The true meaning of Camp David has become increasingly clear: the widely trumpeted "Framework for Peace in the Middle East" is, simply, a grisly hoax. There is no assurance whatever that Israeli troops will ever leave the West Bank, or that the settlements there will not be expanded in the next few years. This is not a peace treaty, but simply a capitulation to the Israeli government's procedur- es that have been in place all along. Beirut has grown more violent out of the last Carter administration's policy of appeasing and subsidizing the Zionists in the Middle East.
There are half a million men and women in prisons around the world for the simple crime of disagreeing with their governments.

From South Africa to the Soviet Union, from Brazil to Korea, authoritarian regimes persist in the barbarian practice of jailing, often torturing, their citizens not for anything they’ve done, but for what they believe.

These prisoners of conscience have only one hope — that someone outside will care about what is happening to them.

Amnesty International has helped free over 14,000 political prisoners by marshaling world public opinion through international letter-writing campaigns.

Your pen can become a powerful weapon against repression, injustice and inhumanity.

Join with us today in this important effort.

Because if we do not help today’s victims, who will help us if we become tomorrow’s?

This powerful weapon can help free prisoners of conscience all over the world.

Amnesty International
3618 Sacramento
San Francisco, 94118
(415) 563-3733

2112 Broadway
New York, N.Y. 10023
(212) 787-8906

☐ I would like to join Amnesty International in helping to free prisoners of conscience. Enclosed are my dues of fifteen dollars.

☐ Please send me more information.

☐ Enclosed is my contribution of $________ to help you in your efforts.

name
address
city state zip

(Dues and donations are tax-deductible)
The Middle East After Camp David: Walking on Water
by Earl C. Ravenal

"Most people say that peace in the Middle East will never be stable without the United States. On the Contrary, peace will never be stable unless it is without the United States."

Page . . . 7

October 1978
Volume 7, No. 9
$1.25

DEPARTMENTS

The Libertarian Editorials
The Snowballing Clark Campaign
The Law-and-Order Man
The Despot Everybody Loves
The Mugger as Hero

The Public Trough
The Resurgence of the Defense Establishment by Bruce Bartlett

The Movement
New Illinois LP Critique of Public Education
Libertarians Attend National Conference of Campaign to Stop Government Spying by Milton Mueller

The Plumb Line
Camp David and After by Murray N. Rothbard

Books and the Arts
Watching the Teletypes by Leslee J. Newman
Hayek's System of Principles by Gerald P. O'Driscoll
Public Schools: Democratic Ideal or Political Tool by Joseph R. Peden
The Gods Come to Seattle by JoAnn Rothbard

FEATURES

Convention Diary, 1978
by Jeff Riggenbach
A no holds barred report on this year's national Libertarian Party convention

LP Ticket, 1978
by Chris Hocker
The National Director of the Libertarian Party reviews the LP's achievements going into the Fall elections

Libertarian Review is published monthly by Libertarian Review, Inc. Editorial and business offices, 1620 Montgomery Street, San Francisco, CA 94111. ©1978 by Libertarian Review, Inc. All rights reserved. Opinions expressed in bylined articles do not necessarily reflect the views of the editor or publisher.

Subscriptions: Single copy, $1.25; 12 issues (one year), $15; two years, $25; three years, $35. Address Change: Write new address, city, state and zip code on sheet of plain paper, attach mailing label from recent issue of LR, and send to Circulation Department, Libertarian Review, 1620 Montgomery Street, San Francisco, CA 94111. Second class postage paid at San Francisco and additional offices.

Editor, Roy A. Childs, Jr.
Senior Editor, Jeff Riggenbach
Associate Editors, Walter E. Grinder, Leonard P. Liggio, Joan Kennedy Taylor
Contributing Editors, Murray N. Rothbard, Tom G. Palmer, Bruce Bartlett
Editorial Assistant, Justin Raimondo
Administrative Assistant, Pat Pope
Art Director, Andy Saunders
When Clark entered the race, he faced an uphill battle even to get on the ballot: nearly 100,000 valid petition signatures were required; could Clark and his supporters possibly meet such a requirement? They could and did: Clark turned in more than 180,000 signatures, and became the first Californian to make the gubernatorial ballot through the petition route.

The statewide media began calling Clark "the Unknown Candidate," but that, too began to change swiftly, as they began to learn of his positions, his candor, his forthrightness in facing up to tough questions. The Los Angeles Times wrote that "had Clark been a major party candidate instead of a member of the Libertarian Party, he would have been a reporter's dream. For within an hour's time, Clark called for: Legalizing prostitution; Abolition of the minimum wage; Reduction of the sales tax by one-third; a $400 income tax credit for renters" and other radical proposals. Clark "assailed Proposition 6, the anti-homosexual teacher's initiative, as 'an especially ugly and vicious example' of the attempt to legislate life-styles and personal freedoms. 'Gays are people. Gays have the right to teach in schools,' he added."

But Clark went further: calling for more tax cuts, he said that Proposition 13 had not gone nearly far enough in cutting taxes. He called for deregulation of business, and took other unorthodox positions, ignoring standard political categories. The result was a growing media respect for the outspoken candidate who would not shirk questions or evade issues. And that media respect began to translate into potential votes: Clark began to appear in the most important statewide polls, a major breakthrough for a Libertarian candidate. In late September, Clark began to campaign full-time, criss-crossing the state, appearing at rallies and news conferences, backed by literature, radio and television ads, and a dedicated group of Libertarian activists.
His visibility and his ratings in the polls, have—as of this writing—begun to climb rapidly.

The reasons for this are easy to name: at a time when politicians lie and tell stories, Clark speaks openly even about his most unpopular views. His is a clear, consistent voice in the midst of fog, deceiving and the corruption of language.

Dennis Opatrny, of the San Francisco Examiner’s Capitol Bureau, wrote about Clark as “an outspoken candidate who is willing to stick his neck out... Clark’s platform comes as a refreshing challenge to California’s traditional political oratory. He speaks openly, caring little for how his views could cost him the backing of special interest groups. Clark is a paradox in a day when most politicians are willing to lead only after testing the political winds.”

Dan Walters wrote in the Sacramento Union of attending a Clark news conference that “turned into one of the longest in recent history. The reporters who are used to hearing carefully crafted lies were plainly delighted that a politician was willing to stand before them and give straight answers to straight questions. It became obvious that he wasn’t trying to duck any of the tough issues. The reporters bored in, trying to find a chink in his armor—an issue on which he would waffle, sidestep or otherwise act like politicians are expected to act these days.”

Ed Clark, in short, treated both the media and the people of California with respect. And so he has begun to climb in popularity.

The editor of the Sacramento Union, Don Hoenshell, wrote that “Ed Clark is a soft-spoken man of conviction with ideas that criss-cross Republican-Democratic party lines and approach the public mood more directly than anything else in generations.”

The Berkeley Barb commented that whether Clark wins or loses, “the fact remains that the Libertarian Party is growing steadily in California and should become a major state power in the near future.” And the Sacramento Bee speculated as to whether “Ed Clark, the Libertarian Party candidate for Governor... may not have a bigger impact on the November election results than anticipated. His anti-government philosophy seems in keeping with the public mood. The election yet may turn on whether Clark takes away more votes from Younger or Brown.”

Finally, Ed Salzman, the editor of the prestigious California Journal wrote, in a piece on the voters’ disenchantment with both Brown and Younger—“Campaign ’78: The Year the Boos Drown Out the Cheers”—that “it is probably fortunate for both Brown and Younger that Ed Clark, the Libertarian Party candidate, doesn’t have a couple of million dollars to spend this year... California voters might be attracted to a true non-politician with a platform that would probably be appealing in this antigovernment era. The Libertarian Party platform appeals to both conservatives and liberals because it calls for minimal government intervention in private lives, whether through taxation or restrictions on individual freedom.”

That kind of sentiment shows that a professionally run campaign—with a candidate both consistent and uncompromising—can draw real attention to itself, and can begin to build the electoral base necessary for the triumph of the Libertarian program for change. With this sort of steady growth, and this kind of candidate, the Libertarian Party may indeed find its proposals gaining the acceptance and enthusiasm which, today, neither the Democrats nor Republicans can find in the electorate.

There is no enthusiasm for Democratic or Republican candidates today because neither stands for anything except more of the same. Our “leaders” are timid opportunists who are, above all, afraid of clarity and consistency. In a world where people grow increasingly tired of this stale mixture of incoherent ideas and bland personalities devoid of character, the prospects for radical change may come upon us more quickly than we think.

The law-and-order man

WILL WONDERS never cease? The ever-unpredictable President Carter has nominated Norval Morris, the New Zealand-born dean of the University of Chicago Law School, to head the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, the agency which spends $647 million a year for various projects designed to reduce crime. What makes Morris a wonder in the field of crime reduction is his apparently quite clear understanding that there are two entirely different kinds of acts which go by the name “crime.” On the one hand, there is murder, rape, assault, robbery, arson—the entire set of acts which violate the person or property of the individual. On the other hand, there is prostitution, gambling, dealing in cocaine, selling obscene literature—the entire set of acts which violate no one’s person or property, but which are nevertheless forbidden.

A key component of Norval Morris’s idea of reducing crime is simply eliminating peacable, voluntary acts from the category of crime. In his 1970 book, The Honest Politician’s Guide to Crime Control (written with Gordon Hawkins), Morris calls for elimination of laws against public drunkenness, vagrancy, disorderly conduct, prostitution, gambling, bigamy, incest,
A RECOMMENDATION

This November in California there is a unique opportunity for libertarians to take sides in a political battle between special interest groups. Proposition 6—a ballot initiative written by state senator John Briggs, which would require the dismissal and prohibit the hiring of homosexual teachers in the public schools—is one of the most vicious attempts in history to legislate “morality” and scapegoat an entire community. Briggs’s campaign tactics have amounted to a blatant attempt to ride the coattails of hatred and intolerance into power. The Libertarian Party of California has been active in the statewide campaign against the Briggs initiative. We urge all our California readers to vote NO on Proposition 6.

—The Editors

The despot everybody loves

SHAH MOHAMMED Reza Pahlavi of Iran is in big trouble. Nearly 40,000 of his most articulate young subjects are living in the United States, where they frequently stage powerfully moving demonstrations against his regime. Another 60,000 are scattered through other Western countries, where they’re working hard at a similar job of reverse public relations. And now, the Shah’s first major attempt to buttress his image in the face of this onslaught has backfired loudly.

In late August and early September, the Shah began liberalizing his laws on freedom of expression, which had been some of the most repressive in the world. The ban against political parties was lifted. The order absolutely forbidding public criticism of the Shah was relaxed. More than 300 political prisoners, most of them Marxists, were released. The Shah even agreed to permit television coverage of debate in the Iranian parliament. Surely, such moves as these could only prove to the world that the Shah’s one desire was to Westernize and democratize his country, that he sought only to guarantee the rights of dissent commonly recognized in Western countries, and that any appearances to the contrary had been just that—appearances.

The difficulty with this tactic was that as soon as the Shah made protest possible, protest became virtually a way of life in Iran, overnight. For days, dissenters marched through Teheran, Shiraz, Mashed, Yazd, Qum, Ahwaz—through every major Iranian city, hundreds of thousands strong, chanting, waving signs, demanding removal of the Shah. Articles against the regime began appearing in Hayhan and Etela’at, the two biggest Iranian dailies. And when the TV cameras zoomed in on the parliamentary debate as scheduled, they found themselves covering opposition members who had nothing good but a great deal of evil to say about the Shah and his policies.

The result should have come as no surprise to anyone. The Shah called out the army. The army opened fire on a September 8 march through Teheran by several thousand peaceful demonstrators, killing an untold number of them (the government says about a hundred, the protesters say about four thousand) and wounding several hundred others. Next, the Shah imposed a strict dusk to dawn curfew, empowered his soldiers to invade homes without warrants and arrest without charges, retightened the newly relaxed laws on dissent, and issued orders to detain nearly 4500 suspected “subversives”—mostly journalists, educators and religious leaders who had taken advantage of the momentarily freer political atmosphere to air their true feelings about the government. Those on the list who haven’t been apprehended have fled into hiding.

Of course, the whole period of liberalization had been a fraud from the beginning—a Borgiasque trap into which a goodly number of the Shah’s most articulate critics had walked, unarmed and apparently unsuspecting. Liberalize the laws, make dissent legal, make some public speeches dressed out with the rhetoric of human rights, and see who bites. See who reveals himself as a subversive. Then rescind the liberalization and stamp out the newly self-identified subversives. If the liberalization was ever sincere, why was nothing done about the clause in the Iranian constitution...
which mandates a three-to-ten-year prison sentence for anyone who “casts gates” the Shah? Why were only 300 political prisoners released, when there are an estimated 10,000 in the country?

As for the Shah’s insistence that all opposition to his regime is a communist plot—this, too, is a fraud, along with the American conception that his most important and numerous critics are the Islamic religious leaders who oppose his Westernization program and the gambling, pornography, and liberated women it is bringing in its wake. As Time magazine reported recently, the mosques of Iran have become centers of political action, not so much because the religious leaders have become political as because political leaders have begun disguising themselves with religious trappings. Time quotes one dissident lawyer: “We have not been allowed to form political parties. We have no newspapers of our own. But the religious leaders have a built-in communication system. They easily reach the masses through their weekly sermons in the mosques and their network of mullahs [teachers] throughout the nation. That is why so many non-religious elements cloak their opposition in the mantle of religion.”

The real issue in Iran is not communism, nor is it religious and cultural opposition to certain social changes. It is human rights. It is the fact that 300,000 Iranians have been imprisoned for their beliefs in the past 20 years. It is the fact that a good many of those 300,000 have been tortured—a sufficient number that Amnesty International has called Iran’s human rights record the worst in the world.

Yet it is Iran, we are assured by the establishment press both in this country and elsewhere in the Western world, it is this iniquitous pesthole which is ordained to save us all from the Soviet menace.” The conservative National Review editorializes that the Shah was “forced to impose martial law and censorship” in order to avoid giving the USSR a chance to plant “Communist parasites” in an ascendant radical faction. The liberal New Republic declares that “if the Shah’s regime should fall, it will not be because it was so repressive but because it tried to liberalize itself and was not repressive enough,” and that “no gifts of prophecy are needed to understand that the next Iranian government—or at the very least the one after next—will rule the country more harshly than the Shah did.” And Time, slavishly devoted as always to the trendy political middle, portrays the Shah as “a bulwark of anti-Communism” who is “deeply wounded by events spawned from his own dream for Iran” and “searching for ways to calm his troubled people.”

The fact is that the Shah has calmed his troubled people by placing them under martial law for the next six months, by reimposing his old, repressive legal system after freshly weeding out all its pesky dissidents. The fact is that the Shah’s regime is indistinguishable from that of Leonid Brezhnev or of Idi Amin. The fact is that the Shah is one of the most blatant political atavisms of our century, a Neolithic barbarian who would be more properly at home in the mouth of a cave, wearing a skin and carrying a club, than in his five Iranian palaces with his U.S.-trained and U.S.-equipped army at his heels.

The real issue in Iran is human rights. It is the fact that 300,000 Iranians have been imprisoned for their beliefs in the past 20 years. It is the fact that a good many of those 300,000 have been tortured—a sufficient number that Amnesty International has called Iran’s human rights record the worst in the world.

Yet it is Iran, we are assured by the establishment press both in this country and elsewhere in the Western world, it is this iniquitous pesthole which is ordained to save us all from the Soviet menace.” The conservative National Review editorializes that the Shah was “forced to impose martial law and censorship” in order to avoid giving the USSR a chance to plant “Communist parasites” in an ascendant radical faction. The liberal New Republic declares that “if the Shah’s regime should fall, it will not be because it was so repressive but because it tried to liberalize itself and was not repressive enough,” and that “no gifts of prophecy are needed to understand that the next Iranian government—or at the very least the one after next—will rule the country more harshly than the Shah did.” And Time, slavishly devoted as always to the trendy political middle, portrays the Shah as “a bulwark of anti-Communism” who is “deeply wounded by events spawned from his own dream for Iran” and “searching for ways to calm his troubled people.”

The fact is that the Shah has calmed his troubled people by placing them under martial law for the next six months, by reimposing his old, repressive legal system after freshly weeding out all its pesky dissidents. The fact is that the Shah’s regime is indistinguishable from that of Leonid Brezhnev or of Idi Amin. The fact is that the Shah is one of the most blatant political atavisms of our century, a Neolithic barbarian who would be more properly at home in the mouth of a cave, wearing a skin and carrying a club, than in his five Iranian palaces with his U.S.-trained and U.S.-equipped army at his heels.
fy and unimaginative Marxism, having little patience with such things as “the pseudo-counter-culture types of the past decade who were apt to speak of ‘doing your own thing’” right down to more recent figures such as James Dean, Evel Knievel and, ahem, “Spiderman.” Moreover, champions of these types are all-too-alive and well, too: Mr. Hyfler mentions Mobil Oil, Republican politicians, and Robert Nozick as a few of the apologists for such individualism.

Well, we must at least grant the charming ambitiousness of an analysis which places Robert Nozick in bed with Spiderman. Mr. Hyfler in fact sees “individualism” everywhere: in the radical right, the “do your own thing” left, “success-at-any-price students,” and . . . . But wait—let him speak for himself: “Perhaps the most conspicuous of all American individualists,” he writes, “is the underclass law-breaker who seeks a redistribution of income on the level of the individual. A delightful breakthrough, that, one with a keen insight into the meaning of the concept ‘redistribution of income.’”

Would that more socialists much as their parents proclaimed, ‘mind your own business.’” But occasionally In These Times does break new ground, and when it does, all observers of the political scene ought to Stand At Attention.

Such a breakthrough can be found in the August 23-30, 1978 issue: “Socialism Confronts Cult of Individualism,” by Robert Hyfler. Mr. Hyfler maintains that individualism is, alas, alive and well in America in the form of heroes from “Edison, Teddy Roosevelt and Lindbergh,” right down to James Dean, Evel Knievel and, ahem, “Spiderman.” Moreover, champions of these types are all-too-alive and well, too: Mr. Hyfler mentions Mobil Oil, Republican politicians, and Robert Nozick as a few of the apologists for such individualism.

Well, we must at least grant the charming ambitiousness of an analysis which places Robert Nozick in bed with Spiderman. Mr. Hyfler in fact sees “individualism” everywhere: in the radical right, the “do your own thing” left, “success-at-any-price students,” and . . . . But wait—let him speak for himself: “Perhaps the most conspicuous of all American individualists,” he writes, “is the underclass law-breaker who seeks a redistribution of income on the level of the individual. A delightful breakthrough, that, one with a keen insight into the meaning of the concept ‘redistribution of income.’”

Would that more socialists much as their parents proclaimed, ‘mind your own business.’” But occasionally In These Times does break new ground, and when it does, all observers of the political scene ought to Stand At Attention.

Such a breakthrough can be found in the August 23-30, 1978 issue: “Socialism Confronts Cult of Individualism,” by Robert Hyfler. Mr. Hyfler maintains that individualism is, alas, alive and well in America in the form of heroes from “Edison, Teddy Roosevelt and Lindbergh,” right down to James Dean, Evel Knievel and, ahem, “Spiderman.” Moreover, champions of these types are all-too-alive and well, too: Mr. Hyfler mentions Mobil Oil, Republican politicians, and Robert Nozick as a few of the apologists for such individualism.

Well, we must at least grant the charming ambitiousness of an analysis which places Robert Nozick in bed with Spiderman. Mr. Hyfler in fact sees “individualism” everywhere: in the radical right, the “do your own thing” left, “success-at-any-price students,” and . . . . But wait—let him speak for himself: “Perhaps the most conspicuous of all American individualists,” he writes, “is the underclass law-breaker who seeks a redistribution of income on the level of the individual. A delightful breakthrough, that, one with a keen insight into the meaning of the concept ‘redistribution of income.’”

Would that more socialists
The Defense Establishment can always be counted upon to choose the most antiquated style of defense at the highest possible cost.

In August, the House of Representatives approved a Defense Department budget for fiscal year 1979 of $119.3 billion by the overwhelming vote of 339 to 60. In many respects this vote may be seen as a watershed in recent American history, because it marks the resurgence of the defense establishment in the United States after the debacle of Vietnam. Since the Vietnam War protests began in the late 1960s, it has been almost impossible to get a defense budget through Congress without heavy cuts. But this year the House not only approved the largest defense budget in history with virtually no cuts, but even added $2.3 billion for a nuclear aircraft carrier which the Navy does not want.

The prodefense forces have argued that defense spending has been dropping steadily as a percentage of federal outlays—from about 49 percent in 1960 to about 30 percent in 1973 to a current level of approximately 24 percent. They also argue that in real terms (after adjustment for inflation) defense spending has been roughly constant since 1972. And their efforts have been aided by the Soviet Union’s incredibly stupid trials of Jewish dissidents and western newsmen, and by Cuban adventurism in Africa.

