNCTION AND EVOLUTION
Edited by S. Andreski

HERBERT SPENCER:
THE EVOLUTION OF A SOCIOLOGIST
By J. D. Y. Peel

Herbert Spencer was a great and protean thinker, a self-taught genius who ranged over and systematically integrated vast realms of human thought: philosophy, politics, sociology, biology, and the other natural sciences. He was also one of the great libertarians in the history of thought, and his first, splendid work, Social Statics (1850) is still the best systematic exposition of libertarianism ever written. [Ed. note: Social Statics is available from LR. See Back List.] Despite a few flaws, it stands today as a landmark, an inspiration, and a fountainhead of libertarian ideas. It was Spencer who coined the great libertarian "law of equal liberty," and Spencer who penetratingly developed the vital contrast between "industrial" and "militant" (militarist) principles. Spencer's seemingly naive optimism, his belief in the inevitable progress of mankind (in his early years) was undoubtedly overdrawn, but it rested on a sound insight that the free-market economy and the libertarian society were indispensable for the successful workings of an industrial world. Hence Spencer's belief that, since society had been progressing in the direction of freedom and industrialization, it would continue to do so. Perhaps his optimism was only premature by a century or so.

Spencer, in short, more than any other figure, was "our Marx." At the height of his career, in the middle and late nineteenth century, Spencer was acknowledged to be the greatest intellectual figure of his age, read and hailed widely by scientists, intellectuals, and the general public alike. His acclaim was fostered by his exceptionally lucid and logical writing style, which was free of the jargon and the obscurantism that have won all too many adherents among professionals in various disciplines of social science.

Yet, in the later decades of his life, Spencer's optimism turned understandably to bitter gloom, as the trends of thought and political reality moved inexorably from liberty and laissez faire to various forms of collectivism, forms which Spencer rightly castigated as the "New Toryism." By the 1930s, Spencer had been so thoroughly and devastatingly tossed aside by everyone that unfortunately, Andreski, too, is a sociologist, and he suffers from a similar inconsistent, culturalist problem. For the rest, Herbert Spencer still has the best systematic exposition of libertarian ideas and political individualism. But now interest in Herbert Spencer is beginning to revive among scholars—perhaps another straw in the wind of a renaissance of liberty and reason. J. D. Y. Peel's intellectual biography of Spencer is the first book on the great man since the 1930s. It is valuable on that account alone, as well as for the copious scholarship and references to Spencer's life and thought. For an exposition of Spencer's life and output there is no better place to begin—except, of course, in his own writings. But Peel is scarcely the definitive work on Spencer, nor is it a very good one. In addition to being a hopelessly confused and eclectically thinker, Peel suffers from two major defects. First, as a sociologist, he is really interested in Spencer only in that role; Spencer may have been one of the founders of sociology, but that was in large part a dubious achievement. The "science" of sociology is an unholy mess today, largely due to the vague and holistic concepts at its base, and Spencer erred here too, enamoured as he was of treating society as an "organism." Spencer managed to combine this organicist fallacy with methodological and political individualism, but needless to say this was not the path trod by his successors. Peel compounds the problem by subjecting Spencer's ideas and personality to sociological and psychological reductionism, and thus the ideas are not so much evaluated in themselves as they are "explained" away.

This failure to treat Spencer with genuine seriousness is the result of Peel's second major defect: his extreme relativism and historicism. For Peel is firmly convinced that there is no enduring social reality, that everything is change, and therefore that no principles or doctrines can be carried over from one historical period to another. It is no wonder that Peel concludes that Spencer's "interest for us now lies in how different he was from us."

Unfortunately, Andreski, too, is a sociologist, and he suffers from a similar focus on sociology. His introductory essay to his collection of Spencer's writings is all too brief, and it lacks Peel's rounded account. But he does have the merit of taking Spencer's ideas seriously and of hailing his emerging renaissance for what we have to learn from him. Andreski hails Spencer's prophetic attacks on growing State bureaucracy, and he is unfortunately a middle-of-the-road politician, and therefore asserts that Spencer apologized for the evils of unhampered capitalist "exploitation."

The best thing about the Andreski volume in fact, is the collection of writings from Spencer himself, particularly the last 90 pages dealing with political philosophy. How superior Spencer is to his commentators! It is a joy to read Spencer on the militant versus the industrial principle and on self-ownership versus ownership by others. Equally exciting are his defense of liberty and his attacks on imperialism and on the State. For the rest, Herbert Spencer still awaits a historian or biographer worthy of their subject. Reviewed by Murray N. Rothbard/Political Philosophy—Biography/Andreski/LR Price $8.95/Peel/LR Price $11.95
AN INTRODUCTION TO IMAGINATIVE LITERATURE

By Jeff Riggenbach

This month we are proud to begin Jeff Riggenbach's long-awaited series on imaginative literature. The six-part series will appear every other month. On the alternate months, and beginning next month, Neil McCaffrey, Publisher and President of Arlington House and jazz buff extraordinary, will take us on a tour of the world of recorded jazz. We are very pleased and excited about these two new features, and we hope you will be, too.

PART I: PREFACE

Once, a few years ago when I was ghost-writing college term papers for a living, I was asked to discuss, compare, and contrast the epistemological theories of five philosophers (Descartes, Hume, Kant, C. I. Lewis, and Merleau-Ponty) in seven typewritten pages (about 1700 words). The present assignment—to write a reasonably comprehensive, reasonably useful introduction to imaginative literature in around 36 typed pages (8400 words)—is not nearly so absurd, but it is equally difficult of achievement. If I try to be reasonably comprehensive about only the Western literary tradition, I will have about three words at my disposal for each year of literary history. (“It was good.” “It was bad.” “It was so-so.” That kind of thing.) If I try to be reasonably useful—Ah! but here we have the issue whose disposition will determine what words like “reasonable” and “comprehensive” will mean in this context: Just what have I there in a series of six 1400 word articles on imaginative literature (whatever that is)?

The use of such a series is neither more nor less than the use of any literary criticism—rendering the criticized literature more accessible to its readers and, thereby, making a more intense aesthetic experience available to them. But already I am knee-deep in terms for which no definitions have been offered and for which (alas for the discipline of literary study!) no commonly accepted definitions exist. The definitions I am about to propose and the theory of literature I am about to sketch around them are not commonly or even uncommonly accepted; I know no one who accepts them, save myself. And I am no more able to argue for them effectively in a few hundred words than I was able to discuss, compare, and contrast the epistemologies of five philosophers in seven typewritten pages. All I can do at present is assert my ideas, cite words like "reasonable" and "comprehensive" which shall be defined as adequate to the task. A literary work is made of words in much the same way a painting is made of canvas and pigment, a bust of plaster, a concerto of tones. Judging a work written in a language one does not read is like judging a painting composed of colors one cannot see. Translation is a difficult business at best; outside of certain unusual circumstances, it is impossible where imaginative literature is concerned. (See William H. Gass's "The Medium of Fiction," in Fiction and Figures of Life, and chapters five and six of Rudolf Flesch's otherwise almost valueless book The Art of Clear Thinking.)