In the wave of anti-Soviet opinion and pro-defense lobbying, however, a fundamental question has been left unanswered: that of the relationship between an adequate defense and a given level of defense spending. In other words, is our nation’s defense necessarily improved by giving more money to the Defense Department, or is it possible to selectively cut defense expenditures and still have an adequate defense? Unless one believes the Defense Department to be infallible, with no waste of any kind, then the answer has to be yes.

For example: Military historians now believe that developed from that attack. Yet the Navy Department had considered them to be the backbone of our national defense. As it turned out, the submarine proved to be the critical weapon in the Pacific war. Since the cost of building a submarine was miniscule compared to the cost of a battleship, we can therefore say that before Pearl Harbor all the money spent on battleships in lieu of submarines was wasted. We could have stopped building battleships, built submarines instead, cut the defense budget, and gotten a better defense for the kind of war that developed in the bargain.

The same thing could be done today if we were to stop spending money on modern-day “battleships” and built modern-day “submarines” instead. An example of a modern-day “battleship” is the land-based intercontinental ballistic missile. There is no question that these remnants of the 1950s are totally unsuited for the kind of nuclear war which is likely to develop at any time in the foreseeable future. Military strategists know this is true; but rather than abandon their
commitment to obsolete land-based nuclear missiles in favor of submarine-launched missiles or air-launched cruise missiles they have come up with a new missile, the MX, which would be launched from long, underground trenches stretching for miles. The only problem is that housing these missiles would require thousands of square miles of uninhabited land and billions upon billions of dollars in new expenditures, all for a system which already is probably obsolete.

In fact, even when the military is reluctantly forced to accept a less expensive weapon system, it still tries to find ways of beefing up the cost. In the case of the cruise missile, for example, the military said that it could not be used without building a new supersonic bomber like the B-1, even though a refitted Boeing 747 could do a comparable job at a tiny fraction of the cost.

Thus we must conclude that the Defense Department is no different from any other government agency. It will never admit that its mission could be accomplished in another way, at less cost; it will never admit to waste or mismanagement; and it will never admit that anyone outside the department is in any way qualified to judge its actions. The only difference is that the Defense Department can hide its bungling behind a cloak of secrecy in the name of "national security."

Consequently the conservative attitude that any criticism of the Defense Department or the level of defense spending is anti-American and pro-communist is absurd. There are probably some Defense Department critics who are, in fact, pro-communist and desire to see our national defense weakened in order to hasten their goal. But most want to see an adequate defense at the least cost and the least threat to individual liberty.

As much as you try, you simply cannot get away from the fact that the greatest threat to liberty and prosperity is war—even if you are the victor. The great inroads by the government into the economy and our personal lives in the United States did not result from the New Deal or the Great Society, but from World War I and World War II. Consequently, our vigilance against unnecessary growth of the Defense Establishment can never be too great.
MILTON MUELLER

WELCOME TO "The Movement," LR's monthly overview of important developments in the libertarian movement. A word of introduction is needed to establish my approach. As the name of the column suggests, I believe it is essential to view libertarian activity as part of an integrated and unified attempt to end statism. This "movement-oriented" approach should be distinguished sharply from the attitude of those who pursue isolated reductions of state power as ends in themselves. The assertion may seem paradoxical, but I am convinced we will not end statism by reducing taxes here a little, there a little; we will not end statism by legalizing marijuana; nor by any single act of deregulation or any un-integrated series of such acts. Our goal can be accomplished only by building a movement of radical and consistent libertarians working in concert for the elimination of state power in all areas. We must work to get people into libertarian organizations, to think of themselves as libertarians, and to consistently act to attain libertarian ends.

This is the conceptual framework with which libertarian events will be analyzed and criticized in this column. Both glib puff-pieces and personal tirades condemning others will be scrupulously avoided, in favor of objective attempts to analyze our successes and failures so we can discern the proper path.

All libertarian organizations, from state LPs to fellow-travellers, are invited to barrage me with news and announcements of their activities. Information should be directed to Milton Mueller, c/o LR, 1620 Montgomery St., San Francisco, CA 94111. Or call (415) 781-5817.

***

State LPs looking for a good example of how to apply radical ideology to specific state issues should send for a copy of the booklet Education: Reality Refutes the Myth, published by the Illinois Libertarian Party. The Illinois LP was looking for a plausible way to promote the elimination of the Illinois income tax. In so doing, they went over the "education" budget of their state and local governments with a fine tooth comb.

The hard research done by the Illinois group uncovered lots of damaging evidence. It is one thing to assert that the education bureaucracy is inefficient and wasteful; it is another to know that enrollments have declined by precisely 200,000, while spending has increased by $507 million and the number of non-teaching administrators has ballooned by more than 11,000. A simple list of the salaries and job titles of the State Board of Education says worlds about the byzantine nature of state educational bureaucracies.

One local school district, while pleading poverty, had three of its 16 elementary schools sitting empty, while maintaining $1 million in its construction fund and spending thousands for "site selection." Another district—while crying for funds and proposing a referendum to increase the tax rate—was discovered to have a $12.5 million surplus. State-mandated programs in local schools force all sorts of unnecessary expenses. In one small town, a one-room school was forced to hire a social worker, despite the fact that no one in the community ever asked for or needed a social worker in the school. The costs of such state-man-
format of an “alternative budget.” Essentially, this means that the LPI is going on record as supporting a certain level of government expenditure for the next several years. Proposing an alternative budget puts a libertarian in the Kafkaesque dilemma of pretending that there is a rational and just way to decide how much robbery and coercion people should accept. Should the Water Department’s budget be cut? If so, by how much? How many highway patrolmen do we need? How many jails do we need? Should the State Auditing Department be allowed to purchase a new computer, or not? These are silly questions for a libertarian to even attempt to answer. Merely to face them—as I have done myself, while working on an “alternative budget” a few years ago—is to understand the moral contradictions embodied by such a format.

It is also strategically weak to parade before the press and the public, in excruciating detail, all the specific cuts necessary to attain an artificially set level of government expenditure. The difficulty of getting people to accept tax cuts is multiplied by such an approach. Every cut must seem justifiable to the public in isolation: senior citizen centers, road construction, water reclamation programs, and on and on it goes. Government is intimately involved in the warp and woof of daily life, and very little of that involvement is the kind of blatant, visible rip-off that people can relate to.

On the other hand, state parties that want to add meat to their ideological criticisms of state institutions must research the budget in order to know what they are talking about. What is the answer to this seeming dilemma?

The answer is to make projects like the Illinois education research take the form of a budget critique, not an alternative budget. That is, the research should simply use the budgetary figures supplied by the state as a weapon against government programs. Use the budget to expose and condemn bureaucracy and waste. Use the budget to measure the incredible costs of coercion and monopoly. But avoid the trap of trying to calculate how much injustice we should put up with for the next three years. It is perfectly feasible to make your programs well-researched budgetary critiques of the state apparatus without making them into “alternative budgets.”

Copies of the booklet are available from the Libertarian Party of Illinois, P.O. Box 313, Chicago, IL 60690. Send a donation to cover the costs.

On the weekend of September 22-24, in Ann Arbor, Michigan, the Campaign to Stop Government Spying (CSGS) held its national organizing conference. There were two representatives from libertarian organizations: myself from Students for a Libertarian Society, and Sheldon Waxman from the Libertarian Party of Illinois.

Our presence was welcome, even though we were outside the standard spectrum of left-liberal groups normally interested in stopping CIA, FBI and other state agencies’ violations of individual rights. But our presence was also unexpected; to the predominantly leftist crowd we were a wrench thrown into the smooth functioning of the liberal paradigm.

It was truly enjoyable to violate the stereotypes and categories of these people. The broad conglomeration of liberal, women’s, Native American, black, Latino, socialist, and anti-nuclear groups has become somewhat of a leftist litany; if you’re not one of those, well, just what ARE you? One person mistook Sheldon’s Libertarian Party badge for the Liberation News Service. I went rep-
preservation on the part of the state apparatus. The rationalizations of "national security," the "terrorist threat," and curtailing "violence-prone radicals" are primarily covers for a deeply felt, almost organic resistance to any popular threat to the state apparatus.

It is difficult to fully understand the evil of statism without ever having confronted it directly and brutally. Ed Crane was right in his speech to the LP national convention in Boston, I discovered, about there being a lot of incipient libertarianism on the left: Specifically, those who have been perceived by the state as a threat understand a fundamental tenet of libertarianism at the gut level—the government is not "us," it is a self-sustaining, parasitical organism growing on us that will consciously "disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neutralize" its organized enemies. (The verbs are from an FBI CO-INTELPRO memo.) This fundamental understanding makes the antistatism of "garbage-collection" libertarians seem superficial at times. A speaker from the Native American movement, for example, attempted to goad and challenge the conference into a more radical stance. "You speak of government spying," he said. "But the FBI has killed our men and the federal government has sterilized our women."

"They say the only proper way to dispose of the American flag after it has been desecrated is to burn it," he continued. "The principles this flag is supposed to stand for have been desecrated by the FBI, the CIA, and the police."

"You want us to join you? You gather to burn the American flag. Then we will come from all over the land to join you. We will even bring our own flags." The crowd—some of us—applauded loudly.

In conclusion, it is important to note that the presence of libertarians in traditionally left-wing coalitions is important and powerful. Wherever there is common ground between us—defense spending, government spying, and civil liberties—we are invariably more radical and consistent than most of the other groups in the coalition. Therefore, we cannot be lumped with the right or purged on grounds of being traitors to the cause. At the same time, our presence deprives the left of their longstanding monopoly on certain types of issues, forcing them to broaden their appeal and reach out to a larger number of people. It keeps them on the track, limiting the extent to which an antigovernment spying group, for example, can be quickly transformed into an anticapitalist group, or an antiterror group turned into an anti-American group. Despite this, our presence in such coalitions is of value to the left because it defeats red-baiting. Libertarians are rather invulnerable to the charge of "communism."

While the task will not be easy, the coalition struck in Ann Arbor is an important step toward redefining the political spectrum in this country.

Milton Mueller is executive director of Students for a Libertarian Society. He will be writing "The Movement" every month.
Camp David and after

MURRAY N. ROTHBARD

NOW THAT THE hooping and the hosannas from Camp David have died down, we are in a position to evaluate what actually happened there, and what the agreements portend for the future of the Middle East.

One thing we are certain did not happen: Peace for all time and justice for all peoples in a spirit of mutual concessions were not achieved. For the true meaning of Camp David has become increasingly clear: Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat, in betrayal of his long-time commitments to the other Arab nations and to the Palestinian people, has made a separate peace with Israel. What Sadat accomplished was solely in the interest of the Egyptian state—the return of Egyptian sovereignty over the Sinai, and the removal of the Zionist settlements there.

And even that sovereignty will be limited; for the Sinai will be virtually demilitarized, and United Nations troops will be permanently stationed there, near the Israeli border. To top it off, Jimmy Carter has sweetened the deal even further for Israeli Prime Minister Begin by agreeing to build two air bases for Israel near the Sinai border, at a cost to the American taxpayer of $500 million.

Israel’s gain from Camp David is enormous. In addition to preserving the Sinai as a buffer zone against any possible Egyptian attack, (with the help of the United States and the United Nations), Israel’s major gain is simply the separate peace. For Egypt is the strongest Arab military power, and the peace treaty means that Egypt has abandoned the Arab struggle, putting another conventional war virtually out of the question for the Arab states.

In return for these inestimable gains, all Begin had to give up was the Zionist settlements in the Sinai. This he accomplished very cleverly by throwing the problem open to the Knesset (the Israeli parliament), and letting “democracy” decide. As the leader of the ultra-Zionist bloc in the Knesset, Begin was able to cover himself with his own party and to throw the onus for abandoning the settlements on all the political parties in Israel.

It is no accident that the happiest men at the televised proceedings at Camp David were clearly Begin and Carter. Begin has knocked Egypt out of the war. Carter has revived his flagging popularity, restored his image as a strong statesman, and resurrected Zionist funding sources for his reelection campaign.

Sadat, on the other hand, is in much shakier shape. Sadat’s own Foreign Minister, Mohammed Ibrahim Kamel, thanked by Begin for his part in the negotiations, resigned immediately thereafter in protest of the agreements. But just as Carter desperately needed an agreement—any agreement—at Camp David to restore his political fortunes, so Sadat needed some positive conclusion from his quixotic gamble last November, flying to Israel and returning empty-handed. To save his face, Sadat, too, needed an agreement. Begin, sitting pretty on Israeli conquests, could afford to bide his time. Hence, Begin was able to wait and pick up all the marbles.

But Sadat desperately needed some way to cover himself with Arab public opinion, both for the betrayal of the Palestinians and for the betrayal of his allies. The consequent widely trumpeted “Framework for Peace in the Middle East” is, simply, a gristy hoax. The framework is merely a warmed-over version of the Begin plan for localized autonomy for the West Bank, which Sadat had angrily rejected last December. Briefly, there is no assurance whatever that Israeli troops will ever leave the West Bank, or that the Israeli settlements there will not be expanded in the next five years, much less dismantled. Begin reaffirmed his intention to assert eternal sovereignty over the West Bank, and agreed only to negotiate. Who the negotiators on behalf of the Palestinians will be, or who will represent them in the local government accorded them for the next five years, will be subject to Israeli veto. This means, of course, no role for the major Palestinian group, the Palestine Liberation Organization, as well as no role for the millions of Palestinians exiled from both the West Bank and from Israel proper. They will not even be represented, much less assured the right to return to the homes, lands, and properties seized from them by the state of Israel during more than three decades of combat.

As for the other Arab nations, not a word is said in the “Framework for Peace in the Middle East” about Israel’s returning the Golan Heights to Syria, or about restoring the Moslem holy places of East Jerusalem to the Palestinians. Jordan is merely allotted the thankless role of supervising the Palestinian “representatives.” Despite its longstanding, pro-United States and anti-PLO role, Jordan—the bulk of whose citizens are Palestinians—cannot afford to seem too eager to jettison Palestinian interests. Moreover, Jordan’s financial and political mentor, Saudi Arabia—devoutly Moslem—has
been angered by the failure of the framework to resolve the problem of East Jerusalem. As a result, Jordan and Saudi Arabia have, so far, firmly (though not very heatedly) rejected the Camp David accords. Without Jordanian collaboration, it is doubtful that Egypt alone would try to implement the phony provisions for Palestinian autonomy. As a result, the framework is probably destined to remain a dead letter, although still providing Begin with a coverup to assuage American opinion, and Sadat with an even flimsier coverup for the Arab world.

In the short run, the state of Israel is now in an excellent strategic position. Egypt, the strongest Arab power, has been taken out of the war and effectively neutralized, leaving Israel free to take an even tougher line with the other Arab states. Jordan, on Israel's eastern flank, has always been militarily passive, and there have been no PLO guerrillas based there since "Black September" of 1970, when King Hussein of Jordan turned savagely upon the PLO camps and massacred the guerrillas. The PLO forces are mobilized only in Lebanon; but Lebanon, too, has been neutralized by last winter's incursions from Israel. Southern Lebanon is now occupied partly by U.N. troops, and partly by anti-Palestinian Christian fanatics in an army organized by the fascist Phalange and subsidized and equipped by Israel. Both serve as a buffer against any PLO incursion in force into Israel. This leaves only Syria, effectively in control of civil war-torn Lebanon and confronting Israel on the Golan Heights. But Syria is only one nation, far weaker than Israel. Moreover, rumor has it that Syria's President Hafez el Assad, who has played a vacillating, centrist role in the Middle East, may be mortally ill. If so, Syria will be weakened still further—at least for a while.

It is true that such radical Arab states as Iraq, Algeria, and Libya remain fiercely anti-Zionist, but they can do little about it, since they are not front-line (or "confrontation") states contiguous with Israel. They can offer financial aid and moral support to the Palestinians, but little else.

Beyond all this, Camp David has put the quietus, once and for all, to what might be called the official "dove" peace plan, sponsored by doves in the U.S. State Department and by various "soft" Zionists and peace movement members within Israel. The dove plan entailed Israel's withdrawal from all its post-1967 conquests, including the West Bank, and the establishment of a genuinely independent Palestinian state in that area. In return for these concessions, the new Palistine would pledge to recognize Israel's post-1948 borders and presumably not serve as a base for further assertion of Palestinian rights to the remainder of Israel. The dove plan is now dead, buried by Camp David, and the Israeli peace movement seems perfectly content with the Begin-Sadat-Carter agreement.

In the long run, however, Israel's situation is not that favorable. Instead, Israel is sitting on top of a cauldron, the cauldron of Palestinian rights to their property, homeland, and national self-determination which have been trampled on and remain as remote as ever. For the major burning question in the Middle East, the rights of the
Palestinians, remains unresolved. The most hopeful development of the past decade for the Palestinians has been their resolution to rely, not on the weak reed of Arab nation-states, wedded to their own state interests, but rather on themselves alone, on their within the PLO and between it and other Palestinian political and guerrilla organizations. The PLO “moderates,” headed by Yassir Arafat, are willing to accept the pre-1967 solution propounded by the State Department doves. The radicals have proposal to return to the pre-1967 state of affairs. But there is another, less heralded but still important, reason for the split among the Palestinians, and this problem is not so easily resolved. The Arafat wing believes that all Arab nations can be mobilized to hold that the quickest way toward victory for the Palestinians over Israel is actually the roundabout way—safeguarding the Palestinian rear by first promoting the overthrow of the conservative, pro-United States governments of the Arab confrontation.

A refugee camp in the Golan Heights: “the major burning issue of the Middle East, the rights of the Palestinians, remains unsolved.”

national spirit and on popular militancy. Until 1967, the Palestinians were content to have their interests fought for by the Arab nations, and the result was a tragic series of expulsions and defeats. After the 1967 rout, the Palestinians developed their own national consciousness, and the PLO emerged as the internationally acknowledged representative for the millions of Palestinians at home and in exile. It is probably the PLO’s struggle, based on the widespread support of the Palestinian people, which offers the only long-term hope for vindication of their rights.

In the last few years, a grave split has occurred angrily spurned that solution as a sellout of the ultimate Palestinian aim: the restoration of the rights and properties of all Palestinians, and a consequent secular, democratic state (with freedom for all religions) in all of Palestine. In the last few years, conflict between the moderates and the radicals has led to armed clashes and the recent assassination of leading moderate PLO diplomats in Western Europe.

We can expect that Camp David, by putting an end to the dove proposal, will serve to unify the PLO and other Palestinians around the more radical program—at least until new events occur which might revive the old program to return to the pre-1967 state of affairs. But there is another, less heralded but still important, reason for the split among the Palestinians, and this problem is not so easily resolved. The Arafat wing believes that all Arab nations can be mobilized to hold that the quickest way toward victory for the Palestinians over Israel is actually the roundabout way—safeguarding the Palestinian rear by first promoting the overthrow of the conservative, pro-United States governments of the Arab confrontation.
The outcome of the Middle East summit talks at Camp David was a surprise to virtually everyone, including the participants, who had several times given up on the talks. It certainly refuted public expectations in Cairo, Tel Aviv, and Washington. Everyone had been prepared (cleverly, some would say) for a “thinly disguised failure.” What emerged instead was a thinly disguised separate peace.

Carter, Sadat, and Begin produced two framework agreements, legally separate but linked in ways that will become obvious before long. The first, between Israel and Egypt, would return the entire Sinai—including the Israeli airbases—to Egypt, and provides for a quick bilateral peace negotiation. The second is a scaffolding for a more general Middle East settlement, including, for the West Bank and Gaza, a five-year transition regime, some governance by the Palestinians, a role for both Egypt and Jordan, and security arrangements for Israel. Missing from the latter is any mention of East Jerusalem (which is covered by mutually discordant letters), the Golan Heights, and the role of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Also left vague enough to occasion sharply differing interpretations is the status of Israel’s colonies and military outposts on the West Bank during and after the five-year transition. Egypt gains much—in fact, all—on the ground. But it gives up its insistence on a prior Israeli commitment to full autonomy for the West Bank and withdrawal from all Arab territories. Israel accepts the eventual risk of an independent Palestinian state on its borders. No explicit military role is specified for the United States (though that will, no doubt, come later in the detailed negotiations, or perhaps already exists in secret understandings). The United States extends its influence in the diplomacy and strategic dispositions of the area; and the American president gains great credit, at home and abroad, for his exercise of personal persuasion and of the powers that are thought to reside in his office.

The spirit of Camp David

There is some good news and some bad news in the Camp David formula—but neither good nor bad should be measured by the usual yardstick. I would say that Camp David might have been helpful:

1. insofar as it got Israel and Egypt to talk with each other, not to or through the United States;
2. to the extent that it facilitated the kind of peace that seems most promising in the longer run—that is, a “nation-by-nation” progression, not the comprehensive settlement that is still the goal of most Arab states, and is still, I suspect, an attraction to the White House; such a settlement would be doomed by including too much and too many;
3. if it does not commit the United States to guarantee the settlement, especially by tangible devices such as military pacts, bases, or troop deployments;
4. as long as it does not engender expectations by either side that the United States will do or get something for it that it could not do or get for itself.

In other words, those conditions describe one of two possible consistent courses of events and policies for the United States: They suggest an American stance of disengagement, along with a succession of separate, bilateral deals, or even an aborted sequence, negotiated essentially by the local parties themselves, and resting on the local balance of factors, rather than a comprehensive settlement, dependent on the ministrations and support and coercion of the United States. Camp David embodies elements of both approaches, and thus must be judged as a partial success and a partial failure. Despite Camp David—or because of it—the process of Middle East peace is still ambiguous and open-ended: It could lead either to a series of separate agreements, or it could lead to more attempts at a comprehensive settlement. Camp
David is indeed (as President Carter called it, with Quixotic overtones) an “impossible dream.” The logic of the situation has not been transformed, the ultimate choices of the parties are still roughly the same ones that they confronted before October 1978.

Israel must still choose between autonomy and dependence—between reliance on its own strategic resources and on the aid, arms, diplomatic support, and military power of the United States.

Egypt can confirm the option that Sadat originally grasped at Jerusalem and regained at Camp David—the option of a nation-by-nation settlement—or, under pressure from within and without, it may relapse into espousal of pan-Arab objectives that were not gained at Camp David: the Palestinians, the Golan, Jerusalem.

The United States can aim at preventing the incidence of war or avoiding involvement in war. The first way, it might get both war and involvement; the second way, there could be peace but at least a war would be someone else’s. That is, the United States could fall into Sadat’s “full partner” trap and move from the forced success of Camp David to probable failures that lie ahead; or it could use this occasion to encourage local initiatives and disengage strategically from the region.

These choices by the various parties have neither been definitively made nor finally foreclosed by Camp David; they are still available. What is not available—and is not, therefore, a real choice—is the possibility of holding all positions simultaneously. But that, it seems, as Camp David unfolds into a train of diplomatic maneuvers, is what all the parties are trying to do.

First, Israel: The peace framework conforms to Israel’s long-standing objectives; the nation-by-nation approach has always been its political strategy—though in the past there might have been a different order of precedence: first Jordan, then Egypt. But, even though Israel retains or gains considerable strategic assets (indefinite military presence on the West Bank, substantial demilitarization of the Sinai, American replacement of its Sinai airfields, a number of American electronic warning planes to compensate for its giving up territorial depth), it bargains for even greater American support. Israel now appears to accept a U. S. strategic presence on its soil—perhaps a naval base at Haifa, some air contingents (but not ground troops), and an explicit American security guarantee. But Israel’s acceptance does not make these solutions any more sound, either for Israel or for the United States. Some of them are worse than the problem.

Sadat appears to have made a more definitive choice, reinforcing his Jerusalem initiative. Actually, Sadat has had his separate peace with Israel for several years, at least since the second Sinai disengagement, though he couldn’t admit it. For in the event of another war between Israel and an Arab antagonist (most likely Syria), Egypt and Israel could have stayed in the passes (the 200 American technicians would have rapidly departed), sending off fireworks and lobbing artillery at each other’s protected positions, while Israel would have been free to send its mobilized forces against the Syrians and to dispatch strike units to the oil fields and military installations of other Arab neighbors. That was the secret scenario of the Middle East war that didn’t happen. Even
after Camp David, allowing for the adjustment and formalization of Egypt’s borders, it may remain Egypt’s peace plan for the “next war.”

Nevertheless, Sadat has begun to revert to his old game. Once back in Cairo, he revived some of the pan-Arab demands. According to him, he had even negotiated at Camp David implicitly on behalf of Syria: “Every aspect of the solution concerning the Sinai will be applied faithfully to the question of the Golan Heights (The Washington Post, September 23, 1978). And in his exchange of letters on Jerusalem, he restated his classic position: “Arab Jerusalem is an integral part of the West Bank. Legal and historical Arab rights in the city must be respected and restored. Arab Jerusalem should be under Arab sovereignty. . . . All the measures taken by Israel to alter the status of the city are null and void and should be rescinded. . . . (As for administration,) essential functions in the city should be undivided and a joint municipal council composed of an equal number of Arab and Israeli members can supervise the carrying out of these functions. In this way [and by implication in no other way] the city shall be undivided.” By contrast, Begin’s letter states that “Jerusalem is one city indivisible, the capital of the state of Israel” (Letters to President Carter, September 17, 1978).

It is not at all clear how this dispute can be resolved; but the point is that Sadat has not budged from his original pan-Arab position. Even to the extent that Sadat has chosen a separate peace, it is not certain that he has reconciled himself to the liabilities of his position. He still expects the United States to shield him and his regime from the effects of his choice. And he expects the United States to gain further concessions for him by resolving ambiguous clauses in Egypt’s favor. According to the Washington Post:

“Sadat would never have signed those accords on the basis of just an agreement with Israel,” a high-ranking [Egyptian] Foreign Ministry official said, but Carter told him, “Don’t worry, we will take care of the [loopholes]”. . . . Sadat has a personal commitment from Carter that the Egyptians believe will prevent Israel from taking advantage of the accords’ ambiguities or shelving the West Bank talks once an Egypt-Israel peace treaty is signed. (September 25, 1987)

And as Sadat said to Carter, pointedly, at the signing ceremony, the accords “signal the emergence of a new peace initiative with the American nation in the heart of the process. . . . You made a commitment to be a full partner in the peace talks. The continuation of your active role is indispensable.” (The Washington Post, September 18, 1978, and Evans and Novak in The Washington Post, September 20, 1978).

So the discussion is forced back to the role of the United States. At Camp David, the United States seemed to have turned away from its previously favored plan, a comprehensive settlement underpinned by a universal American activism, procuring the settlement, guaranteeing it, enforcing it; satisfying the demands, claims, and expectations of the parties; warding off the threats of the rejectionist states and the terrorists; awarding compensations of various kinds; blocking Soviet penetration and nullifying Soviet influence. But the United States failed definitively to seize the logic of the nation-by-nation course. It still attempts to broaden its partial success at Camp David into a future comprehensive settlement. (Brzezinski’s “concentric circles” represent a blend of the separate and the comprehensive approaches, of American “brokerage” and American “partnership.”)

Washington’s “interests” in the Middle East (and, according to Brzezinski, the United States is entitled to assert its own interests in the situation) have run increasingly with Sadat, rather than Begin. (Moving Begin the necessary minimal distance, not reinforcing his requirements, has been Washington’s preoccupation.) And that is not surprising, since the American interests consist of frustrating Soviet penetration of the Eastern Mediterranean and Northeast Africa and securing the flow of oil. Of course, preserving the existence of Israel is still an American moral and political concern, even if Israel is seen more and more as a strategic liability. The theory is that the United States can reconcile these otherwise conflicting interests only by avoiding involvement in another Middle East war. And the current American wisdom is that this means avoiding the war, not the involvement. That implies a disposition (though not necessarily the capacity) to run Sadat’s errands.

As Carter put it in his address to Congress on September 18, 1978:

The United States has had no choice but to be concerned about the Middle East, and to use our influence and efforts to advance the cause of peace. . . . The dangers and the costs of conflict in this region for our nation have been great. . . . The strategic location of these countries and the resources they possess mean that events in the Middle East directly affect people everywhere. We and our friends could not be indifferent if a hostile power were to establish domination there. . . . That is why we cannot be idle bystanders, why we have been full partners in the search for peace.

But the necessity for American involvement is conditional and circular. Far from being an objective feature of the situation and an ineluctable requirement, it is a trap of our own devising.

Certainly, given the narrow alternatives to which the parties had been reduced on the eve of Camp David, that meeting has produced the better of the two possible outcomes. One could not have wished for an abject failure and a slide into war. But Camp David is as much part of the problem as part of the solution. For it virtually ensures—indeed, mandates—the implication of the United States in the challenges and impasses that are bound to be strewn on the path to a Middle East accord, as the settlement—now “Jimmy Carter’s settlement”—runs into the predictable troubles.

Precisely because of the hopes it has engendered for American underwriting of the settlement, Camp David perpetuates the dependency and irresponsibility of the local parties. For almost 20 years Israel has enjoyed a one-sided American support that has enabled it to stone-wall against Arab claims. And President Sadat has made a cultivated vice of using the United States to run interference for his maximum objectives. For over a decade the United States has rescued the parties from their diplomatic or military incompetence, and has absolved them of the necessity of choice.

Although it has revived the negotiations and inspired some concessions, the spirit of Camp David may, in the longer run, paralyze the initiative of the local parties, prolong the confrontation, and still implicate the United States in a situation where “a local conflict could spread among other nations and then erupt into confrontation between the superpowers,” as Jimmy Carter himself put it in his address to Congress on September 18.
Now Carter is being widely urged to use Camp David as a launching pad for further ambitious American initiatives in the Middle East and elsewhere, across the whole geographical and functional scene. It may seem strange, even ungrateful, to give the opposite advice: that Camp David should be the outer limit of American involvement; that the United States, having associated itself with this initial success, should now disassociate itself from its train of consequences.

But before we discuss the logic of disengagement from the Middle East, we should trace the path of American diplomacy in the region, to understand how we became engaged.

Coming full circle

The current era of Mideast diplomacy began during the war of October 1973, when the United States, pressed by the need for oil and drawn by the opportunity to supplant Soviet influence, committed itself to extensive and detailed involvement in the region, distributing its support much more even-handedly than before the conflict. It intervened decisively to prevent Israel from annihilating the remaining Egyptian armies; and, with the heavy mediation of Secretary of State Kissinger, it initiated a "step-by-step" process to settle the issues that divided Israel and the Arab nations.

For a while the arduous and resourceful diplomacy of Kissinger and his aides was unexpectedly productive. The first agreements brought about limited Israeli military disengagements from the Suez Canal (January 1974) and on the Golan Heights (May 1974). In October 1975 came the second disengagement, the withdrawal by Israeli forces to the eastern end of the Mitla and Giddi passes in the Sinai, and the interposition of 200 American electronic surveillance technicians. The disengagement agreements were probably the best compromises that could have been obtained. Even Israel could hardly have maintained the irrational frontiers around the Canal at the end of the conflict, and the economic strain of continuing mobilization. The United States, at least temporarily, achieved both oil and influence, and, as a bonus, what had been criticized as Kissinger's hyperbolic hope, the "expulsion" of the Soviets from Egypt and a U.S. diplomatic foothold in Syria. In a sense, Kissinger's efforts (confirmed by President Nixon's visit in the late spring of 1974) had brought about a diplomatic revolution in the Middle East.

But the approving judgment of the liberal press ("[the choice] between Israeli and Arab friendship ... now appears obsolete, if not false"—Washington Post, June 18, 1974) was premature. Even diplomatic triumphs were reversible with Arab sentiment and Soviet influence. The Soviets shored up their position with Syria, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and Iraq. In the ten months after the October war, Russia was reported to have delivered to Syria more than $2 billion in modern weapons, giving Syria an independent capability of launching a "full-scale war against Israel." Characteristically, the Nixon-Kissinger administration had achieved an ambiguous solution by obfuscating the payoffs and by promising things that ultimately could not be delivered. The disengagement agreements were acceptable to the parties only because they did not foreclose the aims of any of them.

This early diplomacy contemplated multilateral talks at Geneva that would deal with more substantial border revisions and the question of a Palestinian state. Still later, it was promised, there would be a virtually complete Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories, accompanied by some kind of Arab recognition of Israel. But the promise—or threat—of Geneva only inaugurated a period of maneuver, in which the principal stumbling block was the guise in which the Palestinians should appear.

The Carter administration's initial diffidence about its role was balanced by its expansive concept of a settlement, based on the "legitimate rights" of the Palestinian people. In October 1977, it invoked Moscow in a joint declaration of principles for a Middle East agreement. This ineptitude had the unintended effect of precipitating Sadat's unilateral approach to Israel, and Begin's equally prompt acceptance.

Sadat's mission to Jerusalem in November 1977, like a flash of diplomatic lightning, illumined the landscape of possibilities and afforded a glimpse of one possible
direction—a nation-by-nation settlement. Among other things, it could have implied that American intervention might be superfluous—even an impediment to be obviated by local diplomacy. Washington was chagrined that the local parties should want to settle matters between themselves. Brzezinski, the great conceptualizer, tried to fold the bilateral talks into the semblance of a grand American framework: “I used the analogy of three concentric circles. The first circle right now involves the Israelis and the Egyptians talking together directly and the United States being there because they want us to be there. . . .” (Washington Post, December 12, 1977).

The Jerusalem initiative enlightened the options, but it could not alter them. And it did not represent a definitive choice by Sadat. Along with his acceptance of Israel’s right to exist, he reaffirmed all the improbable pan-Arab demands: return of the Sinai, of course; but also self-Sadat not to posit “conditions” than as an offer to compromise Israel’s requirements.

The 26-point plan that Begin submitted to the December summit at Ismailia—which was largely endorsed at Camp David—was a long step forward for Begin, but it had to look like a step backward to Sadat. For it prescribed “administrative autonomy,” but in “Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district,” and it envisaged Israeli military occupation during a transition of five years, and beyond. Meanwhile, Israel was sponsoring Jewish settlements, not only on the West Bank but also in the Sinai. Israel further muddied the diplomatic stream with its military thrust in Lebanon in March 1978. There ensued a time of trilateral recriminations, with Egypt cancelling the Israeli-Egyptian political discussions (and later the military ones), both sides appealing for American support, the Carter administration trying to unhinge Begin’s
determination for the Palestinians, though not necessarily under the aegis of the PLO ("As for the Palestinian question, nobody denies that it is the essence of the problem as a whole; and nobody today in the whole world accepts mutterings and slogans here in Israel avoiding the Palestinian people . . . Peace cannot be realized without the Palestinians. . . There is no use in not recognizing the Palestinian people and its own right in establishing its homeland and its rights of return."); the relinquishing of "Arab Jerusalem"; and even, by implication, cession of the Golan to Syria ("total withdrawal from the occupied Arab land . . . is an obvious matter that cannot be compromised").

You could see the diplomacy of Jerusalem falling apart, that very afternoon in the Knesset, when Begin deflected Sadat’s demands. In an exercise that was misappraised as obtuse but was perceptive and artful, Begin took Sadat on an excursion through Jewish history, reminding him that Israel’s claims were rooted in its experience and were not mere bargaining ploys. When he said that “everything is open to negotiation,” he meant this more as a warning to government, and Sadat reaching out to dissident Israeli cabinet ministers and opposition politicians. Sadat’s counter-plan, revealed in July 1978, envisaged Egyptian and Jordanian occupation of the Palestinian territories for the interim period. At the urging of the United States, the Israeli and Egyptian foreign ministers met at Leeds in England in July 1978. That meeting was notable for the first crack in the Israeli position on the cession of territory.

With the talks at Camp David, Middle East diplomacy and the American role came full circle—back to the shuttle, though this time (in the words of the Washington Post) an “instant shuttle.”

The “logic” of American intervention

In October 1975, the Egyptian government invited guests from fifty countries to Cairo to celebrate and analyze its putative victory in the war of two years before. It was a time of high promise, and high illusion; the second Sinai
disengagement had just been effected, and at that moment President Sadat was shopping for arms in Washington. I had the occasion to warn an assemblage of Egyptian military men and academics that the Middle East problem would never be solved until both sides stopped depending on the United States.

It was hard to convince Egyptians that Sinai II was ratified only because Congress was reluctant to repudiate the Secretary of State, and that it represented the high water mark of American public acceptance of interposition between the contestants in the Middle East. Because the United States would not give Israel sufficient compen-

satory assurances (or, more accurately, because Israel would not accept U. S. assurances as sufficient), it could not obtain from Israel all those pan-Arab demands that Sadat has hardly yet brought himself to abandon. So Egyptian choices were cruelly exposed: Egypt could have peace with Israel (there were no insoluble issues between those two countries), or it could have its pan-Arab pretensions; but it could not have both. Nor is either choice free: The one risks isolation or schism in the Arab world, with the loss of Saudi support, or a coup or assassination; the other leads to war.

Sadat’s Jerusalem trip was a reconnaissance of one of these contradictory alternatives. With the puncturing of Jerusalem’s promise, Sadat reverted to the hope that the American president could reconcile the contradictions, that the United States would become the Arabs’ agent by becoming Israel’s protector.

Proposals of an American security guarantee for Israel are not scarce. Scholars such as Nadav Safran have urged such a pact for almost a decade. Others, such as Richard H. Ullman, deducing the inevitable concomitants of this, recommend the stationing of U. S. forces on Israeli soil. Columnists, such as Stephen Rosenfeld of the Washington Post, say that an American guarantee, with all the trimmings, is “worth the risks.” And Zbigniew Brzezinski, even before attaining the position of the President’s national security assistant, made U.S. participation in a multilateral guarantee the cardinal element of his Middle East solution. (Nadav Safran, “The War and the Future of the Arab-Israeli Conflict,” Foreign Affairs, January 1974, and “Engagement in the Middle East,” October 1974; Richard H. Ullman, “Alliance With Israel?” Foreign Policy, Summer 1975; Zbigniew Brzezinski, Francois Duchene, and Kiichi Saeki, “Peace in an International Framework,” Foreign Policy, Summer 1975.)

Indeed, most people would now say that peace in the Middle East will never be stable without the United States. On the contrary, peace will never be stable unless it is without the United States. For the American guarantee is unreliable—or, if you will, only partially or provisionally reliable, which might be worse. Our government cannot reckon the constraints on its future behavior. It might be deterred by the threat of an oil embargo, or dissuaded by European or Japanese allies, or hobbled by domestic sentiments or adverse congressional reactions.

Henry Kissinger, in a private discussion, is reported to have said that he could not be sure that, in the event of another Middle East war, he could even muster congressional support for an airlift. “One participant recalled that Kissinger said the chances were 2 to 1 against his bringing it off again. Another recalled that he put the odds at 3 to 2.” (The Washington Post, February 9, 1974.)

It is not even clear that future generations of American Jews will support the special cause of Israel, beyond the common denominator of concern for the safety of embattled populations; this will particularly pertain if they are faced with personal risks and sacrifices, and if Israel drifts toward militarization, a colonialist mentality, a
“corporate” economic order, and sharpened internal class and racial conflict.

The point is that Israel’s distrust of external assurances is not a subjective disposition, but a situational fact. It could not rely solely on an American or international guarantee for giving up tangible security advantages, even if these are becoming somewhat debased. Israel might “accept” an imposed settlement and imposed guarantees, but from the beginning it would hedge against them. In particular, it would secretly reserve the “right” of reprisal and preemption—all the more necessary in the absence of buffer territory—if it suffered from growing terrorism based in Palestine, or if it saw Arab states building for another attack or evading restrictions on the militarization of border areas (remember Egypt’s violation of the 1970 truce by moving ground-to-air missiles to the Canal).

And there will be challenges. One has only to consider who remains outside this agreement, angrily looking in: the PLO and influential West Bank political figures, the Syrians, the other rejectionist states (Iraq, Libya, Algeria, South Yemen, the Soviet Union, and disaffected elements within Egypt, including a contingent in the foreign ministry and refugees from the Nasser regime floating around Cairo and perhaps concealed in the army.

On the other hand, the odds that America might not honor its guarantees are not an excuse for it to undertake such a commitment, which could be triggered by events beyond its control. And if it made its military guarantee technically invalid in the event of Israeli preemption, the United States might get the worst of bargains: By denying Israel its most potent instrument of deterrence against Arab mobilization or attrition, the United States would be virtually assuring that its intervention, if it still had to occur, would be under desperate military conditions.

Nowhere is “necessity” invoked with such frequency and conviction as in justifying American intervention in the politics and geopolitics of the Middle East. It may be true that, in this case, American participation is close to being necessary to achieve and maintain peace. But what happens if what is necessary is not also sufficient?

American choices

The poignant conclusion is that there may not be a complete solution to the Middle East problem—just a series of hard decisions for Egypt and Israel, and also for the United States.

I do not propose to offer another detailed plan for a settlement—where to draw the interim lines in the Sinai, how big a slice of the Golan to give back to Syria, how to internationalize Jerusalem, how much autonomy to give the Palestinians, what kind of corridor to connect the West Bank and Gaza, what role to accord King Hussein, how to draft an American or a multilateral guarantee, how to demilitarize the border areas, what rules to govern shipping through the Gulf of Aqaba and the Red Sea, what powers to give a UN peacekeeping force, who will man the police patrols, what kinds of fences and ditches and electronic sensors to construct. We have heard the variations, over several decades. What we ought to be discussing is the role of the United States, because that is the piece of the problem that we can manage (though even this is not a simple exercise for the executive branch of government, but rather a complex result of our entire political process).