Nevertheless, almost every lover of literature knows, some of the finest imaginative writing ever done in the English language has been done by playwrights, and some of the most perfectly integrated imaginary worlds in literature have been created by writers who described them in other languages. (It is possible, within limits, when reading a work in translation, to judge the coherence of its world; it is not possible to judge the style in which that world is described.) Accordingly, I want to conclude this preface with a discussion of some plays and some works in translation which I have found particularly exciting. Since any ordinary survey of the "Literature Made Simple" variety variety can provide the reader with a list of significant English-language playwrights and foreign-language imaginative writers, I shall restrict my own discussion to a handful of the most outstanding of their works.

Oblomov, by the late 19th century Russian Ivan Goncharov, is a brilliant character study of the under-achiever, locating his failure to achieve in his failure to think for himself, and presenting one of the most (contextually) admirable heroines I know in fiction. Jealousy, a short novel by the avant-garde French writer Alain Robbe-Grillet, is the most devastating and devastatingly clever presentation of that emotion I have ever read. Thomas Mann's Doctor Faustus ingeniously interweaves the Faust legend with the development of contemporary music and the social and intellectual forces responsible for the transformation of the Weimar Republic into the Third Reich. (The almost incredible complexity of this novel is best appreciated when it is read in combination with Christopher Marlowe's Doctor Faustus and Goethe's Faust, the latter preferably in Philip Wayne's fine translation.) Hermann Hesse's The Glass Bead Game (in the translation by Richard and Clara Winston) is the most effective and moving presentation I know of what it really means to be dedicated to the life of the mind. And the beautifully polished miniatures of the Argentine genius Jorge Luis Borges are available for sampling in the collection

(Continued on page 4)
WAR AND THE INTELLECTUALS

By Randolph S. Bourne (Carl Resek, editor)

"War," Richard Hofstadter wrote, was "the nemesis of the liberal tradition." Only a decade ago most historians could say that the First World War had been such a nemesis, that it was the most traumatic experience American intellectuals had encountered in this century. That was before the escalation of the war in Southeast Asia, the teach-ins, the campus riots, the resistance and the new look at American foreign policy by those historians broadly dubbed "New Left" or "revisionist."

The verdict of history is not yet in on the effects Vietnam will have on the American intellectual experience. We can speculate about the spinoffs that will occur in the intellectual community. How long will revisionism prosper? How hastily will the intellectuals shift to the left by the Schlesingers and Rostows and the Bundys? We shall have to wait and see. But for World War I the verdict is in. That experience triggered a revisionist press which helped to buttress American isolationism in the thirties, slowing the path toward war with the Axis. Other intellectuals emigrated to Europe, leaving those opinion moulders at home reexamining their old liberal principles. American liberalism entered World War I leaning toward statism. Many emerged from that experience veering toward libertarianism. Men like H. L. Mencken, Albert Jay Nock and Oswald Garrison Villard were popular champions of individual liberty and dignity. Symbolic of this shift was what happened to Randolph Bourne during the war itself.

Pre-war liberalism, or Progressivism, was grounded in pragmatism, or as John Dewey called it, instrumentalism. One of Dewey's chief proposals was progressive education, and a young graduate student of Dewey's emerged as its most articulate spokesman. His name was Randolph Bourne. Bourne admired pragmatism and the Progressive school-movement because he felt that it would help to bring about his ideal of a democratic America. But Bourne also liked pragmatism because its founder, William James, had expounded the need for a "moral equivalent to war." Indeed there was possibly no abler spokesman than James amongst the Anti-Imperialist League which had arisen in response to the war with Spain and its sequel, the quelling of the Filipino drive for independence.

Bourne was therefore a pragmatist and a pacifist, faced with an intellectual climate in which John Dewey himself could argue that pacifists were "moonstruck" moralists and in which the editors of the New Republic, that journal of enlightened liberalism, could argue that they had "adopted one of the most terrible means ever known to man to accomplish one of the greatest ends ever offered to man." Both Dewey and the editors of the New Republic counselled the pacifists "to undergo a course in severe realism."

Such arguments were too much for Bourne. When the intellectual community embraced the war aims of the Wilson Administration, Bourne penned in "War and the Intellectuals" that his former colleagues were not content with confirming our belligerent gesture. They were complacent asserting that it was they who effectively willed it, against the hesitation and the dim perspective of the American democratic masses. A war made deliberately by the intellectuals!"

Bourne's argument with the others was two-fold. He argued that this war, as all others, could not be mastered with the brain alone. It called for action, that it would bring undemocratic practices at home and that it could not bring about anything but a Carthaginian peace. These intellectuals had put themselves in the predicament of a "child on the back of a mad elephant."

Bourne hammered home the argument that war was unpragmatic, something one could not master. He wrote that "willing war means willing all the events that are organically bound up with it." The pacifists opposed a "democratic" war or an "antisepic" war because "they knew that this was an illusion, and because of the myriad hurts they knew war would do to democracy at home." Bourne argued that "war determined its own end-victory, and government crushes out automatically all forces that deflect... energy from the path of organization to that end." In "Conscience and Intelligence in War," (in Randolph Bourne, The History of a Literary Radical and Other Papers) Bourne argued that this situation denied the pacifist any choice. "One resists or one obeys. If one resists one is martyred or coerced. If one obeys, the effect is just as if one accepted the war. In wartime, then, one's pragmatic conscience moves in a vacuum..."

Events were to prove Bourne correct. In America, the democracy was Prussianized. Leaders of the IWW were hanged a mass indictment; the editors of the Masses were put on trial; Villard found an issue of the Nation banned from newstands; even the New Republic was under government surveillance. Espionage and Sedition Laws were enacted; a government propaganda agency, the Creel Committee, was formed; Senator Robert LaFollette was targeted for expulsion from the Senate because of his alleged disloyalty. Was this a product of America's unfamiliarity with war or was it inherent in the nature of war itself? Bourne argued that it was the latter: "All governments will act in the same way, the most democratic as well as the most autocratic. It is only 'liberal' naiveté that is shocked by arbitrary coercion and suppression."