Virtually all schemes for the Middle East are based on the unchallenged assumption that the United States is inextricably involved and therefore should determine the settlement and enforce the peace. I would have thought that if anything had been discredited in the past decade or two, it was the assumption that the United States could control other-world (third, second, even most of the first) situations. Moreover, if anyone thinks that even a managed peace will be a free ride for the United States, he should look at the costs. They consist of securing long lines of communication along or across potentially hostile or uncooperative states, and preserving bases and rights of overflight; balancing the Soviet military presence in the Eastern Mediterranean and the approaches to the Red Sea, at an annual cost of $20 to 25 billion; and maintaining a strategic deterrent at every level of potential escalation, including the capacity for selective nuclear response that would be useful in crisis bargaining with the Soviets. (This rough estimate of the cost of balancing the Soviet military presence is constructed by allocating portions of the costs of other theatres: $11 or 12 billion of the $62 billion for Europe; a $5-6 billion slice of the strategic reserve; $2 to 3 billion of the Asian force budget, the portion that supports deployments in the Indian Ocean; several billion dollars more for maintaining a surge capacity in our carrier-based and land-based tactical air; and another several billion dollars for military assistance to Israel and Arab countries that do not pay for their arms. Costs are in 1979 dollars.)

The general and special liabilities of our present policies constitute the reasons why the United States should consider a full range of alternatives in the Middle East—particularly the alternative of disengagement. We should put some insulation and some distance between ourselves and the local contestants and their requisites and concerns. At the very least, we should be wary of extending guarantees on which future political generations of Americans, or a transformed American system, will not be able to deliver. It should be the aim of the United States to encourage Israel and other countries to make the hard remaining choices for themselves, and to reduce our own coercive and dominating role. This might still mean extending our good offices to stimulate direct talks among the local parties, but that role would be more like Begin’s “honest broker” than Sadat’s “full partner.”

What Israel needs from the United States is not more pressure, even in return for more assurances, but freedom from the strategic and diplomatic and political timetable of American presidents. In adopting a stance of disengagement, the United States would avoid the onus of forcing Israel to forfeit remaining frontiers, and above all flexible military tactics, in exchange for dubious international guarantees. A certain sustaining level of arms transfers would probably continue, but we would not manipulate arms exports to gain leverage over the behavior of the parties on either side, or to implement our conception of “balance” in the region. In a conflict, the United States would confine support of Israel to the minimal replacement of destroyed or exhausted equipment and supplies, avoiding a massive and conspicuous airlift in the heat of battle; and it would offer to organize a neutral humanitarian force of interposition if any civilian population were in danger of annihilation or wholesale displacement.
A byproduct of American disengagement would be Israeli strategic autonomy. Actually, Israel would be favored in the short and medium run (though the longer-term effects are incalculable and depend on how Israel uses its time). Even in another war, in the extreme scenario of Russian intervention without American counter-intervention, several divisions of Soviet paratroops armed with conventional weapons might be chewed up by the Israelis—an insufferable humiliation for the Soviets (a fast-motion “Vietnam”) and therefore an incentive for them to abstain from this course. (This judgment is supported by a study of the world military balance produced within the Carter administration. Among other conclusions reported in The New York Times, January 6, 1978, the report states that Israel by itself “might deter Soviet combat force intervention or prevent the completion of such deployment.”) A parallel calculation is that Israel’s existent or threatened nuclear force would deter the Soviets from putting strategic pressure on Israel. I do not believe, however, that Israel should advertise the acquisition and threaten the use of nuclear weapons, as proposed by Robert W. Tucker (Commentary, November 1975, and The New York Times, December 21, 1975). Supposedly, this would enable Israel to stand off its local antagonists and, if necessary, even to deter the Soviet Union, and thus release the United States from excessive responsibility for order in this region, and absolve us from the risk of automatic involvement in a future Middle East war. These are desirable objectives; the question is whether the nuclear option is necessary to attain them. One must admit, however, that to brandish its nuclear weapons, the United States would have to disassociate itself from Israel’s objectives and even from its fate.

A recent assessment of Israel’s strength projected that the outcome of the “next war”—even before eliminating Egypt from the equation—would be triumphant for Israel. It has enough ammunition and war reserve stocks to fight for 90 days on three fronts—and it is unlikely to have to do this, especially now. The conclusion of U. S. government sources was that “Israel can defeat any likely combination of Arab forces between now and 1982 in a non-nuclear confrontation . . . Israel could not only defeat but annihilate Egypt and Syria as military powers in 10 to 14 days and will retain this capability through 1984 even if not permitted to buy any more U. S. military equipment” (International Bulletin, November 21, 1977, quoting or summarizing the statements of American officials, and commenting on the study of Anthony Cordesman in Armed Forces Journal, October 1977).

Even the moves by the Begin government toward economic austerity in the spring of 1977, floating the Israeli pound and eliminating subsidies, were misunderstood at the time as so much Friedmanesque fundamentalism. Actually, they were shrewdly designed to put Israel’s economy—as Israel has already put its war machine—out of the coercive reach of the United States. No more imposed truces and withdrawals in the moment of victory, as in October 1973 or after the Suez episode of 1956. Even though Israel has haphazardly implemented its economic program, it created a stronger bargaining position during its three-quarters of a year of insigience after Ismailia and in the negotiations at Camp David.

There is one more piece in this mosaic—no doubt a speculative one. Israel may well one day have to counter a militant Palestinian state and a host of revanchist Arab neighbors, all hoping to enlist Soviet support. In such a situation, Israel, both freed from and disabused of the American connection, could play its own “Soviet card,” by exploring the Russians’ conditions for a more even-handed role in the Middle East. There have been some slim openings for Israeli diplomatic cultivation of the Soviets: the meetings of their emissaries in Israel and Washington during the spring of 1975, the conciliatory remarks by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in Damascus in April 1975, and the unofficial Israeli mission to Moscow in September 1975. It would remain for some Israeli “Nixon” to exploit such possibilities.

The agreement between Egypt and Israel embodies the hope that the other Arab nations, in turn, may join in the settlement. Jordan and Lebanon would be next, with Saudi Arabia tacitly acquiescing. Syria would be the last country in the sequence, negotiating an agreement as an alternative to isolation, crippling expense, and the risk of destruction. The PLO, ignored, would lose its influence, and the leadership of the West Bank would pass into more complaisant hands. The peripheral Arab rejectionists, Iraq, Libya, and Algeria, would hardly figure in the equation. But the agreement also expresses the calculation that both Israel and Egypt could live with a perpetually divided Arab world.

### The penalties of disengagement

American disengagement in the Middle East, accompanied by a nation-by-nation peace process, would not be cost free. For one thing, the interim situation is not likely to be a stable one—with the Syrians on the outside, and with the active enmity of irredentist factions, implacably and richly supported by rejectionist states. Brzezinski’s pique, when Sadat’s Jerusalem initiative caught the U. S. government by surprise, might have been parochial (the initiative wasn’t invented in Washington and it left American bureaucrats out of the wiring diagram), but it reflected a genuine concern: A separate peace would be less durable and satisfying than a comprehensive agreement that brought all parties together in concord and justice under a protective, and preemptive, American guarantee—a true Pax Americana, the object of our diplomacy in the region since the assumption of Britain’s burden in the Eastern Mediterranean in 1947 and the pushover of Mossadegh’s government in Iran in 1953. But who would predict this perfect state of affairs?

Another problem is that disengagement would leave the United States vulnerable to the punitive deprivation of oil. As long as its energy needs are linked to Middle East supply, the United States faces the alternatives of placating Arab suppliers (with Israel as the victim) or coercing them (with Israel as the accomplice). Schemes for the forcible takeover of oil-producing states—the candidates have been Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, Iraq, and others—have been as plentiful as oil itself, as it turns out, over the past five or six years. Authors, or instigators, range from high officials such as Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger to academics such as Robert W. Tucker, Edward N. Luttwak, and Stephen D. Krasner.

In view of the more recent American tilt toward the moderate Arab states, these schemes have a somewhat antique flavor. But a policy of disengagement would
avoid both of those unpalatable and precarious alternatives. Arab oil producers could no longer coopt the United States by putting economic pressure on us that we would predictably translate into political pressure on Israel. The oil weapon would not lose its sting, but it would lose its sense.

Finally, among the “costs” of American disengagement is the suspicion that we would lapse into indifference toward the “just” causes of the remaining aggrieved parties. But it seems impossible to achieve both complete peace and complete justice in the Middle East. We should prefer peace, but if we cannot ensure that, we should choose not to be involved in a region where other people’s quarrels could draw us into a nuclear war.

Presidential miracles

Jimmy Carter’s peacemaking at Camp David confounded his most relentless detractors and dispelled the more absurd images of his incompetence. We are informed that his “approval rating” soared to 56 percent, “up 11 points since the first week of September and up 17 points since Carter’s low ebb in early August” (Gallup Poll, reported in the Washington Post, September 24, 1978). A political pundit tells us that “Jimmy Carter was a politician capable of destroying all the political wisdom of 18 months in 13 days at Camp David” (Jules Witcover, the Washington Star, September 18, 1978). And a syndicated columnist opines: “President Carter’s spectacular success at Camp David not only gives his personal prestige a needed boost at a critical time, but also renews the image of the United States as a commanding world power. It is reasonable to think, for example, that by getting a framework for Mideast peace, Carter at one stroke has enhanced confidence in his ability to handle international and domestic economic problems, including the sagging dollar and persistent inflation” (Hobart Rowen, “The World Looks Anew at Carter,” the Washington Post, September 21, 1978—as if inflation had nothing to do with massive budget deficits and the government’s facile ability to monetize its debt).

In fact, making hopeful prognoses for peace in the Middle East has given journalistic skeptics, and local political aspirants, a graceful way of retreating from their earlier acid evaluations of the president to positions now ranging from qualified support to outright adulation. It is no coincidence that these sudden sycophants had been mean to Carter precisely because he was not wielding the powers imputed to the presidency. They are the ones who believe most fervently in “presidential leadership,” and have been thirsting for a quaff of this elixir since—well, at least since the days of Lyndon Johnson, though he might have overdone it a bit. All’s right with the world; the president is acting presidential.

But meanwhile, the peace is continually challenged, by Begin’s crabbed reinterpretations, Sadat’s expansive pronouncements, the intransigent attitudes of Egypt’s neighbors, and the threats of rejectionist factions. We are on a roller-coaster of hopes and fears. Will Jimmy Carter get his Nobel Prize?

Our concern should be for another matter. The very success of Camp David would conceal its most pernicious threat. For it would imply that not only the longevity of a chief executive, but the viability of the American political system and the fate of the whole world, depend on expansive presidential government in the United States and ambitious American intrusion into the affairs of other nations. Camp David may have demonstrated that the American president can still bring parties together when he stretches out his imperious hand. But can he also abrogate logic and dissolve facts? That would surpass diplomacy; it would be like walking on water.

Well, the Middle East is just the place for that sort of thing. But Camp David has not quite conferred on the president the gift of miracles, even if he himself is a believer in them. Jimmy Carter had better follow the advice of the old Jewish joke and walk on the stones.
31 August, Thursday:
We arrive in Boston at 9:10 a.m., nearly zombielike from a mostly sleepless all-night flight. The forecast is for rain this afternoon, and a fine mist is already settling on the windshield of the car as we wind through the streets past greenery and old brick toward Copley Square. The streets are clogged with U-Haul and Ryder vans, and Budget and Avis Rent-A-Trucks, as students set up housekeeping for the fall term. Other students, exchange students from Iran, clog Copley Square in a protest march. "The Shah is a murderer," they chant. "Down with the Shah." The rain beats mercilessly upon the expressionless masks they have pulled over their faces. "The Shah is a U.S. puppet. Down with the Shah."

Inside the hotel, we stop by the press room to pick up our credentials to cover the convention. But it's not that simple. The LP refused press credentials in 1977 to a reporter from the second biggest all-news radio station in the country, because he was also a speaker at the convention and was being paid in that capacity. As the party saw it, the purpose of a convention was to make money, and the more freebies you give away, the less money you make. But the way you make money at such a convention is by stimulating attendance by getting a lot of publicity by giving freebies to the press. Is it really necessary to belabor this? Apparently it is; because tonight the Massachusetts LP wants to give me press credentials but not my photographer. How do you cover a convention for a magazine in which all the features are photo-illustrated if your photographer can't get into the convention? Well, you see, the purpose of a convention is to make money, and the more freebies you give away, the less money you make. . . .

A bit of a nap, then dinner and a party. The convention's first-night hospitality suite serves beer for 50 cents a bottle. Now, that's what I call hospitality. The suite is two large adjoining rooms, packed comfortably wall to wall with libertarians, except that all the libertarians are constantly moving and changing, with a constant influx of new arrivals and a constant outflow of bedbound old arrivals. In quick succession I say hello to Jim Clarkson, the Georgia tax rebel; Bill Marina, the Florida history professor who witnessed the Kennedy assassination; Steve Trinward from Massachusetts; Ed Crane and Roy Childs from California; Dave Nolan from Colorado; and a lady named Kate who tells me she's an engineer. "What kind?" I ask, naively.
"I design buildings and bridges," she says. "Incredibly Randian, isn't it?"

"Incredibly," I agree, as the tide of libertarians swirls around me.

Incredibly.

1 September, Friday:

At about 10:30 a.m., Robert Nozick of the Harvard University Philosophy Department begins explaining the wisdom of Zionism to about 225 people in the elaborate Venetian Room of the Copley Plaza, and the convention is under way.

Libertarians, according to Nozick, commonly display a special animosity toward the state of Israel, an animosity which seems to transcend their everyday hostility toward the state as an institution. Nozick finds this perplexing, since libertarians are ordinarily sympathetic, he says, "when a people, a nation, expresses its desire for freedom." Zionism, as Nozick understands it, is the national liberation movement of the Jewish people. What about the Palestinians? Well, in the first place, Palestine has never been independently ruled. In the second place, most of the Palestinians now in Israel have been there only since the Israeli government took over; they were lured there by the (relatively) high standard of living available to them. In the third place, the much-publicized Palestinian refugee camps continue to exist only because the surrounding Arab states refuse to assimilate the Palestinian population, preferring for political reasons to keep them homeless and the camps in highly visible operation. In the fourth place, all the documented cases of Israeli oppression of the Palestinians are also cases of real or imagined fifth column activity. "And countries have never looked favorably on fifth columnists."

Dozens of hands wave energetically for recognition. But there is time for only two or three questions before everyone is hustled out of the room to clear the way for the next "Major Event" on the program, LP National Chairman Dave Bergland's "Welcome," across the hall in the ballroom.

Not surprisingly, Bergland is sanguine about the prospects for the libertarian movement. He talks about the recent striking growth of the movement, about the libertarian character of the tax revolt, about the unprecedented numbers of LP candidates on November ballots around the country. But he cautions against thinking of the trend toward libertarianism as a fait accompli, citing the imposition of rent controls in Los Angeles and the likelihood (in his view) of a majority "yes" vote on Proposition 6 (the vicious Briggs Initiative, which would make it illegal for homosexuals to teach in public schools) on the California ballot in November.

Former LP National Chairman Ed Crane follows Bergland with the keynote address of the convention—a persuasive argument for exactly the sort of optimism the current national chairman has just endorsed. Crane points out that it is no longer utopian to think in terms of LP candidates having a legitimate chance to win their state ballot status for the LP in all 50 states by 1980, that a few persuasive arguments for exactly the sort of optimism the current national chairman has just endorsed. Crane observes, the current climate of hatred and distrust of government has opened the possibility of dozens of potentially profitable alliances on specific issues with nonlibertarian political groups. And too many libertarians, he insists, conceive such alliances entirely in terms of issues shared with conservatives. We have more in common, he says, with leftists who concern themselves mainly with civil liberties and foreign policy questions, than with conservatives who pay lip service to free-market capitalism while advocating that the state seize private wealth to fund wholesale oppression against deviant lifestyles at home and uncooperative governments abroad.

As Crane concludes his remarks, the lights are dimmed in the ballroom for a screening of "For A New Liberty", a new film about the libertarian movement. Then lunch, although a panel discussion on the Kennedy assassination beckons, to say nothing of LP National Director Chris Hocker's workshop on practical political skills and Jarret Wollstein's seminar on "Military Defense Without a State." Too many significant events are scheduled all at the same time and too close together at this convention. If you want to spend any time eating or going to the bathroom, you have to miss some events. If you want to attend one event, you have to miss another one or two scheduled at the same time. It's like three days of non-stop, prime-time television.

Back up to the room, then, for the equivalent of a commercial break or a "pause for station identification." Out in the hallway near the elevator, two hardfaced tight-lipped shorthaired darksided copytypes are instructing a third young man who appears to be a photographer.

"Just get the really weird, far-out stuff," one of the copytypes tells him. "Like two guys holding hands." They snicker. We aren't holding hands, and we're not two guys, so I'm not sure why, but they look suspiciously at us as we walk past them toward the elevator.

In the foyer of the ballroom, meanwhile, three members of the Massachusetts LP are demanding of LR Contributing Editor Tom Palmer why he is distributing that issue (the August issue) of Libertarian Review as a free introductory issue. Because it's the strategy issue, Palmer explains—the issue in which the how to (and the how not to) of libertarianism is discussed in detail. "But it has that in it," say the party people, pointing at Bill Evers's name on the cover. "You mean his criticism of party newsletters?" Palmer asks. But convention duties and rumors have stolen his interrogators away—rumors which have sent dozens of convention goers out into the lobby to see if they can get a look, or at least some more information—rumors that "Anita Bryant is in the hotel!"

Anita is supposed to be in Boston this weekend for a benefit concert—benefiting her nation-wide holy war against gays. A rally has been scheduled for this evening in Copley Square, across the street from the hotel, to protest Anita's visit and express gay solidarity. Dave Bergland has agreed to speak at the rally on behalf of the Libertarian Party. But rumor now has it that the concert has been cancelled (Anita's supporters say because of death threats by militant gays; Anita's opponents say because she failed to sell enough tickets to avoid public embarrassment) and Anita has checked into the hotel, where she'll be holding a news conference shortly.
Right now, there's a news conference for all the LP candidates. But only one news team is present besides ourselves—a reporter and crew from the PBS television station in Boston. The candidates line up behind Dave Bergland, who makes an intelligent, but disappointingly general, introductory speech about laissez-faire economics, civil liberties and noninterventionist foreign policy. In the back of the room, the taping crew has discovered a malfunction in the equipment. No usable video is being recorded. But the reporter is inquisitive anyway. "Isn't it inconsistent," he asks Bergland, "for a party like yours to seek to become the government?"

"We don't seek to become the government," Bergland tells him. "We seek to dismantle the government as fast as we can."

A brief stop at the ballroom for the panel discussion and audio-visual show on space exploration. Mercifully brief, for the audio-visual show—"guaranteed" by the convention management "to be spectacular"—is in fact a colossal bore. A pity, that. The idea of escape to libertarian colonies in space is (to me at any rate) an intrinsically fascinating one. But anything can be made tedious.

Back up to the room, then, for fresh film and cassettes. But this time the coptypes are standing on either side of the hallway by the elevator. And when we walk off the elevator and start toward our room, they block our path.

"May I help you?" one of them asks with a kind of surly courtesy.

"No," we tell him, walking around him. "We're just going to our room."

The coptype falls all over himself trying to get around us again so he can block our path again without roughing us up. Apparently that's outside his assignment. But our room is very close, and by the time he gets around us again, my key is in the door.

"May I see your room key?" he intones, extending his hand.

"No," I tell him, turning the key. "Who the hell are you that I should show you my key? Are you a cop? Where's your identification?"

"I don't have to show you my identification," says the coptype.

"And I don't have to show you my room key," I tell him, and shut the door in his face.

I pick up the phone to call the desk. It's dead. On the way back to the elevator I stop and tell the coptype I think I'll find out what the hotel management thinks of cheap hoods hassling guests on the way to their rooms.

"You're exactly like everybody else who looks like you," says the coptype. It occurs to me only later that this is tautological.

At the desk, a Richard Nixon lookalike is disinclined to agree with my description of the "security men" as hoodlums and thugs. "There's an important guest in the hotel, on your floor," he informs me, "and we need tight security. There've been threats of violence." He looks at me suspiciously.

"I'm nonviolent," I tell him. "I just want a working telephone and freedom from interference when I try to walk to my room."

The Nixon lookalike promises to take care of it all right away.

Outside the hotel, on the square, a rally is beginning to coalesce around a sound truck, a crude speaker's platform and a motley collection of signs. "Gays of the World Unite!" "Attention Anita: Over 90% of Rapists and Child Molesters Are Heterosexual Males!" "Born Again Unitarian Gay" "Lesbians for Wages for Housework" "Libertarian Party—Party of Principle" Word is that Dave Bergland will be the second speaker on the program. Our dinner party decides to linger at least long enough to catch Bergland's speech.

As darkness gathers, so do the gays and their sympathizers, and so do the cops, pompous and ostentatious on their horses, leaving malodorulous little piles here and there as they move about. People are beginning to emerge from the hotel and stand along the sidewalk on the other side of the street. One of them is a woman in her forties, her hair whipped up in a '50s style coiffure, her outfit attractive but noticeably on the conservative side. She looks oddly familiar.

"Is that Anita Bryant?" asks someone next to me. He points at the woman with the '50s coiffure.

"I don't know," I tell him. We look harder and agree that it might be. But by now the rally is getting underway, and we stop looking to listen.

A representative of the Massachusetts Caucus for Gay Legislation is at the microphone. His group has organized the rally, and he minces no words in his explanation of why.

"Word has reached us," he tells the crowd, by now swollen to several hundred, "that Anita Bryant is watching this rally from the fourth floor of the Copley Plaza Hotel across the street. She claims to have cancelled her concert for tonight because she was afraid of violence by militant gays. Anita, if you're listening, come out! Come out and join us! Learn for yourself that it's not gays who are violent; it's not gays who sexually attack thousands of women and children every year; it's heterosexual males!"

Several of us on the Southern edge of the crowd have been watching the woman with the '50s coiffure across the street. She may not be Anita Bryant, but word has been spreading, and a fair number of gays in the crowd now believe she's Anita Bryant. Yet somehow there's no violence, no attempt to snuff out the life of this hyper-straight pop singer and Florida orange juice pusher turned demagogue. Where are all the crazed perverts who frightened Anita's singing voice right out of her?

One of them appears to be taking the platform right now, to considerable applause: the kick-off speaker of the rally, Robin Tyler. Tyler is obviously a pro. Within minutes she has an audience of at least 500 people entirely in her power. First she hits them with the one-liners: "Anita Bryant is to Christianity what paint-by-number is to art." "Politics in this country is a joke, and Jimmy Carter is the punchline." "The Republicans and Democrats should trade in their elephant and their donkey and adopt the prophylactic as a common symbol. It stands for inflation, covers up a bunch of pricks, and gives a false sense of security while you're being screwed."

Then she turns serious. "There are six million Jews in America, 25 million blacks, and TWENTY-SEVEN MILLION LESBIANS AND HOMOSEXUALS. We are the largest minority group in America, and the politicians better learn that, because their jobs are going to depend on it." She points to the button she wears on the lapel of her jacket, and reads it to the crowd: "We Are Everywhere! "Say it with me!" she exhorts the crowd. "Say it so Anita can hear us! We are everywhere! Say it with me so President Carter can hear us in Washington! We are everywhere! Say it with me so John Briggs can
If everyone weren't already standing, Robin Tyler would receive a standing ovation. She's a sensation. Dave Bergland has an impossible act to follow. That he turns out to be a weak second act is only to be expected. Almost anybody would be. She was that good.

To Bergland's credit, he grasps and takes immediate lead of the crowd's mood. "Can you tell by looking at me whether I'm gay or straight?" he demands. And when the crowd tells him no, he roars at them: "Does it matter?"

"NO!" the crowd roars back, and things are off to a fine start. But Bergland can't sustain it. He gets another satisfying round of applause when he announces that "government action is no solution to the problem—government action is the problem," but as he relaxes more into his usual style of expression (intelligent, low-key, lawyerly) he begins losing them, only intermittently holds their attention. After a few more minutes he retires to polite applause, and we retire to a restaurant.

2 September, Saturday:

About a hundred people are in the Venetian Room at 8:30 for what promises to be the most controversial event of the convention, and by the time breakfast is over and the speaker is at the podium, another 50 or so have straggled in. The speaker is left-wing anarchist Murray Bookchin, author of Post-Scarcity Anarchism, Listen, Marxist!, and other books and essays, editor of Anarcho! magazine, professor at Goddard College. The legitimacy of his appearance at the convention was challenged during the summer by LP National Committee members Bill Evers and Murray Rothbard, who argued that an LP convention should properly serve as a forum only for speakers who share at least certain important views with the LP. Bookchin, they asserted, shares the views of the LP on no issues.

Yet Lee Nason, of the Massachusetts LP, relates the following Murray Bookchin anecdote in her introductory speech: She met Bookchin in 1976 at an ecology fair. He saw her MacBride for President button and commented, "If I were a voting man, I'd vote for MacBride." Later she asked him if he'd like to speak at the convention, and he agreed.

Bookchin is a small man who projects enormous self-assurance from the stage. And he turns out to be the second best public speaker of the entire weekend (Robin Tyler from the rally across the street being the best), winning the only standing ovation given any speaker at the convention itself. These leftists almost always display a keener understanding than libertarians of the emotional, rabble-rousing element in public speaking. It's one of the reasons they tend to win more converts more rapidly.

But putting aside Bookchin's delivery for the moment, it's hard to see how the content of his talk is so fundamentally unlibertarian as Evers and Rothbard have led us to expect it would be. Bookchin defines libertarianism as the belief that every human being should be free to run his or her own life in all its aspects, the belief that there should be an end to "the domination of human by human." He calls the American Revolution "a glorious revolution" in which the people of this country "rose up because they were sovereign individuals who did not have to be summoned, who did not have to be ordered, who had independently developed the capacity to command, not others, but themselves." As Bookchin sees it, a second American Revolution will come only with a new generation of Americans who can command themselves. He sees the Articles of Confederation as more or less livable, and
Thomas Szasz: “the subject matter of psychiatry is neither minds nor mental diseases, but lies.”

Michael Emerling: “the most obvious persuasive techniques are also frequently the most overlooked and the least effectively used.”

the U.S. Constitution as a massive fraud, a “recreation of monarchy in the form of the presidency.” He argues against hierarchically structured organizations in a free society, and stresses the need for “more advanced, sophisticated forms of organization, natural organization, organization which proceeds from individual impulses.” Is all this what it was going to be disastrous for the convention-goers to hear?

I follow Bookchin to the press room, where he and Karl Hess are available for the next hour for interviews. Inside is the first radio reporter I’ve seen at the convention, asking one of the Massachusetts LP people why they hadn’t sent her a release. “I would have been here yesterday,” she says, “If I’d known it was happening. I just found out about it this morning by accident.”

The radio reporter’s name is Gail Fuhrer. She’s with WBUR in Boston, and she writes for In These Times, the “independent socialist weekly” tabloid published in Chicago. She’s a leftist herself, of course, “deeply interested in redistributing the wealth.” But she also finds libertarians interesting. As she puts it, “I like to cover things that don’t usually get covered.”

In the ballroom, meanwhile, about 200 people have gathered for the Association of Libertarian Feminists’ panel on “Women and the Law: Legislation that Discriminates against Women.” LR Associate Editor Joan Kennedy Taylor is first on the program, with a discussion of how protective labor legislation stems from the common law view of women as too weak to assert their rights. Next comes “Danielle,” a former Boston-area prostitute, who knowledgeably and wittily criticizes laws against her particular victimless crime. Finally, engineer Carol Cunningham points up one infrequently noted disadvantage of affirmative action: it can undermine the professional woman’s self esteem by creating the expectation in all who meet her that she knows nothing about her field and was hired only to comply with the law.

And so to lunch. After which, in quick succession, Dr. Thomas Reeves on “Gay Liberation/Human Liberation: A Libertarian View” and Dr. Thomas Szasz on “The Case Against Coercive Psychiatric Intervention.”

Only about 35 people show up for Reeves’s highly articulate and quietly aggressive presentation on why “libertarianism is the only way for gay people who really want to be free.” Reeves is a 37-year-old political science professor who’s a veteran of the civil rights, antidraft and antiwar movements of the ’60s, and a former speech-writer for Mark Hatfield and George McGovern. He’s
also an outspoken defender of what one gay activist has called “free intergenerational sex.”

Who is “molesting” gay teenagers? Reeves asks. The parents who throw their children out without a dime upon learning that they are gay? The state agencies which candidly admit their inability to find homes for gay teenagers but also oppose all efforts those teenagers make to find homes on their own with gay “families”? Or the homosexual adults who take such children in and treat them, not as members of a special underclass called “children”, but instead as “younger free agents”?

Szasz draws about 200 to his presentation on “The Ly­ing Truths of Psychiatry,” a trimmed-down version of a new paper he’s written (for a forthcoming British an­thology of essays by leading social scientists and humanists on the lies which pass for truths in their fields). Szasz’s discussion is largely an elaboration of his remark in Heresies that “the subject matter of psychiatry is neither minds nor mental diseases, but lies—the ‘patient’s’ and the ‘psychiatrist’s.’”

“The pivotal lie of psychiatry,” Szasz says, “is the con­cept of mental illness.” And he lists a few of the most recently discovered mental diseases: “Academic Under­achievement Disorder,” “Tobacco Use Disorder,” and “Pathological Tolerance.”

There’s a long intense question-and-answer period after Szasz’s talk. What about the fact that some people express thanks to those who forcibly intervened in their lives during an earlier period of “mental illness”? one woman wants to know. Does Szasz consider that there is no possibility “mental illness” is caused, even in some cases, by biochemical factors? a man wants to know, or only that no adequate evidence of such a claim has yet been presented? And so it goes, with notables like Robert Nozick and Eric Mack joining the discussion.

Then it’s out for drinks with Szasz, Nozick, Roy Childs, Joan Kennedy Taylor, and Gail Fuhrer the left­wing radio reporter, among others. Lively conversation for an hour or two, then Nozick goes home for dinner, and the rest of us repair to the nearby Budapest Cafe for dinner and further argumen­tative conversation. A most stimulating evening.

3 September, Sunday;

Late to bed, late to rise. Having missed Erick Mack on Auberon Herbert, and Bill MacReynolds and Stephen Markman on “Libertarians in Government,” and it being still a bit too early for Gary Greenberg on victimless crimes, I decide to catch the last few minutes of Doc Dean’s performance as “Aym Grand at Ford Hall Forum.” Hilarious! Complete with wig, accent, cape, mannerisms, and cigarette holder.

Greenberg draws an audience of about 65 for his talk on “How to Avoid Being Busted for Victimless Crimes”—useful information on just what the cops can search and what they can’t search, the extent to which your cooperation with an officer is legally required, and generally how the criminal justice system really works (no one in the audience seems surprised to learn that it isn’t just the way the high school civics text said it was). Greenberg is hustled off the stage by Massachusetts LP people before he has time to take any questions, to make room for the panel discussion on “Libertarian Ap­proaches to Education,” which is scheduled for the same room, exactly one hour after Greenberg’s talk began. Who scheduled this convention anyway?

On the education panel are conservative education critic Sam Blumenfeld, author of How to Start Your Own Private School and The New Illiterates; Jan McDaniel, a trustee and former teacher for the Sudbury Valley School of Framingham, Massachusetts; Hal Sadofsky, a 17­year-old student at Sudbury Valley; and surprise guest John Holt, who walked over to the convention from his nearby office to hear his old friend Karl Hess and ac­cepted a sudden invitation to sit in on the education panel.

Holt, of course, favors abandoning schools altogether, both public and private. With Ivan Illich and the late Paul Goodman, he advocates that children learn whatever they desire to learn and that they be given free access to materials and knowledgeable adults and older children who can assist them in learning what they freely choose to learn. As Holt sees it, “telling a child, in effect, ‘I know what you ought to know, and you’re going to learn it whether you want to or not,’ is an outrageous and in­defensible activity, whether undertaken by the state or anybody else, whether undertaken in school or someplace else.” From the standpoint of the child, Holt says, a private school is just as compulsory as a public one. “I think of myself as a libertarian with a small ‘l,’” he says. “The opposite of liberty is coercion. I’m interested in minimizing the amount of coercion in human affairs.” And if libertarians are interested in achieving that goal, he insists, they must be at least as concerned about what he calls “coercive pedagogical interventions” as they are about what Thomas Szasz calls “coercive psychiatric inter­ventions.”

Sam Blumenfeld agrees. “The state educational system,” he says, “is the monster responsible for statism. And you can’t get rid of statism as long as you have the state educational system.” But Blumenfeld is concerned with the decline of reading skills among American children, and he’s worried that if there were no schools at all, not even private ones, kids wouldn’t learn to read.

“If reading were illegal before the age of ten in this country,” Holt retorts, “there would be fewer reading problems and more and better readers.”

Jan McDaniel is inclined to agree with that position, and he offers Hal Sadofsky as a case in point. Hal has been at Sudbury Valley School for ten years, since he was seven years old. At Sudbury Valley, there are no requirements, no grades, no curriculum, no classes. You study whatever you like whenever you like—or you do nothing at all, if that’s what pleases you. You don’t even have to come to school if you don’t want to. Your life’s your own. If you come to school, the teachers’ and staff are there to be of assistance to you if you want them. Otherwise, they leave you alone. You can graduate from Sudbury Valley when you can go before the staff and de­fend the thesis that you’re ready to accept full respon­sibility for your life.

Hal is already better educated than most high school graduates I’ve met, and I’ve met a few of them in my brief career as a college journalism instructor. But he’s content for the moment to stay in school. As he puts it, “the reason I’m still in school is that I’m still learning things there.” And one of the things he’s learning is how town meeting democracy works in practice. That’s how the Sudbury Valley School is governed, you see—by a town
meeting in which each regular member of the school community (teachers, staff and students) has an equal vote. Participation is voluntary, and in fact most members of the school community participate in making only those decisions which directly affect them and thus interest them.

The education panel is hustled off the stage to make room for Roy Childs’s talk on the “U.S.–Soviet Arms Race: A Libertarian Perspective”. Such is the absurdity of the logic which has guided American foreign policy since World War II, Childs says, that in 25 years the United States has been inexorably led, by a commitment to violent anticommunism, to bestow military aid on communist China, with economic aid already under discussion among high level policymakers. Communist China, you see, is now regarded as a bulwark against the Soviet expansionist threat. “In fact,” Childs says, “there has been no evidence of any significant Soviet expansion outside Eastern Europe since World War II. What Soviet involvement there has been in other areas of the world has been in no way comparable to that of the United States. And often, as in Africa at the present time, it is only undertaken in response to American initiatives.”

Not only is the Soviet Union not an expansionist menace, says Childs, it’s not a military menace either. The famous missile gap is a myth manufactured out of statistics. The Soviets do have more missiles than we do, true enough; but our more advanced technology makes it possible for us to use fewer missiles to do more work, with the result that a count of warheads shows the United States ahead of Russia by a factor of about 3 to 1.

After the question and answer period, I catch the last few minutes of the seminar on “Libertarian Socialism,” so called. Martin Blatt, John Hess, and Charles McElwain argue that in a libertarian socialist society, rent and interest would be regarded as “exploitative” even when voluntarily charged and paid, and would probably not be “permitted.” They also contend that atheism is a sine qua non of libertarianism.

Robert Bleiberg, the Sunday night banquet speaker, takes a rather different view. Bleiberg is the editor of Barron’s, the business and financial tabloid published by Dow Jones. He is a remarkably consistent advocate of free enterprise and market capitalism. But there is no evidence in his talk that he has ever given any thought whatever to the requirements, not just of a free market, but of a free society. Does he, for example, regard the ceremony by means of which the heroin user gets his fix with the same genial acceptance he reserves for the ceremony by which the alcohol user gets his? In his remarks on “Can Capitalism Survive?” Bleiberg speaks of biased media presentations which inform the public that giant corporations are poisoning our environment and our food with pesticides and chemicals. He angrily retorts that only capitalism has made it possible to greatly extend the human lifespan within this century. Am I missing the point, or is this a non sequitor? Does this somehow prove that giant corporations are not poisoning our environment and our food with pesticides and chemicals? And are General Motors and General Foods representative of capitalism? Or are they rather representative of state capitalism? This is a distinction which leftist sloppy gloss over at every opportunity. But here is a prominent right-wing free marketeer helping to perpetuate the error.

Bleiberg turns the podium over to LP National Director Chris Hocker, who, with the able assistance of Finance Chairman Ray Cunningham and a phalanx of volunteers, proceeds to raise money for the party. Envelopes have been placed on banquet tables, volunteers circulate among the tables collecting envelopes and checks and pledges, Hocker and Cunningham talk about the growth the party has experienced, the gains it’s now on the verge of making and the immense cost of keeping it all going, much less growing. It’s persuasive, and within an hour, the national LP is richer by a badly needed $10,000-plus.

4 September, Monday:

David Brudnoy’s breakfast address, “The Loneliness of the Long-Distance Liberservative,” is a curious piece. Brudnoy himself is a curious case. He continues to insist, eloquently and with rare polish as a speaker, that the “libertarian wing” (as distinguished from the “traditionalist wing”) of the conservative movement is the true intellectual home base for libertarians. Yet, as he aptly documents in his own talk, those conservative politicians who take office mouthing libertarian slogans, or who even taste primary victories during libertarian-sounding campaigns, inevitably start lending their sanction to one kind of statist oppression or another. Brudnoy calls “libertarian conservative” Jeff Bell, who recently defeated veteran Republican Senator Clifford Case in New Jersey’s primary election, a “fascist.” For Boston radio-talk-show-host Avi Nelson, who’s running for Republican Edward Brooke’s senate seat, Brudnoy has nothing but contempt. “He has no principles. If he gets in office he’ll vote for whatever he thinks his constituents want, whatever will keep him in office.” [Brooke has since defeated Nelson in the Massachusetts primary.] The question is: What exactly does Brudnoy see in conservatism?

Next on the agenda, the tax panel, with Roy Childs; Don Feder of the Massachusetts group, Citizens for Limited Taxation; and Jim Tobin of the Illinois group, National Taxpayers United. Childs’s experience in fighting for tax reduction is mainly as a speaker and editorial writer in the Proposition 13 campaign in California. He’s staunchly opposed to the alternative approach taken by Feder, who wants to limit future taxation to its current percentage of personal income. Childs wants massive tax cuts, and he wants them now. Tobin, who came to libertarianism through the tax revolt and who has brought libertarianism to the attention of the national media by taking a leadership position in the antitax movement in his home state, is right in there with Childs. Even after a 60 percent across the board reduction in property taxes in California, the “vital services” are still there, as is the waste and inefficiency. And the state treasurer says next year’s surplus will be even bigger than last year’s. So we should freeze the level of taxation at its present level? Madness!

Downstairs in the State Room, Michael Emerling is conducting his course in “The Art of Political Persuasion.” What Emerling talks about in this much-publicized seminar is what speech and psychology professors call the process of communication. What he tries to teach libertarians is pretty much what debate coaches and professors of public speaking try to teach their students: how to be aware of all the elements in the process of communication and how to manipulate them to best advantage in trying to persuade others. But Emerling is better than most professors at teaching these things—
more animated in his presentation, more systematic in his use of his audience, as he draws them out, involves them in experiments with each other, wins them over. In a handful of words, Emerling exemplifies his own principles. Much of what he says is (and he is the first to acknowledge it) obvious. As he puts it, "the most obvious things are also frequently the most overlooked and the least effectively used."

Rudolph Laubscher, Williamson Evers and Jeffrey Butler, the participants in the South Africa panel, portray the regime in power in that country in such a way that no libertarian in his right mind could ever after apologize for it again, as some have incomprehensibly done in the past. Butler (who teaches at Wesleyan University) and Laubscher are refugees from that regime. Laubscher paints South Africa as literally a totalitarian state which permits dissent only to the extent strictly necessary to sustain the international public image of a society in which fundamental freedoms are observed.

Evers points out that, far contrary to the South African image among some libertarians as a capitalist country, the facts are that the South African government owns the domestic steel industry, the domestic oil industry, the domestic communications industries, and all utility companies. The facts are that South Africa is a state socialist country, and one which has received and is still receiving U.S. military cooperation, as well as U.S. loans through the International Monetary Fund.

As might be expected, such comments stir up controversy and questions. But the panelists have to be hustled off the stage to make room for World Research, Inc., which is showing its new film "Libra" in the same room. This time (at the end of the convention!) arrangements have been made for the speakers and interested members of the audience to retire to another, smaller room for continued discussion. The other members of the audience are hustled out to show their tickets to reenter to see the film. These people also forced the companion of one of the convention's most prestigious speakers to buy a ticket to hear his speech. One never knows what to expect.

Outside the hotel, Labor Day is clear and beautiful. We have an afternoon's drive ahead of us, through Providence into Rhode Island and across the whole state of Connecticut for dinner with family in Stamford. Then on to New York and, after a few days, a plane back to San Francisco. And already next year's convention beckons: See you in L.A. in '79!
Chris Hocker

Can a self-styled “Party of Principle” win elections? If a certain professional poll is accurate, the answer is “Yes.”

According to a survey taken in Fairbanks, Alaska, Libertarian Party Candidate Dick Randolph, running for a seat in the Alaska State House, is leading a field of sixteen candidates with 55% of the total votes. Respondents were asked to select six—the number to be elected—out of a field of four Libertarians, six Republicans, and six Democrats.