It was little wonder that this officially induced war hysteria propelled Bourne's animus against the war to its ultimate conclusion, an attack on the concept of the State itself. Bourne was bitter in his condemnation of both the war and the state, so bitter that historian Charles Forcey argued that "the very realism with which Bourne had viewed the causes and consequences of the war drove him to an unrealistic anarchism." In the pamphlet on which he was working when he died, shortly after the Armistice, he chanted his haunting theme: "War is the health of the State." In this essay he set forth his idea that the State (as distinguished from the nation) sought universal influence over its citizens and that was provided the emergency for this goal. He also expressed his fear that the State sought to sacrifice individual values to the "herd-instinct." "In general," wrote Bourne, "the nation in wartime attains a uniformity of feeling, a hierarchy of values culminating at the undisputed apex of the State ideal.... Other values, such as artistic creation, knowledge, reason, beauty, the enhancement of life, are almost unanimously subordinated, and the significant classes who have constituted themselves the amateur agents of the State are engaged not only in sacrificing these values for themselves but in coercing all other persons into sacrificing them." This climate of the herd mentality was particularly galling to Bourne, the literary radical who had championed a youthful cultural nationalism, a system of compulsory education based on Dewey's theories of Progressive education. But that was before the war. Dewey had traded universal education for universal military service and had helped to create a situation in which "one's pragmatic conscience operated in a vacuum." This situation was "the health of the State," the State by its very nature being "the organization of the herd." The values which the "significant classes" tried to subordinate were those he held most dear. Bourne's Weltanschauung had been smashed by the war. "The State was" an attempt to piece together a new one that could cope with the circumstances he had faced. Where he would have wandered, had he lived beyond the Armistice, beyond Versailles, one cannot say. Suffice it to say that the politicaization of this literary radical by World War I reaped a harvest of material for those opposed to that war, to war in general, and to the concept of the State itself. He was often rational, at times metaphorical and even mystical. Still his writing has a lyrical quality about it that makes him memorable. This, plus his untimely death, provided the fuel for his legendary status in the twenties and thirties. Although he wrote of events surrounding the First World War, his analysis is as penetrating now as it was then. Reviewed by R. Dale Grinder/History/LR Price $2.50.
From the time of Adam Smith and The Wealth of Nations economists have attempted to influence economic policy decisions. But in translating economic theory into political action economists have found a problem. They have always been open to the charge that their advice was "economically practical" but not "politically practical." Thus, those economists who failed to put their ideas and conclusions within the realm of the politically feasible have had very little impact.

But some economists, such as Lord Maynard Keynes, have had and continue to have a very significant influence. This is because they incorporate the fait accompli of political life into the advice they give. An economist who desires to have any influence on economic policy must accept politics as an important factor in his considerations.

The effects of this trend have been many: a lack of consensus among economists, the weakening of economic theory, the subsequent lack of consistent economic policies, and expediency replacing reason as the ruling force in policy decisions.

In Politically Impossible . . .?, neoclassical economist W. H. Hutt offers his views and insights about this trend in economics, and he presents what he believes to be a more viable means of influencing economic policy decision making. The book begins with an analysis of the setting in which economic policy is made. Hutt holds no illusions about the workings of the democratic process. He realizes that the mass of people are very short-sighted and that most politicians, in order to win their constituents' favor, have also become myopic. He delineates the dilemma economists face in trying to work within a system that involves so much compromise while at the same time maintaining their intellectual integrity. But Hutt rejects the approach that Keynes and others have taken. He does not believe that economists must become politicians. Instead, Hutt offers his own unique approach, which he calls the "dual formula."

The approach Hutt suggests is not to just offer advice based purely on the best economics, nor does he suggest that advice be given purely within the limits set by politics. His approach is to offer both. According to Hutt, when offering ideas and advice the economist should first present them in the purest and best form the economics can give, and then in the next best, that which is politically feasible. But when offering the politically feasible, the economist should not fall prey to the trap that others have fallen into, that of making tacit political judgments. Rather, he should always make his assumptions explicit.

As Hutt sees it, the advantages of this strategy are many, the main one being that it would place the responsibility where it belonged, on those that set the limits on what is and what is not politically possible, whether they be politicians, the populace, or special interest groups. The exposition of this approach is, as in all of Hutt's work, thorough, intellectually vigorous, and most enlightening. If this were all the book contained it would be well worth reading, but Hutt offers more.

He goes on to analyze and apply his principles to three areas of economic policy: the unions, monetary policy, and income transfers (welfare payments, social security, etcetera). His analysis of the effects of the political trend in economics is devastating. He attacks the use of income transfers and monetary policy to buy votes. He attacks politicians for not standing up to the unions' unreasonable demands, and he attacks the unions for making them. And in this connection, he presents an excellent discussion of the effects of Keynesian policies toward labor unions and wage rigidities. His analysis is an indictment of political cowardice and union power.

Hutt's application of the dual formula to each of these policy areas is very interesting, for it is conceivable that if economists had followed his approach—instead of that of Keynes and others—we might not have the problems we now face. His approach deserves serious consideration by economists in general and libertarians in particular, as its application to many libertarian policies and goals is, I believe, possible and very much worth considering.

I cannot, however, give this book my unqualified recommendation. Hutt is a neoclassical liberal, and while I agree with much of his analysis of the democratic political process, I draw much different conclusions from it. Also, he has beliefs about welfare and other policies that I do not think he can justify, in terms of either economics or political philosophy. But even with these qualifications, I strongly recommend the book. Hutt is a cogent, clear, vigorous thinker, one that I believe libertarians will enjoy and learn from. Reviewed by Mark S. Wells / Economics / LR Price $3.70

LET'S EAT RIGHT TO KEEP FIT
LET'S GET WELL
LET'S COOK IT RIGHT
LET'S HAVE HEALTHY CHILDREN
All by Adelle Davis

The average, bright, do-gooding professional thinks he has an adequate introduction to hygiene and nutrition. Actually, he doesn't think about it. Somehow I involved myself in the organization of a child-care center for babies from 4 A.M. to 10 P.M. Adelle Davis has been criticized for some of the most conservative of her advice, thoroughly documented and flawed only by a few enthusiasms. The most spectacular of Adelle's enthusiasms is her belief in cow's milk.

Cow's milk is a fantastic food for calves, but of dubious value for human beings. (Of course, Price did find that isolated societies enjoying splendid health on preindustrial diets did include those eating dairy products from cows fed grass and green hay. Perhaps Adelle's milk enthusiasm would be okay if limited to preindustrial dairy societies.) Davis has been criticized for some of the most conservative of her recommendations and findings. For example, she urges us to have beautiful children through good nutrition. "Bosh!" cry the ninnies of nutrition. Price, however, documented in voluminous detail the deterioration of physical strength and appearance that occurs when isolated societies adopt the white plaque: "white flour, white bread, sugar and white man's canned foods."

And did you know that working in an office increases your need for vitamin A? Working in any unusual light will increase the need for this vitamin. Dim light causes night vision to kick in, and night vision requires more vitamin A. Bright light (including the glare from paper) causes protective mechanisms to kick in, also requiring more vitamin A. Symptoms of "A" deficiency not only include eye problems, but roughness of the skin and increased skin infection (such as impetigo, boils, carbuncles, and acne). Dry hair and lackluster nails are also associated with unusual lighting and its transactions with vitamin A metabolism.

Let's Eat Right To Keep Fit, takes an A,B,C,D,E course through the alphabet of vitamins, underlining Adelle's conviction that vitamin intake by means of good food is absolutely vital. The B vitamins are not really supplemented very well by tablets. The Bs are too complex, needed in a

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very volatile way, are not stored by the body, and are flushed by water. Pills do not deliver the vitamins in proper ratios; they are taken up from the gut in an unphysiologic way—not slowly as from digesting food, but in a sudden rush. So Adelle expounds on ways to increase the "B" dosage usefully.

The A, D, and E vitamins, on the other hand, absolutely ought to be supplemented. Carrots have been analyzed which contain no caroteen at all. Studies show that about three fourths of Americans get less than half the amount of vitamin A recommended by the National Research Council. To be utilized, vitamin A requires vitamin E (which is also deficient in the American diet), and it can't be stored if there is not enough choline. Since these vitamins are fat soluble, the body can store them, and they can be supplemented with the expectation that their delivery will be more physiologic than in the case of the B vitamins.

Let's Get Well is specifically addressed to the problems which often arise out of poor nutrition—or at least are made worse by poor nutrition. No fanatic (the book is dedicated to doctors), Adelle strongly advises good medical care and not using nutrition as a home remedy in serious illness. However, it is abundantly clear that "super nutrition" prevents much disease and reduces the length and severity of most disease. Adelle's "Two Unvarying Rules" are sensible protection against faddism: (1) Nutrition should be improved immediately a symptom is noticed. (2) At least 40 and likely more nutrients must be given simultaneously, preferably in a bionic or "organic" fashion. Nutrition is not like the aspirin approach in which a single "medicine" given alone quickly reduces symptoms. While a specific deficiency often has a characteristic symptom, such solioptic deficiencies are rare in real life. The vitamin B thiamin is an instance of a kind of chamber music, but ordinarily the entire orchestra is required.

Let's Have Healthy Children underlines one of the less pleasant facts of life. If your grandparents and parents were well fed, you have an advantage over people who weren't as choosy about their ancestors. Fortunately, restoration can be enjoyed, and individuals with a poor nutritional history can improve the chances of their offspring. Price. For example, produced pigs without eyeballs by removing vitamin A from mama pig's diet. The eyeless piglets received a restorative diet and their offspring were quite normal. Good child-care requires excellent diet before conception as well as during pregnancy and nursing. And, of course, the only good food for infants is mama's milk.

Adelle's life the nutrition ninny's kept yelling that she was a simplistic fanatic. My own prejudice is that Adelle was far too cautious. In some areas she was taken in by the shrink doctors, hook, line, and sinker. Her discussion of childhood allergy betrays how thoroughly she was sandbagged, for she regarded allergy as an expression of unventilated anger! The present evidence is that a good supply of B-6 and its sidemen will do much more for allergy than all the ventilating tantrums in the world.

Last summer William Branch, M.D., Adelle Davis' old boss, wrote an appreciation of her for Nutrition Today. The appearance of this friendly, warm remembrance of "Vitamin Davis" in the most stodgy mainstream nutrition journal is testimony to the effectiveness of Adelle's lifelong vocation. Beseiged by the medical profession for most of her career, she spent her last years enjoying the rewards of respect won the hard way. Branch and others conclude that the vast storehouse of information about food, diet, and nutrition packed into Adelle's books is based on absolutely accurate data based on prodigious research.

"The best nutrition," said Adelle, "valuable as it is, can only correct conditions which have arisen because certain nutrients were undersupplied or overfilled. It is not a panacea that will make Christmas smile in January." Let's Get Well/LR Price $1.95 / Get Well /LR Price $1.75 / Cook It Right / LR Price $1.75 / Healthy Children / LR Price $1.75

PROGRESSIVISM IN AMERICA

By Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr.

Arthur Ekirch has made some of the most important contributions to libertarian viewpoints in history through books such as The Decline of American Liberalism, The Civilian and the Military, and his anthology, Weapons of Thought in the United States. The Progressive era and its ideologies were very important not only in the growth of the American State, but also as a forerunner of New Deal concepts and Progressivism in America. It was natural then that Ekirch follow his Ideologies and Utopia: The Impact of the New Deal on American Thought and his work, Progressivism in America.

A significant contribution here is Ekirch's treatment of the rise of Urban Evangelism in America and its implications on the religious and political thought in the later nineteenth century. Associated with this was the development of American graduate schools. In the post-Civil War period, Harvard, Johns Hopkins, the University of Wisconsin, and the University of Chicago developed as new institutions in the Anglo-American educational world, the graduate school. Ordinary college education was placed in second place, and graduate education was seen as the means of training leaders in politics and in public administration—a "new science." In England, a lot of this was associated with the Fabians. In America, most of the leaders of this movement had gone to Germany to attend graduate schools and returned with a new vision of a paternalistic socialism as practiced in Imperial Germany. A strong state was able to introduce social legislation without the political implications of a successful socialist movement. Bureaucrats, technocrats, and other graduates of graduate education would run an efficient welfare state for general benefit. Leaders in the Progressive political movement who came out of this tradition included: Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge, Albert Beveridge, John Hay, and Woodrow Wilson.

These were the nationalist Progressives from the eastern US and Ivy League schools who wished to reorganize a society which they felt was corrupted by the rise of uneducated (but rich) enterprisers. Such businessmen needed to be put in their proper place beneath the educated, older families who held political power and high office as a trust for the whole people, et cetera. To overcome the businessmen who had thrived in the laissez-faire of the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian variety, these men wanted to establish a Hamiltonian program that would place control in the hands of the older, established financial institutions, the Market Street and Wall Street banking houses. Thus, Teddy Roosevelt undertook the struggle against the Standard Oil Company, which was viewed as too strong and too independent by Wall Street. The issue that called Roosevelt back to politics to form the Progressive Party in 1912 was William Howard Taft's antitrust suit against the great Morgan creation, United States Steel. The Progressive Party was financed and managed by George W. Perkins, a Morgan partner.

Behind all this important political economy, there was also a mass movement for reform and efficiency in local government, a movement with a populist background, which has also been called Progressivism. This populist Progressivism, whatever its faults, was not related to the state monopoly corporate system of the nationalist Progressives, although it has often been confused with it.

Albert Jay Nock, who had played an active role in this popular, rather than nationalist, Progressivism, saw that the Progressives had been faced with a contradiction that many who were committed to liberalism did not wish to see, and that those who were committed to statism tried to mask. Nock noted: "The reformers themselves apparently did not see that the State, as an arbiter of economic advantage, must necessarily be a potential instrument of economic exploitation." An echo of that view is seen in the comment of the historian Albert Bushnell Hart: "No free people is more subject to the arbitrary will of the man in authority than the Americans."