Another Libertarian candidate, Bruce Boyd, finished sixth in the poll, while Libertarians Bruce Wammack and Butch Stein finished tied for seventh and tied for eighth, respectively.

The survey, taken in August, clearly indicates that all four LP candidates have at least a fighting chance of being elected, with Randolph’s lead appearing virtually insurmountable.

The prospect of a genuine LP victory in Alaska is not the only bright spot for party sympathizers this year. At least three other candidates in other states—Idaho, Oregon and Tennessee—have a chance to win their races, all on the local or state legislative level. Of these, two are running as Libertarians; the Tennessee candidate is running as an independent due to restrictive ballot laws.

Both the Tennessee and the Idaho situations reflect the importance of building credible campaigns in the early going, and then taking advantage of name identification and credibility once it’s been established. In Idaho, LP candidate Larry Fullmer ran for a State Senate seat against a veteran Democratic incumbent (there was no Republican), and took a hard-earned 30% of the vote in 1976. This year, Fullmer faces both the incumbent and a conservative Republican. Fullmer’s 1976 votes came primarily from liberal Democrats, the least likely group to defect to either of his opponents this year.

In Tennessee, Dick Bacon ran hard for the position of Constitutional Convention delegate from his legislative district in 1976, finishing second. This year, Bacon is running for a state house seat from the same district, and the voters remember both his name and his ideas.

In terms of time, expense and favorable exposure, the high point of Libertarian Party campaigns in 1978 is the Ed Clark for Governor race in California. Clark has no chance of winning; each of his major party opponents will certainly outspend him at least ten to one, and they are both well-known California politicians.

Yet Clark has managed to carve out a niche for himself in the gubernatorial race, both by getting ballot status (his supporters gathered 183,000 signatures, a record), and by persuading the news media that his is a serious candidacy.

Even his most controversial stands—full pardons for those convicted of victimless crimes, for example—have been covered fairly, if not favorably, in the news media. Headlines such as, “He Files to Strike a Blow for Liberty,” and “A Candidate Who Doesn’t Duck the Tough Ones” pepper the major newspapers.

Clark’s low-key appearance and approach help to take the unpalatable edge off many of the libertarian positions that he advocates.

Clark’s showing on Election Day will depend on several factors, including the closeness of the race between Jerry Brown and Evelle Younger. Originally the polls showed the gap between the two to be narrowing, but more recent polls show Younger to be losing ground rapidly. Ed Clark, on the other hand, is now beginning to show up in the major polls, which show him at 2% of the total vote, 6% of the “Independent” vote, and rising. With the Clark campaign stepping up its activities, Ed
Following are some addresses for campaigns being run this year, for those who want to send contributions:

**Clark for Governor**
1620 Montgomery Street  
San Francisco, Calif. 94111

**Greenberg for Governor**
15 West 38th Street, #201  
New York, N.Y. 10018

**Alaska Libertarian Party**
1122 Cushman  
Fairbanks, Alaska

**Idaho Libertarian Party**
P.O. Box 4106  
Pocatello, Idaho 83201

**Illinois Libertarian Party**
P.O. Box 313  
Chicago, Ill. 60690

Of the other “Big States,” only Ohio and Pennsylvania can claim LP electoral activity, each fielding one Congressional candidate; Bob Lehman in Cleveland and Jeffrey Smith in Philadelphia.

Neither the Texas, Michigan nor Florida LPs achieved ballot status this year. Texas tried, but started far too late; Michigan tried, but was unable to generate sufficient enthusiasm from party members; Florida suffers from the twin problems of a small membership and a difficult ballot requirement.

Much of the LP’s progress since 1976 has been seen in the medium-size-to-smaller states. Dick Fields in Wisconsin and Craig Fisher in Indiana are running professional Congressional campaigns and are attractive candidates. The same can be said for Ben Olson and John Ball in Iowa, who are running for U.S. Senate and Governor, respectively.

In North Carolina, the LP, with considerable help from National Headquarters, won ballot status for both 1978 and 1980, and is fielding six candidates. No other minor party candidates are active in North Carolina this year; this is the case in many states, where the LP is the only new, alternative party available to disaffected voters.

Many other states are running LP candidates as well. One of the most promising is Amelia Lew Fritts, candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives in Hawaii (2nd District). Fritts is charismatic and articulate, and has received excellent press coverage by stating clearly the libertarian position on a host of issues.

Other states where the LP is involved in the 1978 elections include Washington, Nevada, Arizona, Colorado, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Minnesota, Missouri, Louisiana, Alabama, Georgia, Virginia, Maryland, New Jersey, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire. Many of these have large LP slates—43 candidates in Arizona alone—and will have candidates who take significant percentages of the vote.

This total—over thirty states and nearly two hundred candidates—is far greater than any of the other “third” parties; the LP level of activity, in fact, is unusually high for a smaller party in a non-Presidential election year. LP leaders are hoping that the experience of 1978 will provide a solid foundation for 1980 and beyond.

Chris Hocker is national director of the Libertarian Party.
"You mean I'm not the only one who thinks that way?"

A few years ago, many libertarians thought that they were the only people who "thought that way." Now they know that there are thousands of libertarians—the visible edge of a growing movement.

There is no better indicator of that growth than the Libertarian Party. We’re bigger, better organized, and better equipped to face real-world challenges than ever before. In 1978—a non-Presidential election year—over 200 Libertarian Party candidates will reach thousands more "hidden" libertarians in an estimated 35 states.

Sure, we're still pretty small. The Republicans and Democrats haven't folded up and gone home. But no one ever said it would be easy to combine consistent principles with political action.

Principled political action. It keeps growing, and it’s worth supporting. Join us in our growth.

YES! I want to join the Libertarian Party in the membership category I’ve checked below. Enclosed is my check or money order for the indicated amount.

☐ Basic ($10) ☐ Patron ($100)
☐ Sustaining ($20) ☐ Associate ($250)
☐ Benefactor ($1000) ☐ Student ($5)

☐ I would like to make a contribution in the following amount: $ __________

Contributions up to $100 ($200 for joint returns) are tax deductible.

"I hereby certify that I do not believe in or advocate the initiation of force as a means of achieving political or social goals."

Signature ____________________________

A copy of our report is filed with the Federal Election Commission and is available for purchase from the Federal Election Commission, Washington, D.C.

Libertarian Party

Watching the teletypes

LESLEE J. NEWMAN


Jerry Brown Illustrated. Beaux-Arts, 96 pp., $5.95.

IT WAS ONE day in 1970, and I was working in the newsroom at KHJ radio in Los Angeles. A tall, thin, terse young man had positioned himself in front of the AP and UPI teletype machines. When other visitors entered the newsroom, there were greetings, introductions, at least a polite hello. This man just stood motionless, studying the wire copy the machines were typing. After he made his second or third such appearance, I couldn't help but ask, "Who is that man?" The news director told me it was the newly-elected Los Angeles Community College District trustee, Jerry Brown.

Today few people would ask, "Who is that man?" Today Jerry Brown is news. Jerry's on television all the time. Jerry's become the darling of the press. Jerry's picture is on all the magazine covers as the new superstar of American politics. Teletype machines throughout the nation clatter daily about the governor. And according to Robert Pack, the governor is still as interested as ever in all that copy. "Several times each day," he writes, "the wire-service stories are sent to Brown, and once in a while the governor stands over the wire machines, reading the copy as it comes in."

Pack's book is itself a symptom of Jerry Brown's ubiquity in the media these days. And it's only one of four new books on the governor. Of the ones under discussion here, J. D. Lorenz's provides the most entertaining, witty, and candid look at Brown. Lorenz was the governor's director of employment development during the first months of the Brown administration. And his perspective on Brown is colored by his frustration at not getting his jobs program approved while he was EDD chief and at being fired by the governor. Lawyer-journalist Robert Pack bases his book on interviews with admirers, critics, friends and staff of the governor, and with the governor himself. He even interviewed Lorenz. John C. Bollens and G. Robert Williams claim to have conducted almost 200 interviews in compiling their book, but most of these interviews were conducted with other journalists rather than with Brown intimates and associates. As a result, their book reads like a public relations release.

Describing Jerry's accomplishments as California's secretary of state—the post he held before he was elected governor—Bollens and Williams write: "Brown sprang onto the Sacramento scene like a modern Prometheus who had come to bring light to the masses. Through the darkness of political divisiveness and malfeasance, he dared to offer new illumination... By the end of a four-year term as Secretary of State, Brown would be viewed by millions of Californians as the conveyer of a new political faith and the provider of insights in a most perplexing time."

By contrast, Pack shows that Jerry's "illuminating insights" came mostly in the form of a mountain of press releases designed to please each segment of the California electorate, and that only Brown's proposal that corporations list the names and addresses of their top executives with Sacramento had anything to do with the duties of his office. Pack also mentions his interview with John Jervis, a former television reporter, who said that "on occasions when he went to interview Brown in the secretary of state's office, 'It occurred to me that he wasn't doing very much.'"

Is Jerry Brown a do-nothing or is he slowly contemplating each of his actions? Is his technique of throwing unanswered questions back at his staff and at reporters a way of getting "feedback" and exploring possible alternatives, or is it an attempt to focus attention away from himself? Lorenz calls such tactics Jerry's "survival strategy." The years just preceding Brown's election as governor were disastrous times for many a political career, he explains, and Jerry was quick to pick up the evasive technique, realizing that no matter what position he might take, he would offend some special interest groups, some voters. Thus he was safer to concentrate on small stuff, to practice "symbolic politics," to use "buzz words." Lorenz relates one incident which occurred in October 1974 while he was driving Brown to a luncheon:

He wanted to talk about a television ad he had filmed that morning. He was quite excited about it, he said. It was his law and order ad. He was shown sitting with a group of older people, telling how his grandmother had taken a walk in the park every day of her adult life until she had become too afraid of being mugged. Jerry ran through the ad verbatim, and...

Leslee J. Newman has covered public affairs for California radio and TV stations since 1969. She currently writes and produces documentaries for a national radio network of more than 200 stations.
So newsworthy has California’s governor become that the proliferation of Jerry Brown cartoons has finally exceeded the space available in newspapers and magazines. The small San Francisco firm of Beauxarts (P.O. Box 2210, San Francisco, California 94126) has now printed more than 75 of the best unpublished Jerry Brown caricatures in a large-format quality paperback called Jerry Brown Illustrated. It’s available from the publisher at $5.95.

Bollens and Williams, however, take Lorenz to task for his attack on Brown’s “buzz word” technique. They write that Lorenz “apparently does not know that many public and private figures employ these practices.” They also state that Jerry fires questions right back at his questioners because of his “underlying faith that by engaging in such dialogues a greater good will be achieved,” even at the expense of expediency.

Pack, in contrast, quotes one critic, Bob Moretti (a former Brown opponent in the 1974 gubernatorial race), as saying: “He doesn’t do anything. He calls it creative inaction. I call it sitting on your ass. . . . You’re either an activist governor and have some objectives, or you’re a do-nothing, except you dress it up with some words you learned in a philosophy class somewhere.” Pack also quotes Brown himself, who says, “Why make a decision when you don’t have to? So long as you can keep all the alternatives open, why not? That’s always been my philosophy . . . .”

Is Jerry Brown a revolutionary fiscal conservative or is he just cheap? Is his refusal to live in the California governor’s mansion “symbolic politics” or just another instance of his modest lifestyle? Bollens and Williams note that Brown has not increased general taxes in California and that his “hold-the-tax line attitude, accompanied by some drastic budget slashes over the years . . . have given substance to Brown’s advocacy of fiscal conservatism.” They admit, though, that Brown says he is “not a fiscal conservative” and that he is “just cheap.”

Pack substantiates the Brown admission by interviewing boyhood friends of the governor who describe Jerry as having always been frugal, and in fact downright “cheap.” And as for the publicity about Brown’s refusal to live in the governor’s mansion, Pack states that “Brown’s apartment is anything but modest. It contains about 1,500 square feet . . . and is one of Sacramento’s finest residences . . . .” In fact, the building “has been the home of some of Sacramento’s leading citizens.” As for the low rent, Pack writes that “Brown’s well-publicized low rent simply reflects the fact that 1400 N Street is located in
Sacramento and not in San Francisco, Los Angeles, or Manhattan, where his apartment would cost several times what it does."

Nonetheless, the other symbols of frugality are real enough—the flights on commercial airliners paid out of Jerry’s pocket, the rejection of a chauffeured limousine in favor of a Plymouth Satellite, a cut in his chief aides’ salaries, a refusal to pay for executive briefcases, even an attempt to quash the leasing of portable toilets for a Jobs March on Sacramento. According to Lorenz, a meeting of the governor’s cabinet was called to discuss renting six portable toilets for the Jobs March. At the end of the discussion, Brown entered.

He was concerned about the amount of money involved and he also felt we might be setting a dangerous precedent. If we supplied toilets for the jobs marchers, then the farmworkers would want them too when they came to Sacramento, and the abortionists and antiabortionists would demand them as well, and if we didn’t supply toilets to one of these groups they would accuse us of discrimination. So Mario [O’bledo, California Director of Health and Welfare] proposed a compromise. He said that if it was inappropriate for the state to pay, the O’bledo family would be happy to pledge one portable toilet personally. And I said the Lorenz family would do the same. And one or two of the other cabinet members looked like they were about to follow suit. But Jerry cut in: “All right, all right,” he said. He gave in.

Perhaps Jerry Brown allowed the state to pay for the toilets because he feared the image he might create in the media, if the story ever leaked out. After all, as all three of these books show, Brown is intensely sensitive to what is being written and broadcast about him. Pack quotes reporter Nancy Skelton, who describes Brown’s relations with the press as flatly Machiavellian. She says: “Brown is minutely careful with the media. He uses them. Calculates them. Manipulates them when he can. Indeed, the record shows, they have been his most reliable tool in making the enormous jump from junior college board member to viable presidential contender in seven political years. He knows better than anyone else, if it weren’t for television, radio and the press, he wouldn’t be where he is right now.” It seems all the years of watching the teleypes have paid off.

**Hayek’s system of principles**

**GERALD P. O’DRISCOLL**


In his latest volume of collected essays, Friedrich A. Hayek reveals once again not only his erudition, but the breadth and scope of his interests. If anything, the title does not sufficiently indicate the range of human knowledge over which Hayek has contributed. Cultural anthropology and history proper, to take but two examples, are also Hayek’s subject matter.

Consider “Liberalism,” the longest essay in the volume, and the only one not previously published (although it is forthcoming in Italian in the Enciclopedia del Novicento). This essay is a gem, bringing together Hayek’s thinking in economics, politics, philosophy, cultural anthropology, and history. He is here concerned with “that broad stream of political ideals which . . . under the name of liberalism operated as one of the most influential intellectual forces guiding developments in western and central Europe.” Here in summary form appears not only Hayek’s positive development of the liberal program, as he sees it, but also a concise history of liberalism. Libertarians may feel rightly that in the United States at least, objective conditions have fashioned a more radical liberalism than that to which Hayek subscribed (a point to which I return below). But many libertarians lack a firm appreciation of their own history; for them above all, this essay represents a valuable historical interpretation.

Many familiar Hayekian themes appear in “Liberalism”: the errors of constructivist rationalism and the superiority of the British liberal or Whig tradition over Continental, particularly French liberalism. Hayek’s hostility to French liberalism has been criticized by many, including the historian Leonard Liggio. In this essay, Hayek offers a somewhat more balanced presentation of the various traditions of liberalism than he has offered elsewhere. But many will still wish for a more sympathetic treatment of the radical French liberal thinkers of the nineteenth century.

Hayek is especially good on the classical and medieval roots of liberalism. He points to the Roman legal system’s “highly individualist private law” as being a source of the British common law tradition that played such an important role in Whig theory. The Schoolmen and a group of 16th century Spanish Jesuit philosophers receive well-deserved praise for their contributions to developing a liberal policy. This is one of the few places in which Hayek acknowledges the Aristotelian and Thomistic roots of liberal thinking, which of course, evolved in part from the Natural Law tradition as it filtered through Pufendorf, Locke and Hutchison.

Throughout the essay Hayek appears almost self-conscious about striking such a moderate pose. In a number of places he denies that liberals, except for “an extreme wing of the liberal tradition,” object to particular policies, even governmental actions to which even modern “minarchists” and limited government libertarians would object. In some cases, such as government provision of public goods, Hayek appears insufficiently aware of the pioneering work of, among others, Professors Coase and Demsetz, who have shown how markets could (and have) produced public goods. In this instance, I doubt Hayek could be talking historically, since it would be anachronistic to say that 19th century liberal economists worried about public goods as such. And it is today scarcely an “extreme” libertarian position to question the necessity of government’s providing a wide range of public goods. Even many economists of centrist political stripe now take a jaundiced view of public goods arguments.

Indeed, Hayek’s studied moderation itself reveals much about why classical liberalism declined in the 19th century. Entirely too much was conceded to the sphere of state action, money creation and public education being the two most egregious and empirically most important examples. It is to Hayek’s
credit that even where he cedes a role to government, he would withhold monopoly rights. In Denationalisation of Money, Hayek has recently come out for competition even in the case of money. But in "Liberalism," Hayek continues to point with pride to liberal support of a "universal system of education," the legacy of which is with us today. Though Hayek identifies this as a liberal achievement, he is factually in error here. As Professor E.G. West has noted, though liberals tended to support compulsory schooling, many opposed public provision of "free education." The distinction between compulsory schooling and public provision of schooling is an important one, one which was not lost on nineteenth century liberals.

Professor Hayek is also not entirely convincing in explaining liberalism's decline. In Britain, as Hayek sees it, the decline only began at the end of the First World War, and socialism and post war economic problems were the chief culprits. But surely one must turn to the war itself to understand the intellectual and political realities of the postwar period. And an examination of the war and its origins would surely demonstrate the degree to which Britain was already abandoning free trade and liberal principles in favor of imperialism and nationalism. Socialism no more "happened" to Britain than inflation "rears its ugly head" without prior causes. Moreover, a careful historical consideration could link the liberals' abandonment of anti-interventionist principles (principles alluded to only once in Hayek's essay) with their retreat on liberal domestic policy.

None of my criticisms of "Liberalism," important though they may be, is intended to subtract from the significance of the essay. As I indicated at the beginning of this review, this essay is an important one for libertarians to read. Reading it not only gives one great insight into many of Hayek's characteristic ideas, but also impresses the reader with Hayek's stature. Nonetheless, tour-de-force though it is, the essay is excessively moderate in tone, particularly in light of contemporary developments that call for a more rather than less radical liberal policy. I would especially have wished greater emphasis on the policy of "Peace, Retrenchment and Reform" which characterized 19th century British liberalism. A reading of "Liberalism," or any of his other essays on the subject, makes it clear that even at his most cautious, Hayek is no conservative. Yet he is constantly associated with both American and British conservatism. This association occurs despite his disclaimers, the most famous being the essay, "Why I am not a Conservative." One source of such confusion has been Hayek's emphasis on the importance of traditions and custom. But this emphasis is part of his critique of a rationalism that values only designed orders and institutions. Such an attitude overlooks both the importance of undesigned order (of which the price system, money, and, indeed, the whole market are instances), and the knowledge that comes only through experience and trial-and-error procedures. Hayek has long emphasized this nonrational element in law, harking back to the Roman private and English common law traditions, in which law is discovered not made: good law is old law; new law is impossible. Though for his own reasons he chooses not to emphasize it, Hayek's approach can be broadly interpreted as being in the Natural Law tradition. In this vein, he cites Cicero (quoting Cato) on the superiority of Roman law, which "was based upon the genius, not of one man, but of many: it was founded, not in one generation, but in a long period of several centuries and many ages of men. For, said he, there never has lived a man possessed of so great a genius that nothing could escape him, nor could the combined powers of all men living at one time possibly make all the provisions for the future without the aid of actual experience and the test of time." This argument is essentially the same as the argument for decentralized rather than centralized planning in economics.

So, too, Hayek has been labelled "conservative" for emphasizing that liberty is not the absence of restraints but is rule-governed behavior. The thought that, in Bentham's words, "every law is an evil for every law is an infringement of liberty" permeates modern political thinking. Yet when laws are viewed as natural or evolved rules enabling social integration and compatibility of plans, then one cannot possibly juxtapose law and liberty. Liberty is relevant only in a social context, and society is impossible without rules, i.e., without lawful behavior. Like Hayek, I will quote historian R.W. Southern on law and liberty in the Middle
Ages: "The hatred of that which was governed, not by rule, but by will, went very deep in the Middle Ages, and at no time was this hatred as powerful and practical a force as in the latter half of the period. . . . Law was not the enemy of freedom: on the contrary, the outline of liberty was traced by the bewildering variety of law which was evolved during the period. . . . High and low alike sought liberty by insisting on enlisting the number of rules under which they lived."