In several chapters dealing with imperialism and national security, Ekirch shows the development of statism through the fostering of a national-security mentality. Foreign affairs had become a major focus for the eastern, and especially New York, Republicans and Progressives who were involved in law and banking. With the passage of the income tax amendment and the formation of the Federal Reserve System, foreign affairs seemed to be the best arena for the development both of national unity and new mercantilist institutions. While strongly opposed by the populist Progressives, the American entry into World War I was hoped for and welcomed by the nationalist Progressives. For the nationalist Progressives, Wilson's wartime administration became the model for the corporate state for which they struggled. Wilson's attitudes and policies fitted perfectly their desires and plans. That World War I modeled the basis for the final introduction of national Progressivism and its authority over Americans in the New Deal. Reviewed by Leonard Liggio / History / LR Price $4.95
Why Three Leading Libertarians Read

NATHANIEL BRANDEN, PH.D.

Dear Libertarian:

I find the "Libertarian Review" an invaluable source of information concerning the publication of books relevant to my intellectual orientation. What I like in the fact that all viewpoints are given a hearing within the pages of L.R. is basically the same as the reason I will like the offerings here and elsewhere. In other words, I am not here to express my personal thoughts about the subject, but to preach to the converted. That is not what I am here for. I am here to spread the message of liberty, to inform and to educate the people as to what liberty means.

Nathaniel Branden, Ph.D.

March, 1975

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

The Libertarian Review provides for believers in liberty the kind of book review service that the New York Review of Books provides for social scientists. The Review is a critical survey of works in all fields of inquiry, from economics to history, and from sociology to philosophy. All are reviewed by Libertarians, so that the Review is not only a source of information, but a forum for debate and discussion.

The Review is a valuable service and one that is sorely needed. It is a resource that Libertarians need to keep abreast of the changes in the world.

John Hospers

March, 1975

Murray N. Rothbard

NEW YORK, N.Y. 1975

Dear Libertarian:

I would like to urge you to subscribe to the Libertarian Review and to support its efforts. Libertarians Review is the only libertarian publication in existence, and it is only through the support of its readers that it can continue to publish. Your subscription will help to keep this important publication alive and well.

Sincerely,

Murray N. Rothbard

March, 1975

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There is little doubt that the major role in shaping American history is played by the liberal camp. According to historians such as Charles A. Beard, Oswald Garrison Villard, and John T. Flynn, the major figures in American history have been liberal leaders who have championed reform and progress. This is especially true during the era of the American Civil War, when the liberal camp played a crucial role in bringing about the end of slavery.

After the War of 1812, the economy flourished, as loosely chartered State banks issued redeemable notes far beyond specie. The quantity of money increased, and people moaned over the "scarcity of money." Utmost in the minds of American leaders and influential journalists was the question, "Why did the boom die?"

The panic and depression were a result of a huge monetary inflation. Many ideological stereotypes have been torn to shreds by the conflict caused by the complexities of American attitudes toward world politics, but the dust has not yet settled, and no clear separation into rigid camps has taken place, at least not so far as I can tell. Furthermore, it has been acceptable so far to treat the antia war people as one-dimensional, overlooking the fact that they were immensely complicated persons with wide-ranging and voracious interests. For purposes of analysis of just their antia war views, this is quite reasonable, but the neglect of everything else they advocated and fought for has resulted in a picture badly askew.

The effort to make a "right-wing individualist" out of Harry Elmer Barnes especially comes to mind. I knew Barnes intimately for most of the last 20 years of his life, and whatever else he may have been, he certainly was not a right-wing individualist. His favorite economist was Veblen, not Mises; his favorite analyst of world affairs was George Orwell, not any of the conservative Pythons; by all odds his favorite contemporary sociologist was C. Wright Mills. As near as I could figure out, he never voted for a Republican in his life, and the only person I ever heard him get enthusiastic about as a possible presidential candidate was William O. Douglas. Barnes was an incredibly complex man, but so were the other prominent people associated with the liberal camp in the 1920-1960 era. Justus Doenecke's recent essay in The History Teacher on Barnes as a sociologist, in which he finds Barnes to be an intellectual ancestor of significant parts of the New Left, undoubtedly comes much closer to the truth than any of the Barnes-as-right-wingers characterization of the New Left, who since the mid-1960's, have specialized in opposing the Cold War with Russia and China and with equal breath the now-defunct war in Vietnam. In the course of their researches they have discovered a tradition of antiwar objection associated with all American wars, but in particular the opposition to World War II (which, more than not, even they have considered our One Great Holy Combat) and, from its very start, the Cold War. What has intrigued and excited them is that the critics of both of these martial adventures were essentially the same people. Because some sectors of conservative opinion found these critics' antiwar writing and talk relating to World War II congenial to their own views, the anti-interventionists have come to be thought of as "rightists," too. (Ignored is the conservatives' rejection of their anti-Cold War stance, and the fact that in the early 1950s among the loudest and most extensive supporters of revisionist history concerning World War II were the press of the Socialist Labor Party and the Industrial Workers of the World, which are hardly to be enlisted within any "right wing," at least in this Galaxy.)

The Panic 1819

By Murray N. Rothbard

Andrew Jackson grew extremely suspicious of banks. There is little doubt that Jackson's vehement opposition to the Second Bank of the U.S. grew out of this experience. Other important contemporary figures, such as Martin Van Buren, William Henry Harrison, and Davy Crockett (who called the banking system a "swindle"), also gained prominence at this time as a consequence of their opposition to wildcat banking.

One of the most interesting parts of Rothbard's history presents the views of the Founding Fathers who lived through the Panic of 1819. Thomas Jefferson is referred to as the "most thorough-going opponent of bank credit," favoring the "eternal suppression of bank paper." Jefferson believed that only specie should be allowed to circulate. Jefferson's son-in-law, Governor Thomas Randolph, was in support of a 100 percent specie standard, James Madison regarded banks as "harmful" institutions. And John Adams, whose views on banks were nearly identical with Jefferson's, regarded paper money beyond specie as "theft." Although such views as the 100 percent specie standard are considered repugnant and taboo to most economists today, it is interesting and significant that such views were generally held by the Founding Fathers.

Another fascinating aspect of Rothbard's research is the debate that raged between the inflationists and the hard-money advocates during the depression. Some public figures spoke out for public works projects and relief for the poor. Some states enacted legislation to keep creditors from foreclosing on debtors (stay laws and minimum appraisal laws). Others blamed the depression on the contraction of the money supply and enacted laws to "prime the pump" in an effort to reduce interest rates and

THE PANIC OF 1819

By Rona Radosh

Though short-shrifted in most history books, the Panic of 1819 was an unforgettable nightmare for early Americans. Banks throughout the country were unable to make good on customers' claims for specie and were forced to close their doors. Creditors foresaw on deeply indebted farmers, city-dwellers, and speculators who had bought cheap public land. Wages as well as prices dropped precipitously. Interest rates climbed and people moaned over the "scarcity of money." Utmost in the minds of American leaders and influential journalists was the question, "Why did the boom die?"