Hayek's statements on tradition, reason and the importance of rules can easily be juxtaposed with conservative statements, whose similarities to Hayek's are then seen as merely verbal and superficial. Conservatives who praise institutions do so to impede change. Hayek emphasizes the role institutions play in evolutionary change. Conservatives attack "reason" because their beliefs are profoundly irrational. Hayek points to a nonrational element in human affairs. Most important, Hayek is concerned with "law" as a system of rules, while for conservatives "law" is really a system of arbitrary regulations, and thus the product of "will," not of law proper.

Hayek is no conservative. He is the preeminent liberal of his day. I would not have even brought up this old canard of Hayek-as-conservative were it not for a disturbing element present in his more recent writings, an element that might seemingly support this old stupidity. Hayek has developed an association with a segment of the British Conservative Party. Though I am personally suspicious, my British friends insist that, paradoxically, it is in the British Conservative Party that Whig principles are being kept alive. In any case, Hayek's association has been seen as having a positive influence on that party. I am afraid, however, that the only visible effect of this association has been that Hayek has recently backed away from a consistent application of liberal principles (as he develops them) in the case of free immigration. In The Mirage of Social Justice, he argues that "attempts to push a principle further than general sentiment is yet ready to support it is apt to produce a reaction which may make impossible for a considerable period even what more modest attempts might have achieved." He therefore renounces free immigration "within any period with which we can now be concerned."

The problem with Hayek's pragmatic position is that it proves too much. It could be used against any facet of a liberal social program and especially against the free market itself. Every intervention creates a group whose well-being depends on the continued existence of the intervention. And many such interventions, such as inflation and price controls, have more general and pervasive effects than immigration laws. Surely liberals must not foresee the fight against inflation and economic controls for fear (a real fear) that the population might be radicalized and turn against the whole liberal program. In Rules and Order, Hayek himself provides the best refutation of his own position:

That freedom can be preserved only if it is treated as a supreme principle which must not be sacrificed for particular advantages was fully understood by the leading liberal thinkers of the nineteenth century, one of whom [Benjamin Constant] even described liberalism as "the system of principles". Such is the chief burden of their warnings concerning "what is seen and what is not seen in political economy" [Frederic Bastiat] and about the "pragmatism that contrary to the intentions of its representatives inexorably leads to socialism" [Carl Menger].

In this review, I have focused on one essay because that essay is at once characteristically Hayekian and also of superlative excellence. But a number of other classic pieces are reprinted in New Essays. Among these are his Nobel lecture, "The Pretence of Knowledge," (reprinted in the philosophy section); "Competition as a Discovery Procedure," an important paper previously available only in German, which restates, clarifies and extends the Hayekian view of competition first developed in "The Meaning of Competition"; "The New Confusion About Planning," a broadside levelled against the confused arguments for national planning, an idea we can expect to be resuscitated by 1980; and "The Place of Menger's Grundsatze in the History of Economic Thought," an important assessment of Carl Menger's distinctive contribution to economics.

A number of the other essays repeat particular themes, but each develops its argument in novel fashion. It is with pleasure that one can pronounce confidently that Hayek's contributions can no longer be ignored. Though libertarians may at times wish that Professor Hayek was even more dogged in pursuing the radical implications of his ideas, they can only be grateful for his having so often paved the way for others to do so in his stead.

Gerald P. O'Driscoll, Jr. is professor of economics at New York University.
ideologists and bureaucrats have succeeded again and again in maintaining their monopoly over governmental funds for education. We are even now witnessing the virtual hysteria of the public school establishment at the thought that Congress might at last do justice to the parents of nonpublic-school children by passing a tuition tax credit bill. The exercise by such parents of their right to choose the type of schooling they wish for their children is portrayed as a vicious rape of the public treasury, the death knell of the public school system, and a violation of the principle of separation of church and state.

Yet, one may wonder why Congress and many state legislatures are now so willing to foster parental choice in education, in effect to encourage private and religious schooling. Obviously, practical political pressures arising from well-organized constituencies are significant factors. Almost 10 percent of all American students attend private elementary and secondary schools; nearly 75 percent of these are enrolled in Catholic schools; and Catholics constitute about 25 percent of the American population. In many areas, Catholics constitute a formidable political bloc which politicians must treat with some consideration. In addition, under the pressures both of black domination in many inner cities and of forced busing to achieve integration, the great urban school systems have seen a collapse of their previous educational standards, resulting in the withdrawal of middle class patronage. The upper-class urban population had always patronized private schools; now the middle classes, white and black, have begun to follow suit. All of this has built new and very effective pressure for tuition tax relief.

Another significant factor has been the continuing loss of confidence in the ability of public education to achieve even minimal results in producing graduates who can read, write, speak, or understand the English language. There is also the moral revulsion of the taxpayers who associate public schools with vandalism, criminality, and moralism. But most important is the demoralization so evident among the teachers themselves, who feel themselves victims of a system that resists all efforts of reform. The moral bankruptcy is underscored by the continuous cry for more money for salaries, "special" education, and new research or experimentation, money which seems to produce no real improvements in the quality of instruction, administration, or student achievement.

One major cause of the demoralization so widespread among the teaching profession itself is not yet well-known among the general public. For the last decade, a radical revision of the traditional historical understanding of the public school movement has been under way. A new generation of historians of education has restudied the history of public schooling, its aims, ideals, and achievements. In doing so it has utterly smashed the idols erected by the filio-pietist historians of previous generations, who created and perpetuated the myth of the public school as the very bastion of progressive enlightenment, the epitome of our democratic ideology in action. As historian Marvin Lazarson has noted, the radical revisionists, unlike their liberal colleagues, believe that failure is built into the system as part of its raison d'être. The system we have is not a noble social experiment gone astray. It was planned to be the way it is, and succeeded in achieving the aims of its proponents more than we realize.

In her latest book, The Revisionists Revised, Diane Ravitch, an adjunct professor at Teachers College, Columbia University, and author of the well-received, liberal traditionalist study of New York City's public school system, The Great School Wars (Basic Books, 1974), has stepped forward to challenge the radical revisionists who have come increasingly to dominate the historiography of American education. The radicals had, in Ravitch's words, "directly challenged the usefulness of schooling and questioned not whether Americans had placed too much faith in education, but why they had placed any faith in education." While noting this gross exaggeration, characteristic of her work, let us focus on another incredible claim. In her preface, Ravitch asserts that "radical historians have encountered little opposition," that "even books which flagrantly violated the rules of evidence and logic went unchallenged," that scholars who "disagreed profoundly chose to look the other way rather than engage in controversy with the radical historians." Why, one may ask? One historian, nameless, claimed he had been "afraid." Another, equally brave and anonymous, had been silent "for fear of being shouted down." In short, the revisionist thugs were able to intimidate their liberal colleagues in the late sixties and seventies by means which remain unstated. With the rest of the profession still hiding in their tents or fled from the field of battle, Professor Ravitch has stepped forward like Pallas Athena to defend what she calls "the Democratic-Liberal Tradition Under Attack."

Ravitch identifies three distinct schools of historians of education. The first, the filio-pietist or Cubberleyan school, was dominant from the late 1890s through the early 1960s. Bernard Bailyn has aptly described its work as "the patrician literature of a powerful academic ecclesias." Taking its assumptions and themes from the canonical writings of Ellwood P. Cubberley, founder of the department of education at Stanford University, this orthodox tradition focused almost exclusively on the institutional history of public schools, and the hagiography of its apostles, evangelists, prelates, prophets, priests, and occasionally its priestesses. It was boldly secularist and statist in its ideological assumptions, and took for granted that...
the growth of public schools was a series of triumphant victories against the forces of greed, ignorance, sectarianism, and undemocratic elitism (that is, taxpayers, immigrants, Catholics and other religious folk, and parents claiming prior right to direct the education of their children). The viewpoints of opponents of public schooling were generally ignored by the filiopietists, though Cubberley was somewhat more willing than his followers to acknowledge the fierceness of the struggle. As a contemporary Stanford historian David Tyack has recently pointed out, “we lack to this day any comprehensive account of the long history of dissent against the public school establishment” (The One Best System, Harvard Paperback, 1975).

The first product of the eventual breakaway from the Cubberleyan school was Bernard Bailyn’s trailblazing Education in the Forming of American Society (University of North Carolina Press, 1960). Bailyn departed from the narrowly institutional focus of the older histories to examine the incredibly diverse means by which colonial Americans educated themselves, noting particularly, the small role played by schools in this process.

Five years later, Lawrence Cremin, then professor of history at Columbia Teachers College (and now its president), put the lid on the coffin of orthodox tradition in his The Wonderful World of Ellwood P. Cubberley (Teachers College, 1965). Following up Bailyn’s insight, Cremin found the Cubberleyans too narrow, too institutional, anachronistic, and painfully moralistic. He, too, saw education as a cultural process wider than the schoolhouse experience and its professional clergy.

The last of the great Cubberleyans, R. Freeman Butts (also a Teachers College professor), labeled Bailyn and Cremin as “culturalists” who failed to appreciate the true significance of the public school, its ideological function as creator of a homogeneous, national political community. Writing in the Nation (April 30, 1973), Butts put his position with the forthrightness of a true Cubberleyan:

To achieve a sense of community is the essential purpose of public education. This work cannot be left to the vagaries of individual parents, or small groups of like-minded parents, or particular interest groups, or religious sects or cultural specialties... I believe the chief end of American public education is the promotion of a new civism appropriate to the principles of a just society in the United States and a just world community. We require the renewal of a civic commitment that seeks to reverse and overcome the trend toward segmented and dismissive “alternatives” serving narrow or parochial or racist interests.

While Bailyn and Cremin instigated a new phase in the historiography of American education, they did not seriously challenge the underlying assumptions of the American public school ideology itself. This was to be the work of a third “school” of historians, dubbed the radical revisionists. Diane Ravitch believes this new school was launched by historian Michael Katz in his two major works, The Irony of Early School Reform (Harvard University Press, 1968) and Class, Bureaucracy and Schools: The Illusion of Education Reform in the United States (Praeger, 1971).

Katz revealed the strong class bias in the public school movement in prebellum Massachusetts, and the alternatives to bureaucratic centralized schools which existed and were rejected by the public school proponents. The story was continued into the late 19th and early 20th centuries by libertarian historian Joel Spring in his brilliant Education and the Rise of the Corporate State (Beacon Press, 1972), and by Colin Greer’s slashing attack on the official mythology, The Great School Legend (Basic Books, 1972). Other devastating attacks came from Clarence Karier, who edited a collection of essays, including some of his own, called Roots of Crisis (Rand McNally, 1973), and a collection of primary sources, entitled The shaping of the American Educational State: 1900 to the Present (The Free Press, 1975), in which his antagonists were allowed to speak in their own behalf. Sidney Hook was so shaken by this prospect that he withdrew permission for Karier to reprint some of his earlier published opinions on academic freedom. Ravitch is particularly critical of Karier for portraying many of America’s leading educators as racists who created a school system to promote the “vested interests of the favored classes”—even though his portrayal consisted entirely in excerpts from their own works. But Ravitch is not alone in holding her view of the matter. Karier’s articles on the Archangel John Dewey resulted in the author’s being denied further access to the Dewey papers in a public university library in Illinois.

In the eyes of the pious, the radical revisionists are the sons of Satan. They boldly assert that the public schools were designed as instruments of class rule, and as a means of stamping out cultural diversity and creating a homogeneous, Anglo-Saxon, New Englandized, American society. Upward social mobility was to be controlled through selective sorting and meritocratic credentialism; state schools were to be a moral substitute for the forbidden state church. School reformers were as interested in social control of the masses as in benevolent enlightenment. Rather than being educational and humanistic, state schools were oppressive and coercive in character. The radicals also recognized that the state-directed school system was not the product of the radical, laissez faire, negative liberals, but the enthusiastic handiwork of the positive liberals, politically identified with the Whig party, the Know Nothings, and the Republicans throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries. Public schooling was not a nonpartisan idea; it was an outgrowth of the larger philosophy of the positive...
Now Available:

The Principles of Ethics
By Herbert Spencer
A thorough and systematic exposition of individualist ethics. Spencer himself considered this to be his finest work. In two volumes, with an introduction by Tibor R. Machan. Hardcover $9.00 per volume, $18.00 the set. Softcover $3.00 per volume, $6.00 the set.

The Right and Wrong of Compulsion by the State, and Other Essays
By Auberon Herbert
British political theorist Auberon Herbert (1838-1906) is without equal as a defender of liberty. His writings are eloquent, forceful—and uncompromising. This volume brings together his major and representative writings, including the title essay, "A Plea for Voluntarism," "The Ethics of Dynamite," and "Salvation by Force." Edited and with an introduction by Eric Mack. Hardcover $9.00, Softcover $3.50.

We pay postage on prepaid orders.
To order these books, or for a copy of our catalog, write:
LibertyPress/LibertyClassics
7440 North Shadeland, Dept. F14
Indianapolis, Indiana 46250

liberal state—the ideology of corporate state capitalism.

What kind of a case does Ravitch make against the radicals? Her specific charges against individual revisionists are too detailed to relate in this review; but they fall into the general categories of distortion of sources, omission of mitigating circumstances, inconsistency, lack of clarity, and unconvincing evidence. Her predictions that many of the judgments of the revisionists will be modified and a more balanced picture ultimately emerge is one that most of the revisionists themselves recognize. Revisionism has just begun the herculean task of cleaning out the Augean stables of the traditional history of American education.

But most libertarians are familiar with the writings of Joel Spring, forthrightly identified as an anarchist by Ravitch. So let us see what she has to say of his work. She quite adequately summarizes and understands Spring's anarchist perspective that "any activity that is planned for the good of society compromises the liberty of the individual." But while she acknowledges that Spring has tried to "create an anarchist tradition in education" in his Primer of Libertarian Education, she makes the incredible statement that "it remains questionable whether there is a usable anarchist past"!

Thus she disposes of the theoretical and practical pedagogical achievements of Tolstoy, Max Stirner, Herbert Spencer, Francisco Ferrer, Rudolph Steiner, A.S. Neill, Paul Goodman, and countless others—even Maria Montessori herself—whose focus in education was exclusively on the development of the individual, not on the shaping of a cog for the machine of the state. Spring is accused
of bolstering his “anarchist tradition” by blending the ideas of nonanarchists (such as the “progressives”) with those of anarchists. But such a blending corresponds with the reality of the late 19th and early 20th century, when many people were quite eclectic in their ideological and pedagogical views. Many who were not anarchists politically were attracted to the teaching methods pioneered by anarchists like Tolstoy and Ferrer. Neill apparently never read an anarchist book, but his whole life work reflected anarchist educational principles.

Ravitch attacks Spring for one statement he made: “Whether in Nazi Germany or in the United States, clearly the school by its very nature had become an institution for political control.” She believes that the notion that the school was “consciously designed to change and shape people,” and was therefore a “weapon” in the service of whatever state controlled it, is a “superficial analysis.” After all, in America we always have had “discordant, independent channels of education and information.” True, but the public school establishment has not been notable in encouraging such “discordant, independent” channels. The monopolization of schooling was, and is, a central policy of almost every public school ideologue in the nation. Let her read the ravings of Albert Shanker on the tuition tax credit bill if she doubts the thrust of his intentions. Remarkably, Ravitch praises Spring’s most recent book, *The Sorting Machine* (McKay, 1976) as less polemical and more grounded in a realistic appraisal of American politics. Spring’s tale of the nationalization of the American educational system since 1945 is indeed dispassionate. He tells the facts, which speak for themselves. Ravitch herself must be totally blind to the implications of those facts if she takes any comfort in the “new Spring.” *The Sorting Machine* is a devastating expose of the construc-

that public schoolmen held a common set of Anglo-Saxon values, professed a common core of pan-Protestant Christianity, were ethnocentric, tended to glorify the sturdy virtues of a rural past, and took the superiority of their own values as self evident.

“The public school system has always been inherently racist, culturally imperialistic, pathologically bureaucratic, class biased, and morally bankrupt.”

Ravitch’s final chapter, “The Limits of the Ideological Approach,” is a hypocritical attack on the radical revisionists’ “politicized” approach to historical studies. She accuses them of a “presentist and politicized” treatment of their sources. This comes with ill grace from an author who claims that the whole purpose of her own work is to defend the “Liberal-Democratic Tradition” of historiography from radical revisionist attack. Is her work less presentist or politicized than that of her opponents? The radicals generally recognize this as the phony issue that it is. Clarence Karier openly asserts that all history is written from a perspective that is invariably shaped out of the historian’s existential present. John Dewey agreed with Karier, saying: “The slightest reflection shows that the conceptual material employed in writing history is that of the period in which history is written.” In other words, Ravitch is mouthing academic pieties that wouldn’t fool anyone who ever read two historians writing on the same subject a decade apart.

What really frightens Ravitch, and the nameless colleagues who tremble in silent support of her criticisms, is that thousands of young students entering the teaching profession in the last decade or so have come to read about, as well as to experience, a public school system that has always been inherently racist, culturally imperialistic, pathologically bureaucratic, class biased, and morally bankrupt. If it has any virtue, it is that it is so incompetent that it cannot do half as much damage as it was intended to do in molding American society. Ravitch understands only too well the potential impact of the writings of the radical revisionists. She concludes by warning that if policy makers heed Katz, they will resist taking initiatives and “imposing” reforms on the people; judges too would be restrained from forcing educational change upon reluctant communities; if they heed Karier, they will abandon any effort to work within the system that is fundamentally “racist and designed to protect class interest”; if they heed Bowles and Gintis, they will see the futility of any educational reform within a capitalist society. If they heed Spring, they will cease being policy makers altogether. These are political messages, intended to have a political effect.

You bet your life, Professor Ravitch.
The Gods come to Seattle

JOANN ROTHBARD

SEATTLE HAS DONE IT again! This July, for the fourth year, the Seattle Opera presented the entire Ring des Nibelungen by Richard Wagner within six days. (The following week, Wagnerphiles. Bayreuth, with its enormous prestige and European location, can attract the best Wagnerian singers, and they are a rare and haughty breed. However, offsetting the great singing (although nothing can entirely offset great singing) are the bizarre Bayreuth productions. Currently, Bayreuth is presenting the 1976 centennial production of the Ring, in which Wotan appears in a top hat, representing an exploiting capitalist. It is not necessary to point out that the character of this sometimes weak, occasionally henpecked, often doubting god does not fit the part; it is enough that Wagner did not intend it.

Wagner began work on the libretto of the Ring in 1848, one year before he was exiled to Switzerland from Dresden for political activity. He began composing the music in 1853 and completed almost two-and-a-half operas (through the second act of Siegfried) by 1857. Then, he put aside the Ring and composed Tristan and Isolde and Die Meistersinger, an operas and previous operas, the form was distinct. In the Ring there were no arias, almost no crowd scenes, only one duet—all staples of 19th century Italian opera. Typical of the vocal music of the Ring were monologues, and dialogues among two to four people. And the dialogue in no way resembled the light dialogues of Mozartian gems like Così fan Tutti and The Marriage of Figaro. The characters in the Ring were wont to explain what was going on, or what had gone on. Most of the singing was done over an augmented orchestra, which required singers with extraordinary vocal equipment.

The idea of annual performances of the Ring in Seattle originated with Glynn Ross, general manager of the Seattle Opera, and Henry Holt, its musical director and conductor. Now in its fourth year, the festival is well established, and plans are under way to build a larger opera house, outside of the city, which would include some of the features that Wagner put into the Festspielhaus in Bayreuth—principally a large orchestra pit under the stage.

In this year’s production, the regular opera orchestra was augmented by four Wagner tubas and several percussion instruments, but it was still short by about 20 string players, because of the lack of space in the pit. As it was, the players were almost sitting in each others’ laps. The 20 string players were missed, but more important to the effect of the orchestra was Holt’s conducting. It lacked excitement, and performances of the Ring should be exciting. However, during Wotan’s monologue in the second act of Die Walküre, which is often taken too slowly, Holt kept a pace that did not drag. And despite the sometimes lackluster conducting, the orchestra performed with a beautifully integrated sound, aided by the impeccable horn playing of David Forbes.

Seattle was luckier in its female singers than in its male singers, and (in general) in its character parts than in its stars. Chief among the stars was the wonderful Ute Vinzling, who sang Brunnhilde. She has a glorious voice, very large and tireless. Although she does not have the sweetness of Flagstad or the depth of Nilsson, she is in that tradition of Wagnerian sopranos who soar over
the orchestra and leave the audience with chills up their spines. Unfortunately, she did not have a Siegfried to match her. In the magnificent love duet in the first act of Gotterdammerung, one heard Brunhilde and saw Siegfried with his mouth open. Herbert Becker as Siegfried was a tenor with a small voice that had a strangled quality to it. In 1970, Becker switched from Italian roles to Heldentenor roles, which seems to have been a mistake. Similarly, Rudolf Holtenau as Wotan did not have the volume necessary for his role. His is not an attractive bass voice, and by the end of Siegfried it was noticeably tired.

Marvellee Cariaga, who sang Fricka, is a West Coast mezzo who will sing in Europe for the first time in 1979. She has a full, rich voice throughout the whole register. She also sang Waltraute in Gotterdammerung, and the Second Norn. Especially in the latter part, singing with the other two Norns, the excellence of her voice emphasized the uneven quality of singers in Seattle. Joanna Meier (Sieglinde) is a soprano who has been a mainstay at the New York City Opera, where she is especially known for the roles of Eva and Senta. Hers is an attractive if not beautiful voice, not entirely secure in the upper register.

In bass Noel Mangin the Seattle Opera had a triple threat who injected pathos into the part of Fafner, bad temper into the part of Hunding, and false solicitude into the part of Hagen. Archie Drake was also a convincing Gunther. Carol Webber’s brilliant clear soprano voice was absolutely secure in the small but difficult part of the Forest Bird.

The Seattle Opera has two treasures in the Nibelungs of Paul Crook as Mime and Malcolm Rivers as Alberich. Rivers’ baritone was full of menace, as a dwarf who has given up love for gold and intends to keep the gold. Crook, in very ugly makeup, had a fine tenor voice that was expressive and had a splendid cracked quality when he was being pinched by his invisible brother, or tormented by Siegfried. Both Crook and Rivers are wonderful actors, and with more action than most Ring characters in their parts, they capered around the stage and made the most of their parts.

The sets in Seattle are traditional to the point of stodginess. Bits of scenery are pushed around the stage, and can be detected in scene after scene. Although more imagination would be welcome, one must be grateful in comparison to the grotesqueries of Bayreuth or the almost empty, nearly pitch-black stage of the Metropolitan. As is usual in current Ring productions, many animals that Wagner called for did not appear. The Valkyries did not ride horses; Fricka walked onto the stage when she should have been pulled in a cart by two rams. Nevertheless, we got a glimpse of a bear (or a man in a bear suit) when Siegfried came to torment Mime, and there was a truly terrifying dragon in Fafner’s cave—with blazing red eyes and a lumbering gait. Noel Mangin’s deep voice was amplified to make it more fearsome, in true dragon fashion.

The Opera House is in the Seattle Center, site of the 1962 World’s Fair. Also in the Seattle Center are the Art Museum (which housed the King Tut exhibit this summer), the Space Needle, an amusement area, and many restaurants. At the time of the Ring performances, there were previews of the operas given before each performance. Lectures are scheduled, Wagner movies are shown, and backstage tours take place. There are enthusiastic audiences for all of these events.

A summer festival such as this, which produces the same music every year, has great opportunities for improvement, summer after summer. Alberto Remedios, who sang Siegfried in the English production this year, got splendid reviews. If he could be persuaded to sing the part in German, and a more convincing Wotan lured to Seattle in 1979, what an improvement that would be! Wagnerites must be patient people, picking up Wagner productions where they can, and falling back on recordings in between. And so, despite the flaws of this production, they must be grateful to Glynn Ross and the Seattle Opera and look forward to next summer.

JoAnn Rothbard is a patient Wagnerite who writes frequently for LR.
"In our opinion, every American family should own at least one bag of $1,000 face value U.S. silver coins, minted before 1965, as protection against the failure of our currency. When the time comes that greenbacks are useful only for starting fires, silver coins (dimes, quarters and half dollars), will buy all your groceries and other necessities of life.

You can purchase full bags ($1,000 face value), half bags ($500 face value), or quarter bags ($250 face value); Peace or Morgan type Silver dollars in rolls of 20 or lots of 100 to 1,000. This may be the best possible time for you to acquire your silver hedge for the future, so order today. Call us now on our Toll-Free Wats line for up-to-date delivered prices."

BUD REED

INQUIRE TODAY ABOUT OUR MONTHLY GOLD & SILVER COIN PROGRAM

We are coin brokers and we have the low premium gold coins. The Krugerrands, Austrian and Hungarian 100-Coronas, Mexican 50, 20, 10 and 2-Peso gold coins, Austrian 20-Coronas, 4-Ducat and 1-Ducat coins, and British Sovereigns. We guarantee quoted prices, safe delivery and authenticity of every coin we sell.

NEW MINI-BOOK! "The Tax Rebellion" by Kelly MacNaughton. 40¢ ea., plus postage.

BUD REED
1604 MICHIGAN NATIONAL TOWER
LANSING, MICHIGAN 48933
1-800-248-5952 New Toll Free number.
Michigan residents please call 1-517-484-3198

To learn more about purchasing gold and silver, write today for our free brochure.
THE
LIBERTARIAN
CLASSIFIEDS

CLASSIFIED ADVERTISEMENTS are accepted at the discretion of the publisher of Libertarian Review. Basic rate: 10 cents per word (minimum $3); six or more insertions: 10 percent discount; 12 or more insertions: 20 percent discount. Payment must accompany order. Address: Classified Ad Department, Libertarian Review, 1620 Montgomery Street, San Francisco CA 94111.

LIBERTARIAN ANNOUNCEMENTS

SUPPORT LIBERTARIAN CAMPAIGNS! Orange County has four candidates: Paul Beaird for Congress, David Bergland for Senate, Jim Gallagher for Assembly, Bernie Perra for State Senate, and Jim Gallagher for Assembly. Contributions of $100 - $50 - $25 - whatever - put to good use. Please send checks payable to above envelopes-details-Stamped addressed envelope.

BUSINESS OPPORTUNITY.

HIGH POTENTIAL EARNINGS, stuffing envelopes—details—Stamped addressed envelope. Fortini's, P.O. Box 604, Glen Ellyn, IL 60137.

EARN LARGE PROFITS stuffing envelopes with exciting new patented invention. Not a hoax or phony gimmick. Free details write: D.L. Tindall, Box 1101, Kelowna, B.C. Canada V1Y 7P8.

GET RICH IN MAIL ORDER WITH CASH IN ADVANCE ORDERS. Professional tells how. Free details. Write to W.W. Con Reps, P.O. Box 18764, San Jose, Ca. 95158.

BOOKS

FEAR & FORCE VS. EDUCATION. A Study of the Effects of Coercion on Learning, by Charles G. Wieder. Written for those teachers, parents, and others concerned with quality education of children and adults. Discusses: fear and force tactics common in schools—their demeaning effects on teachers, and their detrimental effects on learning; schools as potentially humanizing institutions—the kind of atmosphere that must prevail if real education is to occur; the proper range of teacher authority—which teacher-imposed sanctions and restrictions are appropriate, and which suppress students' intellectual and psychological growth; the proper range of student freedoms; and how schools can be restructured for real learning. Soft cover, 72 pp, $4.95. Order from Branden Press/221 Columbus Ave./Boston, Mass 02116/USA.


SURVIVAL/COMBAT Self-Defense/Wilderness Living/Guerrilla Warfare... Books/Manuals...Catalog $1.00...Ken Hale (LR 100), McDonald, Ohio 44437.

PAUL GOODMAN'S political, psychological and literary essays. $11.95 each, hardbound; or $32 for the set of 3. From Bellows Distribution, P.O. Box 782, Rochester, Mn. 55901.

IMPRESS YOUR FOLLOWERS/LEADERS! NEW IDEAS FOR LECTURES AND ARTICLES ON STRATEGY!...Forget it. This material was available at the "Future of Freedom Conference"—before Strategy was

IN...For the serious professional revolutionist, who's tired of playing "follow the leader" or "lead the followers," an integration of objectivist anarchist theory with objective context, yielding a practical path to the free society. Content, format, and conclusions are a unique result of applying objectivist epistemology to communication...WARNING: MAY REQUIRE FOCUSING...

For copyright/guarantee/price send SASE to Phil Osborn, 742 Loma Vista Dr., Long Beach, CA 90813. Open your Is and be.

UNTIL NOW, NO AUTHOR HAS DARED TO CHALLENGE THIS ASPECT OF YOUR SELF-DESTRUCTIVE BELIEFS. Dr. Walter Block demonstrates how you pay a burdensome economic and emotional price by not defending such victims as the pimp, prostitute, drug pusher, slanderer, slumlord, profiteer, loan shark and scab. Now his book, "Defending the Undefendable," has itself become a victim. Although this intellectual adventure has received rave reviews from Hayek, Szasz, Hazlitt, Rothbard, Hspers, Nozick, and Mac Bride, it has been virtually banned by the nation's bookstores as too controversial. So order your hardcover copy directly from the publisher. $9.95. 3 week money-back guarantee. Or send for free brochure. Fleet Press, P.O. Box 2L, Brooklyn, N.Y. 11235.

PERIODICALS

PHILOLOGOS—Private newsletter of libertarian commentary and satirical speculation. Sample $ .50, 12 issues $5.00. OEHILR2, Box 2586, Tallahassee, FL 32304.

THE VINEYARD: Weekly publication of the American Orthodox, a true Christian Libertarian viewpoint. $1.00 for a sample copy. $10.00 for the year. P.O. Box 618, Lake Worth, Florida 33460.

MOVEMENT OF THE LIBERTARIAN LEFT. For most radical activists. In-
LIVE AND LET LIVE is our religious doctrine and the name of our newsletter. Free sample issues available. Write Church of Eternal Life & Liberty, Box 622, Southfield, MI 48037.


BOOK SERVICES

LIBERTARIAN, REVISIONIST, FREETHOUGHT, and Radical books. Over 400 used, scarce, and new titles. Send $1.00 for catalogue (credited to first purchase). UNPOPULAR BOOKS, P.O. Box 85277, Los Angeles, CA 90072.

There is another LIBERTARIAN BOOKSTORE with more titles than the one you order from now. FREE CATALOG from LIBERTY, 184 N. Sunnyvale Ave., Sunnyvale, CA 94086.

LITERARY SERVICES

$20,000 YEARLY POSSIBLE—writing short, simple articles. Free booklet, "Writing For Money," Albin's, 5625 LR Northampton Blvd., Omaha, Nebraska 68104.

OVER-LOOKED MARKET for 300-700 word articles about people-places-things. Sell same article for $25-50 many times. Top writer shows "Tricks-Of-Trade." How easy it is! Free booklet, "Writing For Money." Smith, 1141-L Elm, Placerville, CA 95667.

LEARN TV SCRIPT WRITING. Free details, Astrocal, Dept. 9, 7471 Melrose, Hollywood, CA 90046.


LIBRARY RESEARCH, Writing, Editing. Scholarly work in all subjects. We offer the highest quality at the lowest rates. Research Group, Box 3, North White Plains, NY 10603.

BOOKS PRINTED, Compu­

 enlisted typesetting. Biogra­

phy Press, Route 1-745, Aransas Pass, TX 78336.

PERSONALS

WANTED: Copy of Henry Binowanger's "Metaphysics of Universals". Originally published in REC Review. Call Bill Loggins, 713-772-5501 collect or write to 7900 Bellaire Blvd. #327, Houston, TX 77036.

EDUCATION

EDUCATORS—If you have some practical, real world approaches on how to privatize schools in a receptive community, let us know. Write soon to School Project, 805a West Figueroa, Santa Barbara, CA 93101.

ALTERNATIVE DOCT­

ORAL PROGRAM with minimum residency. Write: Southeastern University, 5163 DeGaulle Drive, New Orleans, LA 70114.

FREE MARKET

PROTECT YOUR AL­

BUMS. White cardboard replacement jackets 35c. Gray plastic lined inner sleeves 15c. Postage $1.25. Record boxes and 78 sleeves available. CABCO LM, Box 8212, Columbus, OH 43201.

ELECTRONIC JEWELRY: Send $1.00 for catalog to Lightning Bug, Dept. LRE, 5640 W. 38th, #11, Indianapolis, IND 46254.

BELT BUCKLES, key rings, necklaces, belts. Over 300 designs available. Send $1.00 for catalog to Lightning Bug, Dept. LRB, 5640 W. 38th, #11, Indianapolis, IND 46254.

MILLIONS WON IN FEDERAL OIL. Drawings supervised by U.S. Government. Free Brochure: Research, Box 27571, Phoenix, AZ 85061.

STAR WARS necklaces: DARTH VADER, R2D2, C3PO. Send $5.00 for each necklace wanted to Lightning Bug, Dept. LRS, 5640 W. 38th, #11, Indianapolis, IND 46254.

THOMAS PAINE WALL PLAQUE. Strikingly decorative and meaningful. Information write exclusive distributor: Independent Publications, Box 162, Patterson, N.J. 07513.

LETTUCE OPIUM—The only legal high on the market today guaranteed to get you high, or return unused portion for refund. $4/gram or 2/$7. Highgold Ltd., 4 Van Wyck Expressway, 27 York­

ist, Fl. 01545.

ANTI-INFLATION bumper strip kit. "Inflation is government fraud" bumper strips, balloons, pseudo­

worst, letter stickers and other good ideas. $2.00 postpaid. Order from COMFORT, P.O. Box 1442, Mission, Kansas 66222.

RELIGION: Any life after death is better than nothing—even this one, for explanation send $1 to HEREBEFORE, Box 2138, Youngstown, OH 44504.

BUMPER STICKER PRINTING DEVICE. Cheap, Simple, Portable. Free Details. Bumper, POB 22791 (AZ), Tampa, FL 33622.

Turning
Adversity Into Business Fortunes

Scarcer and scarcer grows the world's food supply. Greater and greater grows the universal demand. Higher and higher climb the prices. That dim view has triggered the whirlwind of storage food buying that has sped over the nation and around the world! Headlines of unprecedented drought and other severe weather conditions, inflation and labor strikes are signals of a worsening situation. Frontier Food Assn. Wholesale Distributors are building bank accounts marketing Frontier's Long Life processed (low moisture) food. Money and time savers. Nutritious and delicious. A gourmet's delight. How you might qualify for a lucrative business is spelled out in evidential literature. ACT NOW!

Request Free Booklet

Today!

Dept. Frontier

P.O. Box 47088

Dallas, TX 75247

Ph. 214-630-6221

dangerous notion that Earth is a sphere. Flat Earthers Straighten things Out. Years membership, card and FESA Newsletter (twice yearly)—$3.00. FESA, 27 Yorkshire Terrace #9, Shrewsbury, Mass. 01545.

LIBERTARIAN REVIEW
You can profit in real estate.

Announcing a cassette-taped "crash course" for the beginning investor—by best-selling author and self-made millionaire William Nickerson.

The author of the runaway best-seller How I Turned $1000 into Three Million in Real Estate—in My Spare Time outlines the secrets of success in residential income property investment.

Real Estate Investment: A Home Study Course is a complete introduction for the beginning investor. Its 48 lessons consist of four hours of personal, expert guidance—on "easy listening" cassette tapes. Also included with the course is the latest hardcover edition of Bill Nickerson's book.

Bill Nickerson's plan is a method anyone can use to quickly master the fine points of residential income property investment. You'll hear Bill's proven techniques for financing, improving, operating and selling for maximum profits—or better yet, "trading up," to avoid taxes. The presentation is succinct, lively, interesting and easy to understand—even if you've had no background in real estate.

Look at your options—and compare the odds. Nothing beats investing in residential income property for amassing the greatest amount of wealth in the shortest period of time. And the opportunities for the average person today are better than ever before. With Bill Nickerson's methods, your risks are negligible and your chances for success are enormous. In fact, they are 1000 times better than if you start on any other business venture.

You can even begin without cash! Your most important asset is the maximum use of credit. And there are more ways to borrow than you ever dreamed of. Bill will tell you everything you need to know about high-leverage borrowing techniques.

A PREVIEW OF THE COURSE

Here's a summary of what you'll learn by listening to Real Estate Investment: A Home-Study Course:

- How to find the opportunities.
- How to evaluate a prospective purchase.
- How to establish and improve your credit rating.
- How to spot and handle distressed property.
- How to make a three-way trade.
- How to grow rich on borrowed money.
- How to buy your first property.
- How to advertise and rent apartments.
- How to avoid real estate "turkeys."
- How to deal with tenants.
- How to keep your tenants happy.
- How to remodel run-down properties.
- How to collect rents and handle raises.
- How to make your property buy more property.
- When and where to seek professional advice.
- How to negotiate prices.
- How to hire an apartment manager.
- How to deal with contractors.
- Techniques for loans and financing.
- How to double values with landscaping.
- Lessons in time, interest rates.
- How to improve your property for profits.
- Creating new properties with more capital.
- How to increase values with furnishings.
- The resort and motel myths.
- How to find the truth in operating statements.
- How to operate under rent control.
- Contracting versus do-it-yourself.

Introducing
BILL NICKERSON

At the age of 42, William Nickerson left his job with the telephone company to devote his full time to supervising the real estate investments he had studied in his spare time.

He is the author of How I Turned $1000 into Three Million in Real Estate—in My Spare Time, which has sold a phenomenal one million copies and has been called "The Real Estate Bible" by professional realtors. (The book is included in the course.)

An active writer and lecturer, Bill lives in California with his wife and two children.

- Eliminating undesirable tenants.
- And more!

MAKE TAXES WORK FOR YOU

Put taxes on your side for a change. Bill Nickerson guides you through the loopholes that exist for property owners.

No other investment gives you the flexible tax treatment, the ownership and estate options, you get from residential income property. You can deduct improvements, interest, depreciation, property taxes, management fees and more. During the years Bill Nickerson pyramided $1000 into $1,000,000.00, paid virtually no income tax!

Here are some of the tax strategies you'll learn about in the course:

- How to deduct for improvements.
- How inflation and appreciation work for you.
- How to write off everyday needs.
- How to avoid capital gains taxes.
- How to avoid rental property and still collect social security.

FREE BONUS!

Order now and you'll receive a special motivating talk by Bill Nickerson. Packed with useful facts, advice and anecdotes, this talk is similar to ones Bill delivers in weekend seminars costing investors hundreds of dollars to attend. Get this bonus cassette—free—just for ordering now.

UNCONDITIONALLY GUARANTEED

Real Estate Investment: A Home-Study Course is just $90 complete. The course consists of five tapes that are shipped to you in a handsome, sturdy album. Plus Bill Nickerson's book How I Turned $1000 into Three Million in Real Estate—in My Spare Time. The price of the course is fully tax-deductible if you use it for business or investment purposes.

Listen to Real Estate Investment: A Home-Study Course for three weeks. If you're not convinced that it's the best possible introduction to real estate investment (or if you're dissatisfied with it for any reason whatsoever) simply return it and we'll send you a full refund. Every penny of your $90 will be promptly returned—no questions asked.

Begin your real estate investment program right now. Clip and mail the coupon today!

 Rush me William Nickerson's Real Estate Investment: A Home-Study Course, tapes #951-956, including bonus cassette and album, and the latest hardcover edition of Bill's book. I understand that if I'm not completely satisfied, I may return the course materials within three weeks and receive a full refund.

Name
Address
City State Zip

[ ] Enclosed is my check or money order for $90.

[ ] Or, charge my:

[ ] VISA (BankAmericard) [ ] Master Charge

[ ] American Express

FREE BONUS!

[ ] Enclosed is my check or money order for $90.

[ ] Or, charge my:

[ ] VISA (BankAmericard) [ ] Master Charge

[ ] American Express

901 N. WASHINGTON ST. / ALEXANDRIA, VA 22314

SA876a
Join the LR team!


There's one team that won't let you down. Every month the Libertarian Review team provides informed readers around the world with hard-hitting exposes of government malfeasance, with in-depth analyses of current issues and events, and with revealing, no-holds-barred interviews with the men and women who are making the fight for liberty count. There is only one magazine that keeps you up to date on the battle between government power and individual liberty. There is only one magazine up front and actively engaged in that struggle—LR.

LR provides its readers with reports on the libertarian movement in the United States and around the world, a movement of which LR is a vital part, serving as a forum for such leading proponents of freedom as Thomas Szasz, Murray N. Rothbard, John Hospers, Roy A. Childs, Jr., Roger MacBride, Ralph Rasco; Williamson Evers, Leonard Liggio, Walter Grinder, D.T. Armentano, and David Brudnoy to name only a few. LR's readers are exposed to the best in books and the arts through stimulating reviews by leading authorities—reviews which inform and challenge the mind. All this and more—only in LR.

That's why John Hospers calls Libertarian Review "an invaluable asset to the libertarian movement." And that's why Roger MacBride calls us "cover-to-cover reading—a must for everybody who cares." And why Murray N. Rothbard says that "no one interested in liberty can afford to be without this magazine." Find out why for yourself—join the LR team!

LIBERTARIAN Review
1620 Montgomery St.
San Francisco CA 94111

☐ Yes, I want to join the LR team, for
☐ 1 year ($12) ☐ 2 years ($22) ☐ 3 years ($30)
☐ Payment enclosed
☐ Charge my ☐ VISA ☐ Mastercharge account.
Number Expiration date
Interbank No. (Mastercharge)
☐ I'd like to see a sample copy of LR before subscribing.
Name
Address
Signature