The Panic of 1819, Murray Rothbard's incisive and extremely well-styled Columbia University dissertation, provides an answer and a fascinating history of the era.

The panic and depression were a result of a huge monetary inflation. After the War of 1812, the economy flourished, as loosely chartered State banks issued redeemable notes far beyond specie. The quantity of money multiplied rapidly. In 1815 alone, bank notes increased from $46 million to $68 million.

Eventually, bank notes began selling at a discount, as foreigners and money-brokers profitably claimed the notes for specie. In addition, the Bank of the United States began to call on branches to redeem other bank obligations. The monetary expansion ended abruptly and a wave of bankruptcies ensued.

Although the 1819-21 depression was relatively short-lived, Rothbard shows how the panic served as an important training ground for future American leaders. It was during this period, for example, that General Jackson grew extremely suspicious of banks. There is little doubt that Jackson's vehement opposition to the Second Bank of the U.S. grew out of this experience. Other important contemporary figures, such as Martin Van Buren, William Henry Harrison, and Davy Crockett (who called the banking system a "swindle"), also gained prominence at this time as a consequence of their opposition to wildcat banking.

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down to the final assessment, public men have to be judged by their public record. I know much more about one of them—Dennis—than I know about the others, but I learned a great deal from him and three of the other four, all of whom were at the peak of their intellectual powers when I was a student. I was never active in practical politics and therefore grew to respect Mr. Taft on the basis of his adherence to views of other men by whom I was influenced. I have always tended to heed Frank Simonds’ admonition that there is only one way for a man to look at a politician, and that is down; in the case of Mr. Taft I made an exception.

The author’s treatment of Dennis is especially welcome, and I am still scratching my brow in disbelief that it has appeared in a book issued by a major publisher in my time. I have always been entertained by the totally panicked disarmament and whooping dismay of our Stalinist liberals at Dennis’ identification of himself as a “fascist” in the 1930s, as though it were the most reprehensible thing in the last million years, while at the same time they looked upon anyone certifying his communism with the sedate galactic aplomb that one would have expected of them had said person announced himself a charter member of the churubin. But in the 1930s, any loyal Russian, no matter where he lived, had to assume this air of prostrated and afflicted outrage, since anyone doing as Dennis did automatically arrayed himself against the side of Stalinist paradise, and thus made himself a candidate for early murder.

Unless a book contains outright factual errors or studied untruths I do not see much sense in criticizing it because it is not the kind of book I would have written, which is almost as much as to say that most unsympathetic reviewers are saying most of the time. I would however like to enter a mild objection to the repeated criticism of Flynn for his enthusiasm for Senator Joseph McCarthy and his domestic anti-Communist crusade. After the abuse Flynn took from the Communists and (especially) fellow-traveling liberals, it is expecting too much of him to believe that he should have stood by in the McCarthy era, waving his hands while hearing mellow forgiveness of his 1937–1950 adversaries, chanting generous benediction and joining in the drool-speak of anti-McCarthyism and the tones of fake horror that accompanied such verbal reflexes. Flynn understood perfectly that McCarthy’s real target was not a handful of obscure Communist clerks in some government agency, but the gang of affluent corporate liberals who had sold Stal­linism so assiduously while the FDR fugglemen made anti­communism a seditious offense. As Alistair Cooke ruefully noted at the height of McCarthy’s prominence, McCarthy was the price the liberals were paying for 12 years of Roosevelt.

Radosh stresses repeatedly the consequences to his subjects of their stubborn opposition to the war crowd and its policies in the 1935–55 period. Flynn and Villard, and especially Dennis (and Barnes), took the slander, the destruction of their careers, the drastic reduction of their influence and income, and the venous character assassination and malicious derogation by the totalitarian liberal coyote pack, with little perceptible complaint. They kept fighting until death or disability via illness made fighting no longer possible. For this I admired and respected them more than for anything they ever said or wrote. They were giants among low creepings who took the easy way of scrapping accommodation with the New American Order which took shape during the Second World War, and which shows only very slight indication of breaking down to this day, despite the inability of its Fuehrers to resolve the unfinished business of World War II, of which Germany, Korea, Vietnam, and Israel are just obvious major evid­ences. And for gratuitous malevolence nothing exceeds the venom of those members of the academic historical l unhorse who, after Beard published his two books critical of Roosevelt II’s foreign policy, undertook to destroy the credibility of everything he had written before.

It has yet to be proven that the system that has evolved in America in this century can work without reliance upon war of some kind. We need more attention to the domestic dependence upon war as an unemployment blotter and engine of “prosperity” and less to florid rav­ning about the necessity of putting down planetary political transgression. Americans have been dusted heavily with the pollen of moral fervor which has been drifting down upon them for 75 years, urging the obligation of going abroad and imposing the death penalty upon political forms such as socialism and communism. For what? It is never about time we examined more deeply what is covered by this rhet­orical canopy. The celebrated New Dealer Chester Bowles admitted in 1954 that FDR’s crowd had failed miserably in trying to find a sol­ution to the Depression and that only the “defense” buildup begin­ning in 1940 had put Americans back to work—and that only the World War and the Cold War had kept them at work. Is it only a coincidence that the business collapse and mounting unemployment of the last year or so have come on the heels of the phasing-out of the Vietnam War and the thawing of the Cold War? Such recent books examining various aspects of our warfare state as those of Fred Cook and Seymour Melman and the Report from Iron Mountain are really just extrapolations of Dennis’ The Dynamics of War and Revolution of 35 years ago. For those who have just begun to think about the problem or for whom Prophets on the Right is an introduction to it, Radosh’s work should be immensely enlightening and very useful. Reviewed by James J. Martin/History–Biography/ LR Price $9.95

COMMON SENSE ECONOMICS

By John A. Pugsley

If someone who was knowledgeable about insurance, tax shelters and mutual funds wanted to write a book like Harry Browne’s How to Profit from the Coming Devaluation, yet different, this is the book he would write.

Like most of us who do not believe in cornucopiae or the goose with golden eggs, Pugsley has always had a healthy skepticism about govern­ment interference in the economy. As with so many others, it was his reading of Browne’s first book which congealed and formulated his fears and acted as a lever for further thought. This has made him rather self­conscious of his debt to Browne and to Henry Hazlitt for his classic Economics In One Lesson; it is a debt that is shared by too few writers of books or financial planning. I do not believe, however, he should feel any more uncomfortable about presenting a book, or popularizing, by others than should a teacher in reiterating that z + z = 4.

In any event, the book’s first 50 pages provide a good short summary of the basis of money (à la Browne) and free market economics (à la Haz­litt). Having laid this foundation, the next 75 pages constitute a primer on investment—stocks, bonds, savings accounts, gold, silver, art, land, counseling services, and so forth. The advice given is based on the prem­ise that the nation’s economy is heading for trouble; I find both the premise and the advice sound.

Pugsley devotes over one-third of the book to insurance and tax shelter­ers. As you might imagine, he recommends term insurance and full use of such things as the Keogh plan. The specifics of who, what, where, why, and how clearly come from someone who has been on both sides of the fence, someone with an insider’s view of the ploys and gambits employed by the ubiquitous insurance man. I am glad Pugsley included this large section, because the points he makes on both life and health coverage need making, and I have only seen this done before in books devoted ex­clusively to insurance. If you own any insurance this section alone makes the book worthwhile—even if you have already read Browne and Hazlitt. Both economists are much the same in their philosophy, and Pugsley, Galbraith might each like a copy to help them figure out how best to protect themselves from the foolishness they have made public policy. Reviewed by Douglas R. Casey / Economics / LR Price $10
This, then, is fresh history, the sort that never finds its way into the standard texts. The colorful narrative is spiced with robust Rothbard wit. At his liveliest when most iconoclastic, Dr. Rothbard here displays the verve and originality that have made him the fountainhead of modern libertarian thought.

But why another American history? Because Dr. Rothbard has exciting new insights to offer. Contemporary American histories too often present only sweeping generalizations studded with a few names and dates. *Conceived in Liberty* returns to an older tradition: the detailed narrative that lets us catch the flavor of an era. Shining through the Rothbard narrative are feisty, rambunctious colonists who take kindly to no human authority. They erupted in a spate of rebellions in the late 1600s—revolts that made the climate congenial for the later Revolution, and fortified libertarian attitudes among our forebears.

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Jerome Tuccille's books are too often criticized not for what they are but for what they are not.

Radical Libertarianism was not the final word on libertarian thought; it was a timely (for 1970) statement of libertarian concepts using left-liberal terminology. It Usually Begins With Ayn Rand was not a factual history of the new libertarian movement; it was a very funny house-cleaning of some dusty, pre-libertarian hangovers. Here Comes Immortality was not a treatise on “resurrection research; it would have been a responsible presentation of a society that had conquered both death and taxes. What Jerry Tuccille does write is entertaining, popular journalism salted with his own irreverent brand of zany speculation. And if you keep your tongue firmly in cheek, you will be much less likely to bite into it when Tuccille occasionally goes overboard.

Who’s Afraid of 1984? continues this pattern. Subtitled “The Case for Optimism in Looking Ahead to the 1980s,” it is approach is twin-edged.

Divided into two parts, Book One is an attempt to refute “Doomsday Past.” The doomsday of George Orwell’s classic 1984. The doomsday of Paul Erlich’s not-so-classic Population Bomb. The anti-technologists. The neo-Malthusians. The “Man is the cancer of Spaceship Earth” crowd. All well and good here, as Tuccille does a splendid job of detailing past doomsday projections and their failure to come about. The Reverend Thomas Malthus’s 1798 prediction that by now we would have multiplied far beyond our food-production capabilities. The Paddock brothers’ Famine—1757, which in 1967 predicted that by this year at the latest most of India’s population would be dead of starvation. (Which is not to imply that the Indians are eating much beyond of knowledge?) There is a hint of how this not-so-rare argument is supposed to work in the startling claim that, “only if our minds are designed for knowledge, would there be a rational reason to suppose that our minds could yield genuine knowledge.”

Here is at least one version of how the argument is supposed to work: We know that our senses are informative independently of having any theory about the natural selection of informative sense organs. Thus, the explanation for our senses being informative cannot be that they developed through natural selection. But if not through natural selection and not through “mere coincidence,” then through the Diety (or visitors from Mars?). This argument presupposes that if one knows something (that the senses are informative) independent of the truth of some particular historical explanation for the known fact, then that particular historical explanation is not the correct explanation. But this is a silly presumption. And it does not explain how, or why, we—even the theist—ought to suppose that our minds could yield genuine knowledge.

Here is one version of an argument which is supposed to work: We know that our senses are informative independently of having any theory about God’s purposes. Thus, the explanation for our senses being informative cannot be theistic. If “mere coincidence” is also ruled out, then the explanation must be natural selection. Of course, neither of these arguments are any good. Knowing that our senses are informative has nothing to do with picking the historical explanation for this fact.

Readers interested in examining this version of the argument from design should read the clearest exposition in the first edition of Richard Taylor’s Metaphysics.

ERIC MACK
Sunderland, Mass.

After reading Veatch’s review of Kiefer’s Objectivism and Theism, I can only deplore retroactively the appearance of this obscurantist tract in your catalogue. Kiefer’s argument for the existence of a God is based on the idea that the natural selection of men has been accounted for as having come about by [an evolutionary process cumulating the effects of natural selection and chance]. This assertion is ambiguous, meaningful either that “if we assume that the human mind is a product of evolution, then we cannot prove that it is capable of knowledge,” or that “chance and natural selection cannot result in an organized informational system without ‘knowledge.’” The phrase is logically antecedent to the possibility of that which it expresses.

The first is demonstrably false, since the evolution of organization out of chance is a well understood natural process. The second is demonstrably true, but true, since knowledge is axiomatic in the Aristotelian sense. One cannot prove that his mind is capable of knowledge, since the axiom of knowledge is logically antecedent to the possibility of that which it expresses. The truth of the first is demonstrably false, since the evolution of organization out of chance is a well understood natural process. The second is demonstrably true, since knowledge is axiomatic in the Aristotelian sense. One cannot prove that his mind is capable of knowledge, since the axiom of knowledge is logically antecedent to the possibility of that which it expresses.

Surely, the idea of a God traveling backward in time in order to design his own mind boggles the mind of a mere human.

ADAM V. REED
New York, N.Y.

I must confess, I do not understand wherein lies the validity of James Kiefer’s argument that man’s perceptual abilities cannot be accounted for solely by natural selection. Natural selection does not mean things happen solely by chance. To assume that ignores the cybernetic relationship which exists between any organism and its environment. The development of the nervous system occurred in bits and pieces over millions of years; we did not just start thinking when Darwin stepped forward and said, “Let there be sight!” Nor did we just start thinking when Ayn Rand stepped forward and said, “Man is a rational being” (or whoever it was who said it first).

The structure of the human mind which allows man cognitive abilities developed in stages just as did the structure of the minds of lower animals which allowed them to integrate senses into percepts. And the argument which Kiefer’s development does not some god but the conditions of existence under which we live, i.e., really.

While no other animal on this planet has developed conceptual faculties as has man, we can see the beginnings of these faculties in higher-order primates such as chimpanzees. This on the basis of recent experimental evidence from Yerkes.

No Athenian was ever independent of the length of his prostrates’ legs; no man was ever independent of the natural forces existing in the universe. (Note to the uninstructed: this is not a deterministic statement, nor does it have anything to do with the issue of free will.) And the theory of natural selection is manifest in the laws of genetics is fully capable of explaining the development of any physical structure in the human body. James Kiefer is in error.

ROBERT B. CRIM
Naugatuck Conn.
Two Important Pamphlets
by America's
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Professor Dean E. Wooldridge is correct—
not only with prodigious historical, legal, and
economic scholarship, but with unrelenting logic.
No, with this work, the process of assem-
bling Dr. Rothbard’s collected essays has begun.
Although he is best known for his work in
economics and history, Rothbard strangely
is least appreciated in areas where he has done
some of his most cogent and seminal work, i.e.
in the area of social philosophy and social com-
mentary. Among the widely quoted essays in-
cluded, besides the title essay, are:

"Left and Right: The Prospects for Liberty,"
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Property Rights," "Ludwig von Mises and the
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tarian." (Price $2.50)

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Libertarian Review

Irwin K. Bennett
Editor

Readers, Authors, Reviewers

Kiefer Replies

It is a pity that my critics have not heard the tape
they complain of, for all their objections are discussed
in it. Had they heard the tape and remained uncon-
vinced (a possibility I am willing to allow for) they
might have broken new ground by explaining why
my analysis of these objections fails to satisfy them. As
it is, I can only reply by quoting most of the tape at
them (which space considerations forbid) or by retort-
ing that those who have foregone the luxury of hearing
an argument should deny themselves the luxury of
condemning it (which diplomatic considerations forbid).

Eric Mack has read Taylor’s version of the argu-
ment, but seems to me to have misunderstood it. Taylor
does remark in passing that we assume that our cog-
nitive apparatus is in principle reliable, that we do not
infer this reliability from biological theory or from
anything else—that it is, as Adam Reed states, “axiom-
atic in the Aristotelian sense.” But he does not offer
this as a reply to Psychological Darwinism. His reply
looks at first glance like the most extreme, deflationary
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Professor Dean E. Wooldridge is correct—
not only with prodigious historical, legal, and
economic scholarship, but with unrelenting logic.

Some persons, considering the great variety of com-
plicated situations which men encounter, and the inge-
nuity which they sometimes use in dealing with them,
deny that the mental apparatus is in principle reliable, that we do not
infer this reliability from biological theory or from
anything else—that it is, as Adam Reed states, “axiom-
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It is a pity that my critics have not heard the tape
they complain of, for all their objections are discussed
in it. Had they heard the tape and remained uncon-
vinced (a possibility I am willing to allow for) they
might have broken new ground by explaining why
my analysis of these objections fails to satisfy them. As
it is, I can only reply by quoting most of the tape at
them (which space considerations forbid) or by retort-
ing that those who have foregone the luxury of hearing
an argument should deny themselves the luxury of
condemning it (which diplomatic considerations forbid).

Eric Mack has read Taylor’s version of the argu-
ment, but seems to me to have misunderstood it. Taylor
does remark in passing that we assume that our cog-
nitive apparatus is in principle reliable, that we do not
infer this reliability from biological theory or from
anything else—that it is, as Adam Reed states, “axiom-
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A Word To Our Readers

- As the result of egregious crypto-bureaucratic confusion, the "Suiten FUOR Violoncello Solo" was substituted for the Bach Magnificat in the June installment of "Introduction to Musical Listening." The Bach Magnificat is available on DG ARC-198197 and on Turnabout 34173. All of Dr. Hospers' superlatives in reference to the "Suiten" were meant, of course, for the Magnificat. Our apologies to Dr. Hospers and our readers.

- In the book world things happen at a very rapid pace. Books come in and go out of print quickly and unexpectedly; prices change with ever increasing frequency. (And, unhappily, the changes are usually UP!) Thus our Back List, which appears in each LR, has changes made on it right up until our printer rolls his presses. So that we may give you the best possible service, please refer to the latest Back List when placing your order. Thanks.

- COYOTE (Call Off Your Old Tired Ethics) is an organization working to de-criminalize the world's oldest profession. COYOTE welcomes the support of all (especially women) who believe that the sexual activities of consenting adults are not any of the State's business. Membership in COYOTE is $5 per year. If you want to fight the Mrs. Grundy State, write Margo St. James, Chairmadam, COYOTE, PO Box 26354, San Francisco, CA 94126; or call (415) 441-8118.

- The LR Book Service is pleased to announce that we now have in stock the paperback edition of Robert Heinlein's *Time Enough for Love*. Consequently, we are discontinuing the hardback edition. The LR price for the paperback is $1.95.

- Readers interested in Asian anarchist/libertarian activities and history will want to have a look at *Libero International*, a new bimonthly publication of CIRA-Nippon, a Japanese federation of "autonomous libertarian groups." The digest-size, English-language magazine covers, on a "fifty-fifty basis," current anarchist/libertarian activities in Japan, Korea, and China and "the facts about the energetic libertarian history of Asia." The first issue includes a biographical essay about Kotoku Shusui, the founder of modern Japanese anarchism, and articles about anarchism in China and Korea. Subscription information is available from *Libero International*, CPO Box 1065, Kobe, Japan 650-91.

- From time to time, we learn of job opportunities with employers who are specifically seeking libertarian-inclined individuals. These range from clerk-typist jobs to foundation directors, from editorial positions to shipping clerks. Jobs in all sections of the country have come to our attention. In addition, LR on occasion has job openings, both full-time and part-time, in our Washington offices, which we would of course prefer to offer to qualified libertarians. If you are seeking work now, or plan to be in the future, and would like to send us a brief resume of your qualifications, we will hold it on file and attempt to match it with job opportunities as they come to our attention. All correspondence will be held in confidence, of course.


REVIEWERS FOR THIS ISSUE: Douglas R. Casey is a Washington, D.C. investment broker. His review of Common Sense Economics is reprinted with permission from the *Inflation Survival Letter*. Solveig Eggerz is a freelance writer and a Human Events contributing editor. R. Dale Grinde holds a doctorate in American history and recently spent a year at the Institute for Humane Studies preparing his thesis for publication. Stanley Lieberman is director of the Information Processing Department at the Research Laboratories of the Bendix Corporation. Leonard P. Liggio teaches history at City College of New York. James J. Martin is a leading revisionist historian. Robert Masters is a freelance writer who has recently removed from the wilds of New York City to the more hospitable wilds of Washington state. Jeff Riggenbach is a book critic for the Los Angeles all-news radio station KFWB. Murray N. Rothbard, Professor of Economics at the Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn, is an LR associate editor and editor of Libertarian Forum. He is currently doing research at the Institute for Humane Studies. J. Neil Schulman is co-editor of New Libertarian Notes. Mark Skousten is managing editor of the *Inflation Survival Letter* and a doctoral candidate in economics at George Washington University. George von Hilsheimer is an authority on special education, a Ph.D. candidate in psychology, and author of *How to Live with Your Special Child*. Mark S. Wells is general manager of the LR Mail-Order Service and holds a BS in finance from the University of Arizona.

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